What It Took To Move A Frontier Army
Most rarely consider what it takes to move armies. On the western frontier – and en route to the Little Bighorn – it took a LOT.
False Impressions
We frequently form false impressions. Hollywood is often to blame. Simple ignorance plays a role too.
We picture infantry marching with only a rifle on a shoulder, maybe an ammunition pouch, and a haversack holding a mess kit and rations. We think of cavalry with only weapons, saddle bag contents, and maybe a blanket roll behind the saddle.
The Stark Reality
The reality was that frontier armies required literally tons of shelter, rations and supplies. Cavalry needed mounts. Wheeled conveyances (i.e. wagons) were needed for hauling supplies.
That meant hundreds of horses, oxen and/or mules were needed just to draw wagons. Pack mules were required at times. In turn that meant teamsters and packers were needed, along with herders and possibly blacksmiths.
To Feed an Army
Not that the armies ate luxuriously. Dried, or “desiccated” vegetables and fruit were sometimes available at least as far back as America’s Civil War. Dried beans and rice, however, would have often made up the “bulk” of a soldier’s diet. Hard tack, much like overgrown soda crackers, was usually the soldier’s daily bread. It was durable (hence the “hard”), fairly light and packable in crates by wagons or pack mules.
The army recognized soldiers’ need for protein. That usually meant salt pork or salt beef. On the 1870’s frontier, soldiers sometimes supplemented rations with fish caught in the region’s teeming streams. Sometimes they obtained fresh meat by hunting deer, elk, antelope and the still-widespread buffalo. This could not be counted on, however.
With no refrigeration, beef herds were trailed on the hoof. This in turn required more herders, which required hauling more supplies. Livestock, soldiers and civilians all required water as well, which dictated travel routes and camp locations. In short, it took a lot to move a frontier army.
Enlightening Photographs
Custer’s 1874 Black Hills Expedition, a thinly veiled breaking of prior treaties, provides classic photographs to demonstrate these points. The links below will give readers an idea of what went into moving that command. The wagons, draft animals and civilian attendants far outnumber the soldiers.
Horse Power
Another compounding factor was that most military stock was put to daily use. This limited grazing opportunities. Therefore, armies had to haul grain, or “forage,” to supplement the livestock’s feed. With this forage, armies’ travel routes were less dictated by grazing availability. It added to the burden, however. (Indians often scoffed at this, amazed at the inefficiency.)
It is nearly needless to say that the army’s livestock herds were favorite targets for Indian raids. Stealing or even just stampeding the animals served to “hamstring” and hamper operations if not end them.
Campaign Plans
As noted in prior posts, the U.S. Army planned a three-column convergence in 1876. General Sheridan’s desired winter campaign meant attacking tribes when their horse herds were weakened due to difficult grazing. However, the severe weather that kept “hostiles” in winter camps also hampered the soldiers’ movements. That, and other delays, turned the campaign to spring and summer operations.
As noted, General George Crook’s Wyoming Column did set out on its initial effort on March 1, 1876. Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column dutifully marched forth on March 17, picking up additional troops and artillery at Fort Ellis by April 1. General Terry’s Dakota Column, including Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, finally set out on May 17th. (Its delays are detailed in previous posts.)
By the Numbers
To demonstrate what each column required, their logistical details follow. Rather than reinvent the wheel I will quote other writers, starting with Barbara Fifer’s summaries in her book Montana Battlefields.
Regarding General George Crook’s command, Fifer wrote, “. . . the Wyoming Column extended for two miles across the snowy ground as it left Fort Fetterman. Ten companies from the Second and Third Cavalry followed thirty-one civilian scouts, with two companies of the Fourth Infantry behind the horsemen. Five ambulances, eighty supply wagons, and one hundred pack mules followed, and behind them ambled a forty-five-head beef herd that was food on the hoof.”
Crook’s venture northward met with setback and, realistically, defeat. He returned southward to regroup, resupply, and reinforce his command. Then, with nearly 1,000 infantry and cavalry troops under 47 officers, he set forth again in early June. This time, Fifer wrote, “More than one thousand pack mules, 120 six-team wagons – with about two hundred packers and teamsters – and a few ambulances stretched the column four miles long.”
It appears Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column was the better performer of the three. On March 17, 1876 he left Fort Shaw in Montana Territory with five companies of the Seventh Infantry totaling 200 men and 12 officers. Carrying only 10 days’ rations, his column needed just 10 supply wagons. They would pick up additional men and supplies at Fort Ellis before continuing on, including two Gatling guns and a “12-pounder” field gun.
Adding a sixth infantry company, the Montana Column now comprised 220 men and 13 officers. It was joined April 2 by four cavalry companies numbering 185 men plus 10 officers and a surgeon. Its supply train then increased too. Journal entries confirm this column was supplied by contract freighters as well. Also, an enterprising trader came down the Yellowstone River in Mackinaw boats to sell fresh eggs, vegetables and even liquor to the column’s troops.
Edgar Stewart noted Gibbon’s train grew to 24 government wagons and 12 contract wagons. He also notes the 23 Crow Indian scouts, two interpreters and more mixed-blood and white scouts. The battery of two Gatling guns and the cannon, needing horse-drawn ammunition caissons increased the entourage.
When General Terry and Custer’s Dakota Column finally left Fort Abraham Lincoln (on the Missouri River near Bismarck) on May 17 they made notable use of two steamboats. Under contract, the boats transported huge loads of supplies and sometimes men up the Missouri. Then they ascended the Yellowstone River to where supply depots were established. The boats sometimes ferried soldiers across.
William O. Taylor, who survived the Little Bighorn with Major Reno’s troops, later described the column. Besides the 12 cavalry troops and 3 infantry troops he lists a huge contingent of scouts, interpreters and civilian employees. The soldiers alone numbered about 700, plus 28 officers.
Taylor states the wagon train, “. . . which was a large and expensive one. . . consisted of 114 six-mule teams, 37 two-mule teams, and 35 pack mules, giving employment in various capacities to 179 men.” Stewart also describes it. The six-mule wagons, he adds, carried two tons of cargo each. He also notes the cumbersome Gatlings required a detail of two officers and 32 men to manage them.
Fifer quotes Libby Custer’s estimate that, “1,200 men – soldiers, around two hundred teamsters and herders, and more than forty scouts and translators – and 1,700 head of livestock (mules, horses, and beef cattle) made up the column that stretched two miles across the prairie.” This included 150 supply wagons hauling forage, rations, ammunition and other supplies.
The Logic of Logistics
It has been said and often repeated that an army travels on its stomach. Sometimes this meant subsisting on Spartan rations. For an army to succeed over the long haul, though, it requires a lot of logistical support. That was never more true than in 1876 on the wide plains that surround the Little Bighorn.
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