Did Custer Disobey Orders?

Taking Sides

Pro-Custer and Anti-Custer factions existed long before his Little Bighorn demise. They had taken root during America’s Civil War. In part, Custer rose in rank quickly and others felt personal or professional jealousy. Some dislike was based on personality as well, and some was attributed to his actions.

The factions seemed to rise up in earnest, as Colonel William Graham wrote, before Custer’s body had even cooled. With that in mind, the debate over whether Custer disregarded orders or not is often based on one’s personal bias. This will be an attempt at an objective analysis.

The Question

So . . . Did Custer really disobey orders? In a word, NO. How could he? The orders General Terry gave to Custer are so ambiguous, ambivalent and open-ended that they could not possibly be disobeyed. If anything, they were written in such a way as to save Terry’s neck if anything went wrong. And it did.

The Orders

On June 22, 1876 Custer marched out with written orders as follows:

Headquarters Department of Dakota, (In the Field,)

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana, June 22, 1876

Lt. Colonel Custer, 7ty Cavalry.

Colonel: The Brigadier-General commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno as few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement; and were it not impossible to do so, the department commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders, which might hamper you action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.  He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads.  Should it be found (as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found) to turn toward the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank.

The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Little and Big Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as the arise; but it is hoped that the Indians if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed (sic) by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek; and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. . . [bold/italics mine]

The Conclusion

It is evident from those written orders that Terry gave Custer complete leeway, and even encouragement, to use his judgment. Even when expressing his desire for Custer to move to the headwaters of the Rosebud and Tongue drainages, he framed it as just that – a desire, not a directive. The only area in which Custer might have disobeyed is in regard to scouting upper Tullock’s Creek and sending George Herendeen to convey the findings. But Custer checked even that box.

A June 26^th Directive?

There are those who try to vilify Custer by saying some sort of “unwritten” orders or agreement existed. Some say that in the final officers’ an agreement was made setting June 26^th as a hard and fast date at which Custer and Gibbon’s commands would meet. Custer was to attack from the south, and Gibbon’s column would arrive on foot (they were mainly infantry) following the Little Bighorn.

It is documented that the topic was discussed in general terms in that meeting aboard the steamboat Far West. Major Brisbin, of Gibbon’s Montana Column, reportedly marked out and pinned a map showing roughly how far each column thought it could move in a given day. Thus June 26^th appeared to be a vague and general target date. However, no one attests that a written or verbal order to meet June 26^th ever existed.

The Views of Those Involved

In fact, multiple officers (and historians) stated how unrealistic such an order would have been. The Indians were extremely mobile and well mounted, with most households owning several horses. To think an infantry column could somehow catch them, or block and engage them in battle is ludicrous.

Lt. Edward Godfrey wrote a lengthy account years later, and he commented on other accounts. In his 1892 Century Magazine article, Godfrey notes that General Terry’s battle report contradicts his actual orders. (Terry claimed he had stated the travois trail should not be followed if it led toward the Little bighorn. His actual orders state otherwise.) Godfrey later added, “A careful perusal of orders issued to Custer will show that the General was given practically a free hand. If any supplemental instructions were given they were never revealed . . .”

Godfrey went on to state it was absurd to think two commands of 700 and 400 soldiers, respectively, could coordinate “in that open country” could . . . “hold the Hostiles for a co-operative attack.” Anyone who had seen the battlefield and its surrounding terrain knows that moving columns of soldiers and their dust clouds would have been easily visible to hunting parties, even if tribal scout were not out.

Godfrey, who served in Benteen’s troop, later attained the rank of General. His insights are invaluable. In regard to the open country, he also wrote the “country toward Tullock’s Fork was under surveillance.” It appears Custer had not failed to obey there either. His timing regarding sending Herendeen back as a courier appears his only failing. It would have changed nothing in what followed.

Bradley and Brisbin

Also, multiple officers indicated they knew Custer had leeway to attack when he deemed it appropriate. Lt. James Bradley wrote in his journal, “. . . it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent . . .”

If, as historian Edgar Stewart believed, a New York Herald piece had come from Major Brisbin, it also reflects the other column’s understanding that Custer was free to attack at will. Its writer stated, “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow.” [bold and italics mine, both quotes]

Private William O. Taylor

Private William O. Taylor, who rode with Reno, wrote an invaluable account that was not published until 1996. He included, “General Custer, with the Seventh Cavalry and scouts, was to take up the trail Major Reno had found and follow it, to some conclusion. . . The question as to whether General Custer fully obeyed these instructions has been extensively debated . . . In his official orders General Custer was given a certain latitude of action.” [again, bold and italics mine]

A Sliver of Doubt

In fairness, Taylor also mentions specific instructions. He questioned whether Custer was justified in all his actions, but he deferred to the views of those in higher rank. He offered no opinion of his own.

In his account published in 1877, Colonel Gibbon did allude to a discussion of the troops meeting “the third day.” However, even if Custer had waited until the 26^th to attack, Gibbon’s column would not have been there. Gibbon’s command finally approached the battlefield and abandoned village at evening on the 26^th. Their presence was well known (hence the abandoned village.) No “hostiles” would have fled their way or remained stationary to be attacked.

What We Do Know

This much is known: Custer did not follow the trail into the Little Bighorn drainage until he realized his troops’ presence was known. Troopers including trumpeter/orderly John Martin stated Custer had planned to rest his troops and not attack until June 26^th. (A surprise dawn attack was far preferable than the afternoon action Custer settled for.)

When Custer realized “hostiles” had seen his troops, he felt compelled to attack early for fear the hostiles would flee and disperse. Had the large gathering dispersed, the months-long campaign would have failed. Had “the hostiles escaped,” as Godfrey wrote, “who would have shouldered the blame?”

While Custer’s judgment is subject to question, it strongly appears he did not disobey orders. It was other factors, still discussed and debated, that led to his demise at the Little Bighorn.