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Results of Reno's Powder River "Recon" And His Recalcitrant Rosebud Foray - Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond

Results of Reno’s Powder River “Recon” And His Recalcitrant Rosebud Foray

On June 18, 1876 the detachment under Major Marcus Reno descended Rosebud Creek after an eight-day scout. Reaching its mouth at the Yellowstone River, they camped on the river’s south bank, across from Colonel Gibbon’s Montana Column encampment. The commands communicated across the river by signal flag and through letters carried across by intrepid Crow scout swimmers.

General Alfred Terry, leading the Dakota Column, had sent Reno out on June 10. Reno had directions to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to move westward down Mizpah Creek, then ascend Pumpkin Creek to the Tongue River and descend the Tongue to the Yellowstone. He followed only a part of those orders.

Reno was to ensure no hostiles lurked in the Powder and Tongue River drainages. Taking six cavalry companies and the mixed-blood scout Mitch Bouyer, he was provisioned with 10 days’ rations and forage. Perhaps due to Bouyer’s influence, he became sidetracked. Bouyer, with Lt. James Bradley, had observed a large Sioux village on Rosebud Creek several weeks earlier.

Reno barely touched the Tongue drainage, potentially leaving hostiles to attack the column from behind. Worse, he disobeyed Terry’s orders to stay out of the Rosebud drainage. The entire campaign’s effort could have been jeopardized if Reno’s detachment had been detected. The large gathering of hostiles would have dispersed.

It is noted that Custer strongly believed, like others, that no hostiles remained in the drainages east of the Rosebud. However, true to his nature, he wished to lead the mission. Historian Edgar Stuart noted Custer had already led a fruitless scouting foray on the Little Missouri. Some writers speculate that General Terry wanted to spread assignments out in order to avoid showing favoritism.

Regardless, it undoubtedly chafed Custer to see the assignment go to his rival and subordinate. He and Reno had never liked each other. Custer would soon get his chance, though, with all 12 companies of his 7th Cavalry Regiment.

In the open, un-timbered terrain, Reno apparently felt he could see down into enough of Mizpah Creek to warrant bypassing it. He then scouted little of the Tongue, instead taking up a heavy lodgepole trail made by a large number of Indians and their ponies pulling travois, or pony-drags. He followed it well into the Rosebud Creek drainage, then backtracked and followed the Rosebud down to the Yellowstone.

Terry had specifically directed Reno to avoid Rosebud Creek. Upon learning Reno’s flaunting of his orders he fumed. He was concerned that Reno’s relatively small force would merely tip off the large, multi-tribe gathering that his column sought to locate. It is hinted that he would have arrested and Court-martialed Reno had he not been the regiment’s only major.

At least one writer states that Terry suspected Reno had hoped to best Custer, his superior officer, whom he despised. Custer was also indignant at Reno’s half-way attempt to follow the moving hostiles. He too was concerned Reno had spoiled the regiment’s chances for a surprise attack.

In a letter to his wife, however, Custer lamented that Reno had come so close but had failed to attack. He decried the waste of time. Custer also rued what, to him, was a missed opportunity. That mindset toward Reno’s best course of action might explain Custer’s own upcoming decisions (More on that topic to come.)

It should be noted that even General Sheridan, in Chicago, had no real expectation that a mobile bunch of nomads could be trapped and crushed between even two converging columns, much less three. Edgar Stewart, among others, noted that each column was believed capable of attacking and defeating any hostiles alone.

Reno’s junket bore little direct result. He had seen no Indians. However, the fact that he had seen a wide and heavy travois trail brought impending results – or consequences. The fact that he had disobeyed orders and potentially compromised the column’s mission made things even more urgent.

A lot legend and folklore exist regarding Custer’s personality and motives. Perpetuated by Hollywood and the “dime novel” mentality, these conceptions have muddied the waters. However, objective historians can agree that Custer was impetuous, audacious and exuberant if nothing else. Reno’s report could have served only to stoke those fires.

With Custer, General Terry moved the command to their designated meeting place near the  mouth of the Tongue River during Reno’s absence. Messengers brought him news of Reno’s prodigal return down the Rosebud. After a hard march on June 20th the regiment reunited. New plans were made based on Reno’s report.

It was noted by General Terry that Reno’s horses and pack mules were “tired and badly spent.” The existing plan had been for Custer to take nine companies back up the Tongue River on Reno’s return and then scout down the Rosebud drainage. All that changed, however, based on Reno’s report. All twelve companies would ascend the Rosebud.

The condition of mounts and mules in Custer’s last contingent has been the topic of much speculation. It may be that the animals’ fatigued condition played a role in the mission’s outcome.

On June 22 Custer set forth with all 12 companies of the 7th Cavalry. Presumably, he was already worried that Reno’s abandoned travois trail was growing colder. He would have set out with an underlying urgency that must have colored his upcoming decisions. That urgency would be compounded two days later when it Custer realized his command’s presence had been discovered.

Had Reno obeyed his orders, Custer’s actions would likely have not been much different. He would have found the lodgepole trail when he reached the Rosebud, and he would have locked onto it like a bloodhound. Even his letters bear out that he planned to pursue the hostiles, once on their trail, even if his rations ran out and the regiment had to eat their mules.

Regardless, the result of Reno’s scout and report can be said to have reaped one result. They threw fuel on the fires that would lead to destiny on the Little Bighorn.


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