Gibbon Gets There — Too Late

Some maintain that Custer was to have met General Terry along with Colonel Gibbon’s Montana Column on June 26. It might be noted that those making this assertion usually have already placed themselves in the “anti-Custer” faction. They overlook at least two glaring factors.

One oversight is that Gibbon’s infantry could in no way have blockaded, stopped or otherwise intercepted mounted Plains Indians. His cavalry troops would have been badly outnumbered, and their horses were in questionable condition by June 26. His infantry would have been totally ineffective against evaders, mounted or otherwise.

Had Custer waited until June 26^th to attack – and had Gibbon’s column been in place – the dispersing “hostiles” would easily have eluded them. That’s assuming the hostiles would have even been fleeing Custer’s command. It also assumes the two columns could have gotten into position without first being discovered by Sioux or Cheyenne scouts and/or hunters.

The second overlooked factor is that not only were the Sioux and Cheyenne well aware of Terry’s approaching column, that column did not arrive until June 27^th. Actually, Lt. James Bradley and his scouts did begin to encounter hostiles on the 26^th. They even rode within striking distance of a large gathering of “hostiles.”

However, Gibbon’s troops were in no position to support an attack by Custer, even by late evening on June 26^th. By the time Bradley’s scouts approached late in the day, they were still only scouting ahead of the column. It is good that they did.  

The Sioux and Cheyenne were celebrating their overwhelming victory as their families dispersed and moved southward toward the Bighorn Mountains. They were not without a rear guard, however.

While Terry’s tired men and horses moved up the Little Bighorn late on June 26^th, Bradley’s men first encountered a small group of “hostiles” moving into a stand of timber down on the river bottom. The warriors appeared to be attempting the decoy tactic that had led William Fetterman to his demise nearly 10 years earlier.

Bradley had seen other warriors moving into the timber, and he perceived that perhaps hundreds more awaited there. He knew an ambush awaited.

Bradley and Lt. Roe also witnessed what appeared to be blue-clad cavalry riding in formation and joining in column of fours. In fact, Roe rode ahead to hale them.

It was only when warriors responded with a fusillade of carbine fire that Gibbon’s lieutenant realized the riders were hostiles dressed in cavalry uniforms. The clothing could only have been stolen from dead soldiers. Gibbon’s men were far too late for any coordinated effort, even if the attack had occurred on June 26^th.

Any plan for the columns to make a coordinated attack – or for one to support the other – would have been idealistic at best. The words of Lt. Edward Godfrey bear that notion out. His account was published in Century Magazine in January 1892.

In his published narrtive Godfrey wrote, “Had Custer continued his march southward – that is, left the Indian trail – the Indians would have known of our movement on the 25^th . . . the Indians never would have remained in camp and allowed a concentration of the several columns to attack them.” He concluded, “If they had escaped without punishment of battle Custer would undoubtedly have been blamed.” 

Any attack carried out by Custer on June 26^th would have happened at dawn, or at least early in the day. Even arriving late that day, or evening, Gibbon could not have intercepted fleeing villagers. By the time his command approached, the occupants had already left – away from them.

Terry and Gibbon commanded five infantry companies and four cavalry troops. This was a force of only about 400 men, far less than Custer’s 12 companies. They struggled over rough and uneven terrain up the Bighorn River to the mouth of the Little Bighorn. By the time they approached late on June 26^th, they were exhausted.

While Custer may have neglected to go as far south up the Rosebud as Terry had wanted, it cannot be said that he disobeyed orders or disregarded set plans. His intention, as attested by several survivors, was to rest his command all day on June 25^th and attack early on the 26^th. It was only when he realized his troops had been discovered by Indians that he altered that plan.

At least two survivors, including trumpeter/orderly John Martin, later stated that Custer had a bugler sound “officers’ call” once he learned his command had been spotted by “hostiles.” That alone attests that he felt he must hurry. Up to that point, since starting up the Rosebud on June 22, all bugle sounds and loud noises had been prohibited.

Once Custer realized he had lost the element of surprise, he saw no reason to refrain further from using bugle calls. He had to attack before the village scattered. Regardless, even if Custer had delayed his attack until the morning of June 26^th, Gibbon’s column would still have arrived too late.

Bradley described going into camp thoroughly exhausted, without having reached the Little Bighorn, on the night of June 25^th. He wrote that the infantry and regular cavalry had covered 35 miles that day, and his scouts had covered at least 55. He also wrote of the grueling march they had made over very rough terrain.

The command had lent their best Crow scouts to Custer, and instead they relied on some of Cap’n Ball’s squadron that had scouted the area more two months prior (see A Portentous Taunt, April 29). These impromptu guides led the column over a route full of steep climbs and descents followed by more steep climbs as they crossed one ravine after another.

Bradley had been out scouting away from the column. He returned to find the command’s plight and suggested that Terry us the older Crow scout Little Face, who had roamed the area as a boy. Only then, in complete darkness as rain fell, the command took a reasonable route.

Around midnight Terry’s cavalry and scouts finally camped at a good water source. Many had consumed all the water in their canteens, and even that had been alkaline at best. They had not yet even reached the Little Bighorn. The infantry had stopped 12 miles back.

Bradley and his scouts were sent out abruptly at four the next morning. About two miles from the Little Bighorn he finally found tracks left by Indians. At the river he found three of the Crow scouts sent with Custer. Distraught, they bore news of the command’s annihilation.

Bradley rode back to deliver the news personally to General Terry. The infantry finally caught up to the cavalry around noon on June 26^th, and the reunited force marched until 9 p.m. They finally went into camp after spotting hundreds of hostile warriors ahead. One of the advance companies, sent out as flankers, had witnessed the noncombatants moving away, southward, toward the Bighorn mountains.

Trail-worn and tired, Terry and Gibbon’s command did reach the Little Bighorn and approach the village site until late on June 26^th. It had required long, forced marches. Horses and pack mules had gone short on feed, and all had gone short on water.

They were too late. The village was gone, and they were in poor shape for fighting anyway. They could easily have suffered the same fate as Custer.

Numerous accounts given by Sioux and Cheyenne survivors attest that they were well aware of Terry’s approaching column. He could in no way have surprised them, much less pursued them or blocked their escape.

Even if Custer had waited until June 26^th to attack, the Montana column would have been of no help. And had Custer gone 20 miles further south, his attack would have been delayed until June 27^th. Gibbon’s command, rather than Custer’s would likely have suffered annihilation at the Little Bighorn. Or, the Indians would have dispersed.

Simply put, any hope of a coordinated attack on June 26^th was idealistic at best. Gibbon’s command arrived exhausted and far too late. Custer had little choice but to press his attack early. Lieutenant Bradley would find the results on the morning of June 27^th along the hills overlooking the Little Bighorn.