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How (and Why) Things Happened At The Little Bighorn June 25, 1876 - Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond

How (and Why) Things Happened At The Little Bighorn June 25, 1876

Volumes have been written, and they continue to be, about the Little Bighorn battle. Little more is warranted here aside from a brief summary of what occurred. It might even serve to answer how and why.

After a full day’s march on June 24 (roughly 28 miles), Custer allowed his command to rest. They would then mount up for a night march at 11:30 p.m. Troop commanders, however, got very little rest; Custer called them to a meeting at 9:30. His plan was to rest out of sight June 25th and attack at dawn June 26th against the huge gathering of hostiles he had been trailing.

After General Sheridan’s impossible edict that all tribes must report to reservations by January 31st, Sitting Bull had summoned all Sioux and Cheyenne tribes to gather in that area of the Powder, Tongue and Rosebud drainages. Non-treaty bands were more motivated to do so after General Crook’s failed March 17th attack along the Powder River. Many had left reservations to join the huge gathering.

After the night march beginning just before midnight June 24th and halting at 2 a.m. June 25th, Custer’s troops remained concealed in a large ravine. Meanwhile his scouts trudged through the darkness to a promontory known as the Crow’s Nest. It gave them a view across much of the Rosebud drainage but also much of the Little Bighorn. At dawn they spotted the village Custer sought.

After briefing his officers around 8 a.m., Custer ascended to the Crow’s Nest to see what his scouts had found. The events were detailed in previous posts. However, in Custer’s absence more events transpired. They would set in motion a series of dire decisions and results.

During the night a mule had lost a pack containing hardtack rations. Custer had sent a detail to retrieve it. Upon reaching it they found two Indians investigating it or possibly enjoying its contents. The Indians fled, but the regiment’s presence had been revealed.

Another small group of “hostiles” was seen by the scouts near the head of the ravine. All hopes of secrecy seemed lost. Worse, when warned of the soldiers approach, the whole village might scatter. While some scouts had advised Custer not to attack, others told him he must do so right away. Custer changed his plans, choosing the latter.

Riding down Ash Creek toward the village, the command passed a lone tepee at a recent camp site. It held the body of a dead warrior, likely one wounded eight days prior against Crook. Custer soon detached Captain Benteen with three companies, directing him to sweep southward, preventing escape that way. He was to attack any hostiles he found.

When scout Fred Girard spotted a group of hostiles moving away from the command, he and Custer thought they were fleeing. Custer detached Major Reno with three more companies. Reno was to charge in and attack. Custer told him he would be supported by the whole regiment.

Custer moved northward, planning to hit the village from its other end. It appears terrain forced him farther north than intended. Still, he did not reach the camp’s north end. As Custer gained more information, however, he sent messengers to recall Benteen’s troops. Trumpeter John Martin, one of the messengers, related that Custer meant to send Benteen into the camp’s middle while Custer attacked from the north.

For some inexplicable reason, Reno stopped his advance when he saw warriors in his front. Several survivors mentioned dust clouds that obscured vision on that hot, chaotic afternoon. Maybe Reno was confused by them. Regardless, he dismounted his troopers, forming a skirmish line.

Every fourth trooper became a horse holder, holding the reins of four mounts while the quartet’s other three soldiers fought. Reno’s three companies numbered at most 150 men. By dismounting his troops, Reno reduced his already small fighting strength by 25%. Worse, he fell back into a stand of timber, then gave confusing commands. He finally conceded all initiative to the defenders when he led a headlong retreat away from the village he had been directed to charge.

Benteen had found nothing to justify continuing southward with his troops. He turned back toward where he had detached from the command. Soon he was met first by Daniel Kanipe and then by bugler John Martin. Both bore orders for Benteen to join Custer. However, he had no idea where Custer had gone.

En route back toward their parting place, Benteen saw soldiers fighting on the flood plain and more fleeing up nearby bluffs. A scout directed him toward where Reno was regrouping. Benteen had no idea which soldiers he was joining, but he found Reno disconcerted and flustered. Reno directed him to stay and help him reorganize. During this time both Benteen and the soldiers in the bottom heard heavy firing two miles or more downriver.

After leaving Reno, Custer had topped some tall hills and had finally gained a partial view of the village. It appears that either he, or a detachment, rode down to a ford near the village. Accounts, again, are many and varied. Archaeological evidence has indicated the position of troops as they moved over time, but it cannot definitively show that troops reached the river.

Some Indian accounts state that a group of soldiers entered the river. One in particular states their leader was shot midway across and soldiers around him either helped him stay mounted or placed him back on his horse. The soldiers then turned back.

It is uncertain in which order deployments were made then. Both archaeological and Indians’ anecdotal evidence indicate that some troops were deployed tactically. The timing is difficult to pin down precisely.

After Reno’s threat was neutralized as he was driven to the bluffs, warriors learned of the second attack by Custer. They swarmed away from “Reno Hill” and northward to meet this second threat. Some accounts say Hunkpapa chief Gall directed many of them up a ravine below and to the south of the troops. At the same time Crazy Horse is said to have led many warriors across the river and to the north and east of Custer’s troops.

In effect, Custer himself was attacked from all sides by hordes of warriors. Many of them were hidden by the roll of the ridges and the ravines. They were able to stay largely out of sight, making poor targets for Custer’s troopers.

At the same time the warriors were able to arc arrows into massed troops. At some point, various charges and counter-charges were made by both forces.  In the end many warriors apparently circled as they completed the surround.

Multiple accounts say some warriors could not even join the fight for fear of shooting their allies. In the confusion, as least one Sioux or Cheyenne was killed by an ally who thought he was one of Custer’s scouts.

Some say if Reno and/or Benteen had ridden immediately to Custer’s aid the outcome would have differed. However, Benteen lacked the benefit of history’s hindsight. Some efforts were made to proceed in Custer’s direction. By the time Benteen had bailed Reno out, any such attempt would have undoubtedly yielded the same results Custer suffered.

At the time of the battle, it was believed Custer’s five companies could take care of themselves. When a victory by him came into doubt, those besieged with Benteen and Reno were sure he had retreated northward to join Terry and Gibbon’s command. It was expected he would return reinforced and break their siege.

Custer had failed to support Reno as promised. At the same time Reno’s failure to complete a charge gave the offensive to his opponents. Having fought Crook to a standstill eight days earlier, the Sioux and Cheyenne likely had renewed confidence. With their families and way of life under attack, they fought tenaciously and effectively.

Again, prior successes might have made Custer too confident. Surprise dawn attacks had yielded predictable results. Even war parties had fled before concentrated carbine fire. They didn’t on June 25, 1876.

Sadly, for nomads wanting to preserve their free-roaming and unfettered life, that great victory would be short-lived. It marked their high-water mark as far as battles were concerned. They would be harried relentlessly. Worn out and starving, most would soon resign themselves to reservation life.

The Sioux and Cheyennes had won a victory, however, that will forever claim a prominent place in history. They had succeeded where Custer’s troops failed at the Little Bighorn.


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