In such a scenario, a static battle, it is also easy to picture a Gatling Gun. We would imagine it firing not just dependably, but also rapidly and repeatedly, barrel after barrel. With attackers arranged in circular surrounding lines, we can easily imagine the gun swiveling, rotating, and mowing the attackers down – without hitting the fellow soldiers who also surround the knob in a tight circle.

In 1876, reality was far different. Yes, both the Montana Column and Dakota Columns brought Gatling Guns on what is called the Yellowstone-Little Bighorn Expedition. Custer declined to take them on his final campaign, however. He had good reason.

The commands had obviously seen value the guns up to that point. Decision makers somewhere in the ranks saw their potential. Even one of Custer’s troopers later stated that he felt they might have changed the battle’s outcome.

However, at the same time others found them to be a tremendous hindrance. Their journal entries bear that out. Among them are Lt. James Bradley of the Montana Column and Lt. Edward Godfrey of the 7^th Cavalry. But first, the proponent’s viewpoint.

Sergeant Daniel Kanipe, in his 1924 account, mentioned both Gatling Guns and Rodman Guns available to Custer. (Gibbon’s Montana Column had also brought two Gatlings and a “Napoleon” cannon. They must have been left as his supply base near Fort Pease.) Kanipe later mused that Custer should have brought the artillery. Both the Rodman and Napoleon were Civil War-era cannon.

Kanipe was quoted, “There’s where he made a mistake, as we see it now, because if he had had one of those Rodman guns and had fired it one time those Indians wouldn’t have stopped running yet . . . And if we’d had one of the Gatling guns there would have been a lot more survivors than me.

Bear in mind that Kanipe survived only because he had been sent with a message to Benteen’s detachment miles to the south. Upon meeting Benteen he was heard to yell something like, “We’ve got them, boys!” Kanipe did not see how Custer’s actual battle played out. However, some merit does exist in Kanipe’s notion that case shot from cannon at a distance might have changed things before warriors engaged Custer.

James Bradley’s journal reflects a different reality regarding the Gatling guns. His first reference is to a Lt. Low, who brought the two guns from the Tongue River to Gibbon’s camp near the mouth of the Rosebud. He remarks that Low arrived the night of June 22^nd “during the night.” The distance was 28 miles, and seems to have taken a great deal of time beyond what even infantry might have required if unencumbered.

Both Bradley and 2^nd Cavalry Engineer Edward McClernand wrote of the travails of getting Gatling guns up Tollock Creek and the Bighorn River to the Little Bighorn. Guns overturnd on hills and had to be uprighted, apparently. They also had to be unhitched and lowered with ropes downhill at at least one point, requiring a great deal of manpower.

Bradley referenced the Gatling battery getting separated from the column and lost during a night march. They did indeed hamper the column’s progress. At least one reference mentions the gun detail finally reaching the column’s camp around 2:00 a.m. during the march.

Gatling guns were not light or readily mobile, necessarily. They were pulled by teams of four condemned horses – in other words by mounts no longer fit for cavalry use. The required manpower as well. The Dakota Column’s battery comprised 32 men plus officers.

Gatlings were also not unfailingly dependable either. Although capable of firing up to 350 rounds per minute, they were plagued by two common nemeses: overheating and fouling. Their rapid fire would obviously heat barrels quickly. Also, they pushed solid lead bullets, which helped to foul barrels. Smokeless powder would not find common use for another 20 years; the black powder of the day also fouled barrels quickly, which led to firing issues.

It is said Custer was offered extra cavalry from Gibbon’s command but declined it. Some speculate, understandably, that Custer did not want to share the anticipated laurels with another regiment. Others concede that Custer also might have found it less efficient to include troops that were not familiar to him or his command. Godfrey later wrote, sensibly, that Terry realized dividing Gibbon’s command would have left him unduly weakened, with only a few hundred infantry men.

Historian Thom Hatch wrote that Custer initially did accept the offer of Gatling guns but changed his mind an hour later. Godfrey and others described Custer’s directives to troop commanders that they be ready to travel light and fast. He planned to pursue the “hostiles” indefinitely, even if their 15 days’ rations ran out and they had to eat their pack mules. He wanted no encumbrance, which the Gatlings obviously would have been.

Hatch credits other historians with the observation that, had Custer taken Gatling guns, they would likely have delayed his movements. In turn, other events would have played out differently. Therefore, Custer might not have died June 25, 1876, if he had been delayed by taking Gatling guns. An interesting thought.

While a long-range shelling before direct attack would likely have change Custer’s outcome, he opted not to take a Rodman or Napoleon gun. If Gatling guns had been present, no one can say what difference one or more might have made. It is feasible the cumbersome, manpower-intensive guns would have helped – assuming their crews might have escaped arrows arching their way from hidden attackers.

It is just as likely Gatling guns would not have helped Custer, even they had not delayed him and he had attacked that afternoon of June 25, 1876. No one will really know exactly how that battle transpired, or what its outcome might have been, if Custer had brought Gatling guns to the Little Bighorn.

The post Should Custer Have Taken Gatling Guns? (And/Or More Cavalry?) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Pro-Custer and Anti-Custer factions existed long before his Little Bighorn demise. They had taken root during America’s Civil War. In part, Custer rose in rank quickly and others felt personal or professional jealousy. Some dislike was based on personality as well, and some was attributed to his actions.

The factions seemed to rise up in earnest, as Colonel William Graham wrote, before Custer’s body had even cooled. With that in mind, the debate over whether Custer disregarded orders or not is often based on one’s personal bias. This will be an attempt at an objective analysis.

The Question

So . . . Did Custer really disobey orders? In a word, NO. How could he? The orders General Terry gave to Custer are so ambiguous, ambivalent and open-ended that they could not possibly be disobeyed. If anything, they were written in such a way as to save Terry’s neck if anything went wrong. And it did.

The Orders

On June 22, 1876 Custer marched out with written orders as follows:

Headquarters Department of Dakota, (In the Field,)

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana, June 22, 1876

Lt. Colonel Custer, 7ty Cavalry.

Colonel: The Brigadier-General commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno as few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement; and were it not impossible to do so, the department commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders, which might hamper you action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.  He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads.  Should it be found (as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found) to turn toward the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank.

The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Little and Big Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as the arise; but it is hoped that the Indians if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed (sic) by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek; and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. . . [bold/italics mine]

The Conclusion

It is evident from those written orders that Terry gave Custer complete leeway, and even encouragement, to use his judgment. Even when expressing his desire for Custer to move to the headwaters of the Rosebud and Tongue drainages, he framed it as just that – a desire, not a directive. The only area in which Custer might have disobeyed is in regard to scouting upper Tullock’s Creek and sending George Herendeen to convey the findings. But Custer checked even that box.

A June 26^th Directive?

There are those who try to vilify Custer by saying some sort of “unwritten” orders or agreement existed. Some say that in the final officers’ an agreement was made setting June 26^th as a hard and fast date at which Custer and Gibbon’s commands would meet. Custer was to attack from the south, and Gibbon’s column would arrive on foot (they were mainly infantry) following the Little Bighorn.

It is documented that the topic was discussed in general terms in that meeting aboard the steamboat Far West. Major Brisbin, of Gibbon’s Montana Column, reportedly marked out and pinned a map showing roughly how far each column thought it could move in a given day. Thus June 26^th appeared to be a vague and general target date. However, no one attests that a written or verbal order to meet June 26^th ever existed.

The Views of Those Involved

In fact, multiple officers (and historians) stated how unrealistic such an order would have been. The Indians were extremely mobile and well mounted, with most households owning several horses. To think an infantry column could somehow catch them, or block and engage them in battle is ludicrous.

Lt. Edward Godfrey wrote a lengthy account years later, and he commented on other accounts. In his 1892 Century Magazine article, Godfrey notes that General Terry’s battle report contradicts his actual orders. (Terry claimed he had stated the travois trail should not be followed if it led toward the Little bighorn. His actual orders state otherwise.) Godfrey later added, “A careful perusal of orders issued to Custer will show that the General was given practically a free hand. If any supplemental instructions were given they were never revealed . . .”

Godfrey went on to state it was absurd to think two commands of 700 and 400 soldiers, respectively, could coordinate “in that open country” could . . . “hold the Hostiles for a co-operative attack.” Anyone who had seen the battlefield and its surrounding terrain knows that moving columns of soldiers and their dust clouds would have been easily visible to hunting parties, even if tribal scout were not out.

Godfrey, who served in Benteen’s troop, later attained the rank of General. His insights are invaluable. In regard to the open country, he also wrote the “country toward Tullock’s Fork was under surveillance.” It appears Custer had not failed to obey there either. His timing regarding sending Herendeen back as a courier appears his only failing. It would have changed nothing in what followed.

Bradley and Brisbin

Also, multiple officers indicated they knew Custer had leeway to attack when he deemed it appropriate. Lt. James Bradley wrote in his journal, “. . . it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent . . .”

If, as historian Edgar Stewart believed, a New York Herald piece had come from Major Brisbin, it also reflects the other column’s understanding that Custer was free to attack at will. Its writer stated, “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow.” [bold and italics mine, both quotes]

Private William O. Taylor

Private William O. Taylor, who rode with Reno, wrote an invaluable account that was not published until 1996. He included, “General Custer, with the Seventh Cavalry and scouts, was to take up the trail Major Reno had found and follow it, to some conclusion. . . The question as to whether General Custer fully obeyed these instructions has been extensively debated . . . In his official orders General Custer was given a certain latitude of action.” [again, bold and italics mine]

A Sliver of Doubt

In fairness, Taylor also mentions specific instructions. He questioned whether Custer was justified in all his actions, but he deferred to the views of those in higher rank. He offered no opinion of his own.

In his account published in 1877, Colonel Gibbon did allude to a discussion of the troops meeting “the third day.” However, even if Custer had waited until the 26^th to attack, Gibbon’s column would not have been there. Gibbon’s command finally approached the battlefield and abandoned village at evening on the 26^th. Their presence was well known (hence the abandoned village.) No “hostiles” would have fled their way or remained stationary to be attacked.

What We Do Know

This much is known: Custer did not follow the trail into the Little Bighorn drainage until he realized his troops’ presence was known. Troopers including trumpeter/orderly John Martin stated Custer had planned to rest his troops and not attack until June 26^th. (A surprise dawn attack was far preferable than the afternoon action Custer settled for.)

When Custer realized “hostiles” had seen his troops, he felt compelled to attack early for fear the hostiles would flee and disperse. Had the large gathering dispersed, the months-long campaign would have failed. Had “the hostiles escaped,” as Godfrey wrote, “who would have shouldered the blame?”

While Custer’s judgment is subject to question, it strongly appears he did not disobey orders. It was other factors, still discussed and debated, that led to his demise at the Little Bighorn.

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A Reporter Riding Along

General Alfred Terry had been sent in charge of the Dakota Column. Lieutenant Colonel Custer had angered President Grant. Initially he was denied permission to go. However, with support from his Civil War superiors and mounting political pressure, the popular Custer was finally allowed along.

While admonishing Custer, Commanding General of the Army William T. Sherman ordered Terry not to take reporters, “who always make mischief.” Kellogg came anyway. The Bismarck Daily Tribune benefitted, along with the New York Herald. Kellogg, a stringer for both newspapers, did not.

A Prophetic Preamble

Kellogg is best known for his classic lines to the Tribune, “We leave the Rosebud tomorrow and by the time this reaches you we will have met and fought the red devils, with what result remains to be seen. I go with Custer and will be in at the death.” [italics added]  In hindsight those words ring poetic, prophetic and ominous.

The Bismarck Tribune’s editor agreed. It led off its astounding July 6, 1876 extra with Kellogg’s prophetic words. Word of Custer’s unthinkable defeat and annihilation had just reached Bismarck the night of July 5^th when the steamboat Far West arrived bearing the battle’s wounded.

A Phantom Telegraph?

Oddly, several writers overlook the obvious; they ignorantly state that Kellogg telegraphed his last dispatch to the Tribune. Nothing could be farther from the truth. One of the distinct challenges of Custer’s last campaign was the lack of telegraph wires or other efficient forms of communication.

In fact, the entire campaign was hampered by that distinct challenge. Three military columns had all been sent to seek out and attack non-reservation Indians, viewed as “hostiles,” in the Powder, Tongue, and Bighorn River region. No command really knew the others’ whereabouts most of the time.

The three “converging” columns were effectively unable to communicate. In fact, Reno was within roughly 40 miles of General Crook’s Wyoming Column at the time of the Rosebud Battle. Reno went north up Rosebud Creek while Crook was attacked and turned back south.

The communication challenge was two-fold. First, couriers had to ride miles and days through lands teeming with hostile Sioux and Cheyenne. The closest telegraphs were at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Fort Ellis, or Fort Fetterman respectively. These posts lay 200 to 300 miles or more from the Powder River, Rosebud, and Bighorn drainages.

Any telegram would had to be sent by courier back to one of the forts. Then, the messages were telegraphed to the Department Headquarters in Chicago or St. Paul – or at best to whichever fort might served as the recipient’s home base. Then that message must be relayed by courier out to the officer for whom it was intended.

Any reply would require that the process be reversed. Return messages then had to be taken back by courier to the nearest fort, then telegraphed to the recipient’s home fort. Another courier then had to relay it to its recipient at an unknown location.

All of that to say that Kellogg’s final dispatch was hardly telegraphed. He had to send his missives downriver by whatever boat might be travelling that way. His previous dispatch, dated June 12, had been dropped into the Yellowstone River with an entire mail bag of mail while being loaded onto the steamboat Josephine. Some diligent souls spent an entire night opening letters and messages, then spreading them out and drying them by a fire.

Slow News Days

Kellogg had chronicled parts of the column’s travels and experiences thus far. However, he had relatively little to report. In more than 300 miles of marching, patrolling and scouting, the Dakota Column had not seen a single Indian – except their own Ree scouts.

That was about to change. It might be understandable that most in the command were eager for some action. In fact, Gibbon’s column held the same anticipation, which would soon turn to disappointment.

Kellogg’s final dispatch, hand-written, described the changing terrain and natural history. He even commented on how ripe the Rosebud drainage looked for “economic” development. He castigated Reno and praised Custer. It might well have appealed to Bismarck Tribune readers.

Aside from that, Kellogg had no action to report – except that he planned to march out with Custer’s 12 cavalry troops, and that he expected they would find “hostiles” and fight them. He expected to be “in at the death.” He neglected to specify whose death.

At The Death?

Kellogg’s words “at the death” ring poetic. Several writers have noted that they are an expression used previously in fox hunts. Apparently those who rode fancy horses and chased foxes with hounds strove to finish the fox and be “at the death.”

The expression, interestingly, was used by two other members of that campaign. In his journal, also on June 21, Lt. James H. Bradley expressed frustration and disappointment when he wrote, “. . . it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent. We have little hope of being in at the death [my italics], as Custer will undoubtedly exert himself to the utmost to get there first and win all the laurels for himself and his regiment. . .”

In his excellent book Custer’s Luck historian Edgar Stewart noted a New York Herald article printed July 8,1876 amidst the battle’s aftershocks. The piece mentions General Terry’s meeting with his higher-ranking officers. It then states, “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow and General Gibbon and his men received the decision without a murmur. There was great rivalry between the two columns and each wanted to be in at the death. . .” [italics mine]

Stewart stated the article was written by a member of Gibbon’s command. He believed Major James Brisbin was likely the source. Brisbin led the 2^nd Cavalry troops that were combined with infantry under Gibbon. Brisbin was noted for some published writings. Given the duplicated wording and Bradley’s literary bent, however, it seems he also could have been the source.

Regardless, the repeated use of “at the death” makes Kellogg’s final dispatch and others stand out stark and ominous. Four days later, on June 25, 1876 Kellogg would be in at his own death at the Little Bighorn.

Remains and Relics

Gibbon’s troops would arrive, somewhat as predicted, to deal with the aftermath. When combing the battlefield for survivors or corpses, Gibbon’s men found Kellogg’s body well below most of Custer’s dead. It lay and closer to the Little Bighorn near a ravine where others had apparently attempted to escape.

It is unknown if Kellogg was killed there early in Custer’s advance, or in a later attempt to flee. His body, curiously, had been stripped. He had been scalped, and an ear was missing (given his ‘mutton-chop’ whiskers, perhaps one of those had been scalped away, as Lt. W.W. Cooke’s had been.)

Kellogg could be identified only by his civilian clothes and the unique boots he wore. They had an unusual strap that buckled over the arch, and they had not been taken.

Some of Kellogg’s belongings had been left back at a supply base at the Powder River. They now belong to the North Dakota State Historical Society and may be displayed in its museum. A notebook of Kellogg’s is also there, but it holds no entries past June 9, 1876. It is unknown if the notebook was found near his body or had been left behind.

Kellogg’s Legacy

The Bismarck Tribune was in close cahoots with the New York Herald. Even in death Kellogg helped the Herald sell countless copies. In an earlier Kellogg bio it was noted that the New York Herald’s publisher helped Kellogg’s two daughters financially, along with the aunt who had taken them in. In the end, maybe being “at the death” did benefit Kellogg in some way, as his lifeless body rested near the Little Bighorn.

EXTRA: THE BIG SKY SCOOP

News of Custer’s defeat had reached Bozeman, MT via courier on July 3rd. Due to telegraph wires being down, a stringer instead sent the dispatch to Helena, but not before the Bozeman Times ran an ‘extra’ at 7 p.m. on July 3^rd. The Helena Herald received the report on July 4^th and ran its astounding ‘extra’ that evening. It also sent the new by wire to the Associated Press in Salt Lake City.

The steamboat Far West, bearing Reno and Benteens’ wounded survivors reached Bismarck the night of July 5,1876 on the heels of America’s first centennial celebration. The New York Herald then got the news by telegraph and published it on July7. It followed up with several reports, including the letter above.) Other papers had gotten the AP report, but the New York Herald ran ongoing reports for more than a week, due to its Bismarck Tribune connection.

The post “At The Death:” Reporter Mark Kellogg’s Final Dispatch: (“I Go With Custer . . .”) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Life-saving Assignments

Dutifully, Godfrey checked in only after ensuring his troop was duly prepared. As a result he was assigned to the rear, along with the regiment’s mule train. It saved his life. Those who went ahead with Custer – and many who went with Major Reno – died at the Little Bighorn.

It appears the designation of orderlies followed a similar process. On June 25^th trumpeter John Martin was designated as the colonel’s Orderly of the Day, or one of several. As with Godfrey, it saved his life.

Developing Battle Plans

Custer divided his command as he approached the sought-after village of “hostiles” on the afternoon of June 25^th. First he sent Benteen, the regiment’s senior captain, with three troops sweeping southward. He was to ensure the command would not miss hostiles encamped or fleeing in that direction. The regiment’s pack mules lagged behind under the protection of a single cavalry company.

Custer then detached Major Reno with a second battalion of three troops. Reno was ordered to proceed as fast as he could and charge into the encampment’s south end. Tall hills and bluffs obscured the village from Custer’s view, so he did not yet realize its exact location or extent. He told Reno he would support him with the whole regiment.

After separating northward from Major Reno’s attack, Custer topped a hill and saw more of the village and its layout along the Little Bighorn. However, he saw only a portion of the village. He did not fully realize what he was up against (despite repeated warnings from his scouts that they would face an overwhelming force.) Custer saw enough to make him realize he needed Benteen’s battalion to complete his developing battle plan. He wanted more ammunition too.

Misconstrued Call For Cartridges

Some writers construe Custer’s call for ammunition as a sign of desperation. History, including Martin’s later account, show it was more an afterthought. Troopers carried 50 rifle rounds in their ammunition belts and 100 more in saddle bags. They also carried 24 revolver rounds apiece. Custer’s message was not sent under duress.

Martin’s Account

Trumpeter Martin’s written account nearly 50 years later provides some of the best insight into Custer’s plans and intentions. As Custer’s orderly, Martin rode within a few yards of Custer until detached with a message for Benteen. Martin heard and witnessed most of the orders as they were given out. They reveal a great deal.

Martin states Custer told Reno he would have Benteen hurry northward and attack the village’s center. Custer would “drive them” (the hostiles) from the north.

Martin’s account is included, along with numerous others, in Colonel William A. Graham’s tremendous resource book “The Custer Myth, A Source Book of Custeriana.” The only caveat is that Martin was an Italian immigrant who had just arrived in America two years prior. His difficulty with English may have caused misunderstanding of some statements, or miscommunication of others. (He referenced that in regard to his 1879 testimony in the Reno Court of Inquiry.)

Custer’s First Impressions

Martin relates that upon seeing the village Custer first noticed no warriors. He was unable to see Reno’s advance or the warriors that were rushing to meet him. Custer is said to have commented the men appeared to be asleep still in their tepees. (Some, in fact, were rising late after their large social dances the previous night.) Martin related that Custer then commented only that his command had “got them this time.” He was likely still under the impression the hostiles were fleeing.

Custer turned and yelled, according to Martin, “Hurrah, boys, we’ve got them! We’ll finish them up and then go home to our station.” Then he and Martin returned to the troops, conferred with adjutant Cooke, and proceeded another mile northward at a trot and gallop. Martin estimated they had gone three miles from where Reno was detached.

Only after reaching a ravine leading downward toward the Little Bighorn (Medicine Tail Coulee) did Custer detach Martin with his classic message to Benteen. First Custer ordered Martin to ride as fast as he could to Benteen and tell him to hurry. Martin recounts Custer’s mention of a big village and Benteen’s need to be quick – and to bring the ammunition packs.

The Historic Dispatch

Custer’s adjutant, Lt. W.W. Cooke, told Martin to wait while he hurriedly wrote the command out in a small memo book. He then tore the page out and handed it to Martin. That message is the classic, “Benteen, come on – big village – be quick – bring packs. P.S. – bring packs.” Even most casual students of the battle know of it.

Martin related that his horse was fatigued, but he rode as fast as he was able over the troops’ back trail. He was fired on by a small group of warriors and was thankful he was not hit. He realized only later that a round had hit his horse. He related that when he topped the hill where he and Custer first surveyed the village, he could now see Reno’s skirmish line as it fell back under attack.

Boston Custer had left his brothers’ battalion earlier when his horse “played out.” He had gone back to the pack train in order to obtain a replacement. Martin met him near the high hill. Boston asked where the “general” was, and Martin directed him northward. Boston’s body was later found near those of his brothers. Under orders to hurry, Martin continued south.

Martin’s Message

Finally locating Benteen, Martin conveyed his message. Benteen asked, “Where’s the General now?” Martin relates he replied they had seen Indians running and he believed by that time Custer had charged through the village. That information undoubtedly played into Benteen’s subsequent course of action. Reno would soon appear far more in need of help than Custer did at that time.

Martin belonged to Benteen’s company and was directed to stay with it. That order also helped preserve his life. He remained with Reno and Benteen’s combined forces under siege for two days but survived. He related an attempt to move the forces in Custer’s direction once they had reorganized (despite the challenge of caring for wounded troopers). Overwhelming numbers of Indians prevented the move, and the besieged forces fell back. They believed Custer had withdrawn northward to join Terry and Gibbon’s column.

Background and Military Career

Born Giovanni Martini in Rome in 1851, Martin had been a drummer boy in the Army of Liberation by age 14. By 1866 he apparently served as a soldier against Austrians in Italy’s armed conflict. He came to America in 1873 and soon enlisted in the U.S. Army. He was assigned to Benteen’s H Company, 7^th Cavalry in time to experience its Black Hills Expedition. His name was “Americanized” to John Martin.

A Grateful Immigrant

A grateful immigrant, Martin served out a 30-year army career. He is said to have taken pride in his service and in the fact that his two sons both served honorably too. He admired Custer and even named a son for him. Army lawyer Col. William Graham noted Martin donned his old uniform for years and never missed a chance to “honor the Stars and Stripes.”

Martin retired to New York City in 19004 and worked as a subway ticket agent for years, dying in 1922. His long and productive life were made possible because he had been designated for orderly duty. They were ensured when Custer detached him with a classic dispatch at the Little Bighorn.

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General Alfred Terry, leading the Dakota Column, had sent Reno out on June 10. Reno had directions to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to move westward down Mizpah Creek, then ascend Pumpkin Creek to the Tongue River and descend the Tongue to the Yellowstone. He followed only a part of those orders.

Reno was to ensure no hostiles lurked in the Powder and Tongue River drainages. Taking six cavalry companies and the mixed-blood scout Mitch Bouyer, he was provisioned with 10 days’ rations and forage. Perhaps due to Bouyer’s influence, he became sidetracked. Bouyer, with Lt. James Bradley, had observed a large Sioux village on Rosebud Creek several weeks earlier.

Reno barely touched the Tongue drainage, potentially leaving hostiles to attack the column from behind. Worse, he disobeyed Terry’s orders to stay out of the Rosebud drainage. The entire campaign’s effort could have been jeopardized if Reno’s detachment had been detected. The large gathering of hostiles would have dispersed.

It is noted that Custer strongly believed, like others, that no hostiles remained in the drainages east of the Rosebud. However, true to his nature, he wished to lead the mission. Historian Edgar Stuart noted Custer had already led a fruitless scouting foray on the Little Missouri. Some writers speculate that General Terry wanted to spread assignments out in order to avoid showing favoritism.

Regardless, it undoubtedly chafed Custer to see the assignment go to his rival and subordinate. He and Reno had never liked each other. Custer would soon get his chance, though, with all 12 companies of his 7^th Cavalry Regiment.

In the open, un-timbered terrain, Reno apparently felt he could see down into enough of Mizpah Creek to warrant bypassing it. He then scouted little of the Tongue, instead taking up a heavy lodgepole trail made by a large number of Indians and their ponies pulling travois, or pony-drags. He followed it well into the Rosebud Creek drainage, then backtracked and followed the Rosebud down to the Yellowstone.

Terry had specifically directed Reno to avoid Rosebud Creek. Upon learning Reno’s flaunting of his orders he fumed. He was concerned that Reno’s relatively small force would merely tip off the large, multi-tribe gathering that his column sought to locate. It is hinted that he would have arrested and Court-martialed Reno had he not been the regiment’s only major.

At least one writer states that Terry suspected Reno had hoped to best Custer, his superior officer, whom he despised. Custer was also indignant at Reno’s half-way attempt to follow the moving hostiles. He too was concerned Reno had spoiled the regiment’s chances for a surprise attack.

In a letter to his wife, however, Custer lamented that Reno had come so close but had failed to attack. He decried the waste of time. Custer also rued what, to him, was a missed opportunity. That mindset toward Reno’s best course of action might explain Custer’s own upcoming decisions (More on that topic to come.)

It should be noted that even General Sheridan, in Chicago, had no real expectation that a mobile bunch of nomads could be trapped and crushed between even two converging columns, much less three. Edgar Stewart, among others, noted that each column was believed capable of attacking and defeating any hostiles alone.

Reno’s junket bore little direct result. He had seen no Indians. However, the fact that he had seen a wide and heavy travois trail brought impending results – or consequences. The fact that he had disobeyed orders and potentially compromised the column’s mission made things even more urgent.

A lot legend and folklore exist regarding Custer’s personality and motives. Perpetuated by Hollywood and the “dime novel” mentality, these conceptions have muddied the waters. However, objective historians can agree that Custer was impetuous, audacious and exuberant if nothing else. Reno’s report could have served only to stoke those fires.

With Custer, General Terry moved the command to their designated meeting place near the  mouth of the Tongue River during Reno’s absence. Messengers brought him news of Reno’s prodigal return down the Rosebud. After a hard march on June 20^th the regiment reunited. New plans were made based on Reno’s report.

It was noted by General Terry that Reno’s horses and pack mules were “tired and badly spent.” The existing plan had been for Custer to take nine companies back up the Tongue River on Reno’s return and then scout down the Rosebud drainage. All that changed, however, based on Reno’s report. All twelve companies would ascend the Rosebud.

The condition of mounts and mules in Custer’s last contingent has been the topic of much speculation. It may be that the animals’ fatigued condition played a role in the mission’s outcome.

On June 22 Custer set forth with all 12 companies of the 7^th Cavalry. Presumably, he was already worried that Reno’s abandoned travois trail was growing colder. He would have set out with an underlying urgency that must have colored his upcoming decisions. That urgency would be compounded two days later when it Custer realized his command’s presence had been discovered.

Had Reno obeyed his orders, Custer’s actions would likely have not been much different. He would have found the lodgepole trail when he reached the Rosebud, and he would have locked onto it like a bloodhound. Even his letters bear out that he planned to pursue the hostiles, once on their trail, even if his rations ran out and the regiment had to eat their mules.

Regardless, the result of Reno’s scout and report can be said to have reaped one result. They threw fuel on the fires that would lead to destiny on the Little Bighorn.

The post Results of Reno’s Powder River “Recon” And His Recalcitrant Rosebud Foray appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

West Point Records and Early Career

At West Point, apparently, Reno did outdo Custer in one area: demerits. A notorious as Custer is for pushing the limits on demerits, Reno outdid him. Scheduled to graduate in 1855, Reno failed to finish until 1857 and may have set a record for demerits in a term with 1,031.

Entering “the Point” in 1858, Custer should have finished in 1862. He actually graduated sooner, in 1861 due to the Civil War’s outbreak. Trained officers were suddenly in demand. Unlike Custer, though, who finished last in his class, Reno managed to finish 20^th out of a class of 38.

Until 1861 Reno served as a junior officer at Fort Dalles and Fort Walla Walla. Assigned to cavalry in the Civil War, he became a captain and was breveted major after the Kelly’s Ford battle in 1863. In 1864 he was breveted lieutenant colonel, then gained the rank of full colonel in early 1865. He received the brevet rank Brigadier General of Volunteers in March 1863, shortly before the war ended.

Post-Civil War Career and the Springfield Specter

Like most officers continuing their careers, Reno dropped in rank and moved to assignments around the country, including the Reconstruction South. By 1869 he had become a major in the 7^th Cavalry at Fort Hays, Kansas but then served two years on the army’s Small Arms Board starting in 1871.

During Reno’s time there the army adopted the Model 1873 Springfield Trapdoor rifle and carbine. The carbines became well known for failing to eject spent cartridges. This may have contributed to Custer’s astonishing defeat that the Little Bighorn. Other aspersions fell toward Reno after that battle too.

Seventh Cavalry Career

Assigned to the 7^th Cavalry in late 1873, Reno missed his regiment’s 1873 and 1874 expeditions. In 1874 he was assigned, with two companies, as escort for America’s part of the joint Northern Boundary Survey. His wife died unexpectedly during that time. Requesting funeral leave, he received a sympathetic but firm denial. Worse, his wife’s family saw fit to deny him any of the family’s fortune.

After leave spent in Europe in 1875, Reno rejoined his regiment and assumed its command while Custer dealt with scandals and politics in Washington, D.C. When Custer returned in time to resume command, Reno allegedly was resentful. He also allegedly neglected drill and marksmanship practice in Custer’s absence.

The Powder River “Recon”

Questions regarding Reno’s performance began in earnest with the Little Bighorn battle. They first began, though, with his Powder River scouting assignment. On June 10, 1876, General Terry sent him with six companies to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to reconnoiter its tributary Mizpah Creek as well, then range west to the Tongue River and down to its mouth back at the Yellowstone.

Colonel Gibbon would have already reported his scouts’ findings of a large hostile village up the Rosebud. Perhaps Mitch Bouyer, assigned to Reno, led his detachment there in hopes of an early attack. It appears, though, that General Terry wanted to rule out the possibility of any remnant hostiles still in the Powder or Tongue River drainages and their tributaries.

Custer had led a scouting foray up the Little Missouri. This time General Terry sent Reno with three cavalry troops. They took rations for 10 days. Watch for “Results of Reno’s Powder River Recon” coming on June 18. One result was Reno’s finding of a wide and heavy travois trail heading up Rosebud Creek. It would lead to the Little Bighorn.

Little Bighorn Legacy

Reno would come into question after Custer detached him and ordered him to attack the hostile camp on the Little Bighorn, June 25, 1876. Reno ended up leading a headlong “charge,” as he described it, that has been characterized as a chaotic retreat. His behavior drew question after his men were besieged on the bluffs above the Little Bighorn for the next two days as well.

In fairness, at least some of his tactics and choices were later defended by knowledgeable military analysts. Much, however, remains subject to question or outright disgrace.

One charge against him was drunkenness during the fight. As with most or all of the battle, accounts are many and varied. Some eye witnesses stated they saw him drinking an “amber-colored” liquid from a flask, both during his attack/retreat and during his subsequent siege. Others state they never saw it. He was later quoted by Rev. Arthur Edwards in the Northwest Christian Review (Sept. 7, 1904) as stating he performed poorly there because he had been drunk. (Maybe just an excuse for poor performance, but a damning confession nonetheless.)

One virtually unforgiveable act by Reno was his willingness to abandon some of his wounded. Reno was said to have proposed to Captain Benteen that the combined battalions mount up and flee during the night. When questioned about moving the wounded, Reno was said to respond that they could mount those capable of riding; those unable would be left. Benteen, and apparently others, evaded questioning on this and other topics during Reno’s 1879 Court of Inquiry. Benteen later confirmed the conversation in a letter published long after his death.

Court of Inquiry

With relentless finger-pointing, questioning and criticism after the battle, Reno requested his own Court of Inquiry in hopes of exoneration. It is noted that he conveniently waited until the army’s two-year statute of limitations had expired. He was indeed exonerated, but much speculation and evidence point toward the witnesses “closing ranks” to protect the 7^th Cavalry’s reputation; the process is seen by as a sham.

Reno’s Final Battles

Reno was not particularly liked by most of his subordinates or fellow officers. Historian Thom Hatch notes two 7^th Cavalry officers, Benteen and Godfrey, who specifically disliked him. Plenty of subordinates did too. Young Lt. Hugh Scott, another contemporary who would go on to become a general also fell among them.

Many supported him though, in ways including their Court of Inquiry Testimony. Whether by coercion or fear of retribution, most of the regiment signed a petition asking that all officers move up in rank, filling voids including that left by Lt. Colonel Custer. Many later denied signing, but it requested that Reno fill Custer’s vacated position.

In following years Reno was Court-Martialed and convicted twice. His first sentence, including charges of drunkenness on duty, was commuted. Other charges were raised and dropped. He was accused of “peeping” into the parlor of a young woman with whom he had become enamored. She was the daughter of Colonel Samuel Sturgis. This conviction was not commuted and ended his military career.

Though Reno’s discharge was eventually changed to “honorable,” his struggles with alcohol would plague him. They would overshadow what he did well in America’s Civil War and at the Little Bighorn.

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False Impressions

We frequently form false impressions. Hollywood is often to blame. Simple ignorance plays a role too.

We picture infantry marching with only a rifle on a shoulder, maybe an ammunition pouch, and a haversack holding a mess kit and rations. We think of cavalry with only weapons, saddle bag contents, and maybe a blanket roll behind the saddle.

The Stark Reality

The reality was that frontier armies required literally tons of shelter, rations and supplies. Cavalry needed mounts. Wheeled conveyances (i.e. wagons) were needed for hauling supplies.

That meant hundreds of horses, oxen and/or mules were needed just to draw wagons. Pack mules were required at times. In turn that meant teamsters and packers were needed, along with herders and possibly blacksmiths.

To Feed an Army

Not that the armies ate luxuriously. Dried, or “desiccated” vegetables and fruit were sometimes available at least as far back as America’s Civil War. Dried beans and rice, however, would have often made up the “bulk” of a soldier’s diet. Hard tack, much like overgrown soda crackers, was usually the soldier’s daily bread. It was durable (hence the “hard”), fairly light and packable in crates by wagons or pack mules.

The army recognized soldiers’ need for protein. That usually meant salt pork or salt beef.  On the 1870’s frontier, soldiers sometimes supplemented rations with fish caught in the region’s teeming streams. Sometimes they obtained fresh meat by hunting deer, elk, antelope and the still-widespread buffalo. This could not be counted on, however.

With no refrigeration, beef herds were trailed on the hoof. This in turn required more herders, which required hauling more supplies. Livestock, soldiers and civilians all required water as well, which dictated travel routes and camp locations. In short, it took a lot to move a frontier army.

Enlightening Photographs

Custer’s 1874 Black Hills Expedition, a thinly veiled breaking of prior treaties, provides classic photographs to demonstrate these points. The links below will give readers an idea of what went into moving that command. The wagons, draft animals and civilian attendants far outnumber the soldiers.

Horse Power

Another compounding factor was that most military stock was put to daily use. This limited grazing opportunities. Therefore, armies had to haul grain, or “forage,” to supplement the livestock’s feed. With this forage, armies’ travel routes were less dictated by grazing availability. It added to the burden, however. (Indians often scoffed at this, amazed at the inefficiency.)

It is nearly needless to say that the army’s livestock herds were favorite targets for Indian raids. Stealing or even just stampeding the animals served to “hamstring” and hamper operations if not end them.

Campaign Plans

As noted in prior posts, the U.S. Army planned a three-column convergence in 1876. General Sheridan’s desired winter campaign meant attacking tribes when their horse herds were weakened due to difficult grazing. However, the severe weather that kept “hostiles” in winter camps also hampered the soldiers’ movements. That, and other delays, turned the campaign to spring and summer operations.

As noted, General George Crook’s Wyoming Column did set out on its initial effort on March 1, 1876. Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column dutifully marched forth on March 17, picking up additional troops and artillery at Fort Ellis by April 1. General Terry’s Dakota Column, including Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, finally set out on May 17^th. (Its delays are detailed in previous posts.)

By the Numbers

To demonstrate what each column required, their logistical details follow. Rather than reinvent the wheel I will quote other writers, starting with Barbara Fifer’s summaries in her book Montana Battlefields.

Regarding General George Crook’s command, Fifer wrote, “. . . the Wyoming Column extended for two miles across the snowy ground as it left Fort Fetterman. Ten companies from the Second and Third Cavalry followed thirty-one civilian scouts, with two companies of the Fourth Infantry behind the horsemen. Five ambulances, eighty supply wagons, and one hundred pack mules followed, and behind them ambled a forty-five-head beef herd that was food on the hoof.”

Crook’s venture northward met with setback and, realistically, defeat. He returned southward to regroup, resupply, and reinforce his command. Then, with nearly 1,000 infantry and cavalry troops under 47 officers, he set forth again in early June. This time, Fifer wrote, “More than one thousand pack mules, 120 six-team wagons – with about two hundred packers and teamsters – and a few ambulances stretched the column four miles long.”

It appears Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column was the better performer of the three. On March 17, 1876 he left Fort Shaw in Montana Territory with five companies of the Seventh Infantry totaling 200 men and 12 officers. Carrying only 10 days’ rations, his column needed just 10 supply wagons. They would pick up additional men and supplies at Fort Ellis before continuing on, including two Gatling guns and a “12-pounder” field gun.

Adding a sixth infantry company, the Montana Column now comprised 220 men and 13 officers. It was joined April 2 by four cavalry companies numbering 185 men plus 10 officers and a surgeon. Its supply train then increased too. Journal entries confirm this column was supplied by contract freighters as well. Also, an enterprising trader came down the Yellowstone River in Mackinaw boats to sell fresh eggs, vegetables and even liquor to the column’s troops.

Edgar Stewart noted Gibbon’s train grew to 24 government wagons and 12 contract wagons. He also notes the 23 Crow Indian scouts, two interpreters and more mixed-blood and white scouts. The battery of two Gatling guns and the cannon, needing horse-drawn ammunition caissons increased the entourage.

When General Terry and Custer’s Dakota Column finally left Fort Abraham Lincoln (on the Missouri River near Bismarck) on May 17 they made notable use of two steamboats. Under contract, the boats transported huge loads of supplies and sometimes men up the Missouri. Then they ascended the Yellowstone River to where supply depots were established. The boats sometimes ferried soldiers across.

William O. Taylor, who survived the Little Bighorn with Major Reno’s troops, later described the column. Besides the 12 cavalry troops and 3 infantry troops he lists a huge contingent of scouts, interpreters and civilian employees. The soldiers alone numbered about 700, plus 28 officers.

Taylor states the wagon train, “. . . which was a large and expensive one. . . consisted of 114 six-mule teams, 37 two-mule teams, and 35 pack mules, giving employment in various capacities to 179 men.” Stewart also describes it. The six-mule wagons, he adds, carried two tons of cargo each. He also notes the cumbersome Gatlings required a detail of two officers and 32 men to manage them.

Fifer quotes Libby Custer’s estimate that, “1,200 men – soldiers, around two hundred teamsters and herders, and more than forty scouts and translators  – and 1,700 head of livestock (mules, horses, and beef cattle) made up the column that stretched two miles across the prairie.” This included 150 supply wagons hauling forage, rations, ammunition and other supplies.

The Logic of Logistics

It has been said and often repeated that an army travels on its stomach. Sometimes this meant subsisting on Spartan rations. For an army to succeed over the long haul, though, it requires a lot of logistical support. That was never more true than in 1876 on the wide plains that surround the Little Bighorn.

The post What It Took To Move A Frontier Army appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

From his Chicago headquarters, General Phil Sheridan had ordered the winter campaign against non-treaty Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho bands. He did so after the Sioux repeatedly refused to sell the Black Hills to the U.S. in 1875. Sheridan commanded the army’s Department of the Missouri and its Department of the Platte. He would use columns, or mobile forces, marching from each department.

The campaign was set in motion by Brigadier General George Crook. Crook’s Wyoming Column began to march forth from Fort Fetterman, in Wyoming Territory. His was one of three military columns ordered to converge in a pincer-type movement intended to entrap and subdue the non-treaty tribes, forcing them to reservations.

As most readers know by now, the second column was the Montana Column, marching from Fort Shaw and Fort Ellis in Montana Territory. The third was General Alfred Terry’s Dakota Column, directed to march from Fort Abraham Lincoln in Dakota Territory.  Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer was its second-ranking officer. (Major Samuel Sturgis had remained behind at Fort A. Lincoln.)

 As Crook’s Wyoming Column began to “march forth,” it set in motion the events that would largely culminate at the Little Bighorn.

More posts will highlight these unfolding events as they coincide with specific dates in coming weeks and months.

The post March Forth! A Directive from General Phil Sheridan appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Custer had actually divided his regiment’s 12 troops.  Many additional casualties were suffered by the separate commands under Major Marcus Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen. However, more Seventh Cavalry troopers survived the Little Bighorn than did not. The defeat they suffered that day, though, was convincing at best, and certainly demoralizing. The whole affair shocked a nation that was celebrating its first centennial.

The Little Bighorn battle was far from a stand-alone battle, however. In the end, it was truly a debacle for those on both sides of the conflict. While the Sioux, Cheyenne and other allies won an overwhelming victory that day, the battle is widely seen as a final “beginning of the end” for those tribes’ freedom. They had won a great battle but had lost a war that day. The shock of Custer’s dramatic demise merely fueled the fires of war against them. It threw kerosene onto the growing flames.

The Little Bighorn’s aftermath is a topic in itself. It encompasses many topics, in fact. Likewise, the battle’s prelude, viewed over many years, comprises countless sub-topics. In a nutshell, though, a summary of circumstances and events might serve to set the stage for those who seek to understand that historic battle’s magnitude.

Lengthy books could be, and have been, written on the Sioux conflicts alone. For background purposes I’ll try to keep this summary brief (unlike my introduction above.) Each component of it could easily fill multiple dissertations, but I’ll attempt a short summation:

It is generally believed the Sioux tribes, or bands, were pushed westward by Eastern Woodland tribes. During the time of America’s Civil War, Little Crow led an uprising of Santee Sioux in Minnesota. That uprising was quickly crushed, and it resulted in further pressure for various Sioux bands to move westward. These movements put them in territorial conflict with other Plains tribes, including the Crows and Blackfeet. Competition and fighting for homelands, hunting grounds (buffalo) and horses was much a part of every band’s existence.

It would be convenient to state that the Sioux and Cheyennes’ struggles with white settlers began with Red Cloud’s War along the Bozeman Trail, or with the opening of the Oregon Trail, or with the advance of fur trappers and fur companies from St. Louis. It would be even simpler yet to say the clashes started with Lewis and Clark’s Voyage of Discovery up the Missouri River and onward to the Pacific Coast.

While all those factors contributed, the widely diffused roots of the conflict go back, arguably, to the inevitable westward expansion from Europe. Explorers, various pilgrims, and settlers all viewed new lands as unsettled and free for the taking.

Beyond the smaller-scale conflicts of the Fur Trade era, though, the build-up to the Little Bighorn began in earnest as settlers moved in greater numbers along the Oregon Trail. It sliced through the heart of what the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho and other tribes saw as their territorial homelands. As conflicts simmered and grew, more settlers followed that route, branching off to California goldfields (mainly on the heels of the big strike in 1848/49) or down to the Salt Lake area, or on to Oregon’s fertile and coveted lands.

The most intriguing common thread, though, might well have been gold. Besides the quest for individual wealth, national governments sought gold too. Gold discoveries in western North America were of significant interest to both the United States government or that of the upstart, rebellious Confederate States. It was nations, not just individuals, who sought gold.

That’s another large topic for another time. The fact, though, that the United States placed heavy artillery at Alcatraz, overlooking the mouth of the San Francisco Bay during its Civil War certainly speaks volumes. Fighting a war is expensive: a lot of funding is required in order to feed, clothe, arm and otherwise supply any army. Gold had the attention of both governments, and it would continue to be a factor in conflicts long after the nation’s Civil War had ended.

Soon, as gold was discovered up in Oregon and Idaho Territory, miners came not just from California but from many eastern and southern states. Treaties negotiated before the Civil War were broken (wronging Nez Perce tribes as well as the Sioux and Cheyenne) and even more gold strikes drew even more settlers.

Fort Laramie, the site of two major treaty negotiations, lay along the Oregon Trail. John Bozeman found a cut-off route from Fort Laramie northward around the Bighorn range and on to gold fields in the new Montana Territory. This route saved travelers a great deal of time and effort, which was important. Harsh weather limited travel and mining to warmer months.

Bozeman’s trail, however, cut through the heart of tribal hunting grounds. Conflict that had simmered now boiled over along the Bozeman Trail. The route is sometimes called the “Bloody Bozeman.”

Conflicts calmed somewhat after the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. The U.S. had agreed to abandon three of its five forts along the Bozeman Trail. Non-treaty tribes still harassed other forts and white settlers, but conflicts diminished until 1873.

The Panic of 1873 caused widespread economic depression in the eastern states. Nearly a fourth of men were out of work, and farmers’ crops lost value. Then came reports of gold in the Black Hills.

The resulting rush meant more intrusion onto treaty lands. The U.S. Army under President Grant ignored its treaty ceding the Black Hills to Sioux. Grant had long pursued a “Peace Policy” toward the Plains tribes, but he now turned a blind eye to his army’s entrance into that “sacred ground.” In 1874 George Armstrong Custer led his U.S. Cavalry regiment into the treaty-protected Black Hills under the pretext of trying to keep prospectors out.

If protecting the Black Hills was indeed Custer’s mission, he failed as expected. Somehow a report leaked out – deliberately, perhaps? – that gold was literally in the grass’ roots. Those words actually were spun through mass media – specifically, the Chicago Inter Ocean – rather than Custer. (Not much has changed in 150 years.) Needless to say, those reports brought a bigger stampede of gold seekers, and the U.S. military did little to stop it.

Any lid on Sioux and Cheyenne conflicts quickly blew off. Custer’s first direct conflict with Oglalla Sioux leader Crazy Horse had been along the Yellowstone River in 1873. Then, Custer was protecting a survey expedition mapping a route for the Northern Pacific Railroad. Now that the economic depression had halted railroad expansion – at least for the time – Custer’s Black Hills Expedition fueled greater fires.

Further west, the same pattern was occurring with the Nez Perce tribe and its various bands. Amidst gold rushes and other incursions onto the various tribes’ homelands, a series of treaties had been made, misunderstood, and sometimes deliberately broken. It would lead to new conflict and much more bloodshed on the heels of Custer’s demise (watch for future posts on the1877 Nez Perce conflict.)

A major source of both the Sioux and Nez Perce conflicts was that white men misunderstood, or misconstrued, tribal governments. No chief spoke for all the bands, or even for all members of his own band. When a few chiefs agreed to treaties, white men often believed that agreement applied to all the related tribes. When some chiefs and leaders openly refused, their bands or tribes became known as “non-treaty” Indians. White men still presumed all belonged on reservations, though, under agreements acknowledged by a few chiefs.

In 1875 the U.S. government tried more than once to purchase the Black Hills from the Sioux. Both treaty and non-treaty chiefs repeatedly refused to sell their sacred ground. Finally, exasperated, Grant and his military abandoned their Peace Policy. They ordered all non-treaty Indians to move to reservations in the dead of winter. They then began a campaign to converge upon and crush those tribes who failed to comply.

General Philip Sheridan’s hoped-for winter campaign failed to materialize, which I’ll discuss in more detail in future posts. He did order a convergence of three military columns on non-treaty tribes, who were now called “hostiles.” The columns were intended to close in around the Powder, Tongue, Bighorn and Little Bighorn Rivers, where most non-treaty tribes were believed to be.

The advances of the three columns will bring many more discussions. Their campaign, though –after a long series of events leading up — became the march toward the final showdown. After a long build-up, and before its dénouement, the campaign would reach its climax in Custer’s final date with destiny, his Little Bighorn debacle and demise.  

The post Build-up to the Battle: What Led Up to the Little Bighorn (and the Big Hole and Bearpaws?) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

What is barely worthy of debate, however, is whether four U.S. presidents deserve a monument of some kind. In view of our nation’s founding, development, preservation and conservation some former presidents do deserve such an honor. Only a handful truly merit that consideration. I believe the four on Rushmore lead the pack by far.

Among that deserving handful of presidents only two, in my opinion, stand out above the rest. We will honor their birthdays this month. Each had personal flaws, but in the perspectives of their times and the challenges they faced, each showed unique and outstanding leadership.

In a weak society where sadly laughable terms like ‘G.O.A.T’ are often childishly applied to pampered, overpaid players of meaningless kids’ games (i.e. athletes) , the word ‘great’ is cheapened and devalued. However, “greatness” is a term that can legitimately be applied to a few truly great American presidents.

Today, on a day when all America should honor Abraham Lincoln’s birth date, I believe it’s appropriate to give a bit of background on the Fort named in his honor back in 1872. Its history might be a bit infamous, but its place in the events that would unfold 150 years ago is undeniable. It bears mention, at least in terms of honoring its namesake.

Fort Abraham Lincoln was built in 1872 mainly to protect advancing construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad. The NPRR would reach the site of Bismarck, Dakota Territory in 1873 and would continue westward. With that in mind, the fort was established on the Missouri River’s west bank, across from Bismarck.

The fort was built at the former site of a Mandan village. The Mandans had left, moving northward to settle with Hidatsas after a small pox epidemic in 1781.  A site neighboring their old village was chosen, and the fort was built first as an infantry post, hosting three companies of infantry. It was originally named Fort McKeen to honor H. Boyd McKeen, a Pennsylvania brigade commander who was killed in the battle of Cold Harbor (May 31-June 2, 1864) during America’s Civil War.

On November 19, 1872 (the anniversary of Lincoln’s excellent 1863 Gettysburg Address – try reading it and actually contemplating its words) the fort was re-designated as a cavalry post and re-named Fort Abraham Lincoln. In 1873 a larger post was authorized by Congress and was constructed about a mile to the south. By the fall of that year six companies of the 7^th Cavalry were posted there, and soon four companies of infantry joined them. Its first commander was Lt. Colonel George Custer.

Needless to say, the expanding railroad brought conflict with the region’s various tribes, who resented its incursion on what they viewed as their lands. In fact, much of that land had been ceded to the Sioux in an 1868 treaty. Making matters more volatile, the new fort would serve as a “jumping-off point for General Stanley’s 1873 Yellowstone railroad survey into the unceded lands in what is now Montana.

The economic Panic of 1873 halted railroad construction for several years, but military expeditions and campaigns originated from Fort Abraham Lincoln. It was also the launch point for the 1874 Black Hills expedition as well as General Terry’s advance in the 1876 Great Sioux War. At least one source has indicted soldiers from Fort Abraham Lincoln also fought against the Nez Perce in 1877.

Once the Northern Pacific Railroad was completed in 1888, the fort was no longer needed. It was abandoned in 1891. Over time, residents and settlers in the region dismantled most the fort in order to re-use its nails and lumber. In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt signed title to its lands over to the State of North Dakota as Fort Abraham Lincoln State Park.

I haven’t been to Fort Abraham Lincoln since boyhood, but at the time I was fascinated by the well curated Mandan earth lodges. A good bit of the fort has since been rebuilt, and the North Dakota Parks and Recreation website indicates interpretive tours are available mid-May through early September. The site also offers camping, a kayak launch and other recreational/education opportunities. I believe it’s worth a visit.

In researching this topic I noted that one writer on the Emerging Civil War web site saw the fort as representing reconciliation in some ways. Custer was re-united with his former West Point classmate Thomas Rosser, either at Fort Abraham Lincoln or on the survey expedition that originated there. Rosser, with ties to Virginia and Texas, had left West Point in order to fight for the confederacy, and he and Custer traded blows in more than one Civil War cavalry scrap. They were able to re-unite and reconcile in events involving Fort A. Lincoln. Rosser would later again serve the United States in the Spanish-American War.

Today we all should honor that great president Abraham Lincoln, a man who wanted badly to preserve and unite our nation. We can only wish and strive for those ideals in our present divided society. The fort named in his honor had a life spanning only two somewhat tumultuous decades. In retrospect many would decry the purpose it served. Today we can only hope that Fort Abraham Lincoln might in some way represent – and inspire others toward – that great president’s ideals.

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