March 17, 1876: 150 Years Ago Today

The March Toward Destiny Begins: General Crook and Colonel Gibbon’s Milestones

March 17, 1876 is little remembered, but three notable developments coincided that day. It would mark, in ways, another beginning of events that would lead to the Little Bighorn.

A recent spring snowstorm here in central Montana nearly mimics the conditions of 150 years ago. Nearly 200 miles of Interstate 15 were shut down March 14^th due to high winds and blizzarding, white-out conditions.  Of interest is that at least 40 to 50 miles of that route follow the Missouri River. They approximates the route of the old Mullan Trail, which was used by troops ultimately en route to the Little Bighorn.

On March 17, 1876, Colonel John Gibbon and five infantry companies from Fort Shaw, Montana Territory, set out along the Mullan Road toward Fort Ellis. There, at the northwest end of the Bozeman Trail, they would gather another infantry company. They would soon be joined by four companies of 2^nd Cavalry, also from Fort Ellis. They were following orders to begin General Phil Sheridan’s desired “winter campaign” against non-treaty Indian tribes, forcing them to reservations.

Known as the “Montana Column,” this force would then continue down the Yellowstone River to coordinate and “cooperate” with military columns from Wyoming and Dakota Territories. They would end up at the Little Bighorn a day after Custer’s ill-advised and ill-fated attack there.

Gibbon’s assignment was to patrol the north bank of the Yellowstone River in order to keep non-treaty Sioux and Cheyenne tribes from moving northward. Columns from Wyoming Territory and Dakota Territory were intended to close in, catching the tribes deemed “hostile” more or less in the jaws of a trap.

Not only did the column set out in blizzard conditions, many of its members suffered frostbite. Just as this year, 150 years later, the skies soon cleared and the sun shone brightly, turning deep snows to a slushy mess. With sunlight glaring off the snow, other members of Gibbon’s force then suffered snow blindness.

According to the journal of Lieutenant James Bradley, one way soldiers tried to combat snow blindness was to rub stove-black under their eyes. Modern athletes continue to use that practice, theoretically to fight glare from sunlight or stadium lights. Oddly, the eye black of today’s athletes seems to be worn more for the sake of drama or a Halloween-like makeup effect. (Why the makeup under only one eye, or over one side of the face?) Regardless, in the absence of sun glasses, the practice seems to have some basis in merit.

On March 17, 1876, Major James Brisbin and his two cavalry companies returned from their rescue mission. As noted in an earlier posts, Brisbin had been asked by occupants of the Fort Pease, a trading post, to bring them relief from marauding Miniconjou Sioux. Many occupants had left the post by the time Brisbin arrived, but he provided protective escort back to Fort Ellis for those who remained at Fort Pease. Although the event has little real bearing on history, they arrived back at Fort Ellis 150 years ago today.

One item of later interest is that while returning from Fort Pease, Brisbin’s troops happened onto George Herendeen. Herrendeen had left Fort Pease and was out trapping on his own. He accompanied Brisbin’s troops only grudgingly, under military orders. Herendeen would soon figure significantly in future events. He would save lives at the Little Bighorn.

The only real battle of the planned winter campaign also occurred on March 17^th, 1876. Sadly, while Gibbon’s troops were making final preparations for their march out of Fort Shaw, General George Crook was unleashing an attack on a winter encampment of Cheyenne Indians. Some visiting Oglala Sioux also shared their camp on the Powder River in Montana Territory.

Part of the U.S. Army’s strategy was to attack tribes in their winter encampments while their food supplies were limited, while snow hampered their movements, and while their horses were weak due to limited winter grazing. While Crook didn’t actually lead his attack, he directed his Colonel John Reynolds to lead the attack. It appears the tribe had no scouts or sentinel out due to the weather. The village was taken by surprise.

After a night march through frigid, snowy conditions, Reynolds’ command neared the village around 4:00 a.m. on March 17^th. He broke his six cavalry companies into four battalions. One was assigned to approach along the river and drive the horse herd away. A second was to position atop bluffs overlooking the village and provide covering fire. A third was to make a mounted attack into the village , while the fourth would follow in support.

Due to prohibitive blizzard conditions, difficult terrain and overtaxed cavalry mounts, the battalions failed to position and attack in a coordinated fashion. The Cheyenne horse herd was driven off and captured, but the battalion assigned to the bluffs failed to reach them in time. The first wave of attackers found that contrary to their expectations, the Cheyenne stood their ground and fought rather than fleeing. The support battalion failed to advance in a timely fashion, and the troops soon found themselves needing to retreat.

Much of the village had been plundered and burned, which did leave much of the tribe destitute in the throes of winter. Most of them were able, however, to walk to Crazy Horse’s Oglala Sioux village 30 miles away where they found sustenance. After his hasty retreat, Reynolds left the captured horse herd unguarded (based on faulty advice from scout Frank Gruard, who will be featured again in future posts.) That night Cheyenne warriors recaptured all but 100 of the horses.

General Crook would later report that he had ordered Reynolds to capture the village and hold it until he arrived. He would bring charges, resulting in courts-martial, against Reynolds and two of his captains. His force returned southward to Fort Reno and then Fort Fetterman in Wyoming Territory, and Sheridan’s proposed winter campaign largerly ground to a halt. (As is so often the case in today’s military, para-military and other large organizations, higher-ups had failed to seek out and heed the perspectives of those doing the work.)

Crook’s charges against his subordinates, and their resulting countercharges, are reported to have led to divisions in those ranks. As with Custer and other officers, ranks became divided for or against General Crook. As for the those he had attacked, they allied with other villages and tribes, now more angered and steeled against the invading armies.

General Crook had dealt successfully with Indians in the Northwest, and he would do so later in the Southwest. He attained the rank of General in America’s Civil War. However, he did not fare so well in Montana Territory. Exactly two months after his Power River attack, he would again face Sioux and Cheyenne at the headwaters of Rosebud Creek.