In such a scenario, a static battle, it is also easy to picture a Gatling Gun. We would imagine it firing not just dependably, but also rapidly and repeatedly, barrel after barrel. With attackers arranged in circular surrounding lines, we can easily imagine the gun swiveling, rotating, and mowing the attackers down – without hitting the fellow soldiers who also surround the knob in a tight circle.

In 1876, reality was far different. Yes, both the Montana Column and Dakota Columns brought Gatling Guns on what is called the Yellowstone-Little Bighorn Expedition. Custer declined to take them on his final campaign, however. He had good reason.

The commands had obviously seen value the guns up to that point. Decision makers somewhere in the ranks saw their potential. Even one of Custer’s troopers later stated that he felt they might have changed the battle’s outcome.

However, at the same time others found them to be a tremendous hindrance. Their journal entries bear that out. Among them are Lt. James Bradley of the Montana Column and Lt. Edward Godfrey of the 7^th Cavalry. But first, the proponent’s viewpoint.

Sergeant Daniel Kanipe, in his 1924 account, mentioned both Gatling Guns and Rodman Guns available to Custer. (Gibbon’s Montana Column had also brought two Gatlings and a “Napoleon” cannon. They must have been left as his supply base near Fort Pease.) Kanipe later mused that Custer should have brought the artillery. Both the Rodman and Napoleon were Civil War-era cannon.

Kanipe was quoted, “There’s where he made a mistake, as we see it now, because if he had had one of those Rodman guns and had fired it one time those Indians wouldn’t have stopped running yet . . . And if we’d had one of the Gatling guns there would have been a lot more survivors than me.

Bear in mind that Kanipe survived only because he had been sent with a message to Benteen’s detachment miles to the south. Upon meeting Benteen he was heard to yell something like, “We’ve got them, boys!” Kanipe did not see how Custer’s actual battle played out. However, some merit does exist in Kanipe’s notion that case shot from cannon at a distance might have changed things before warriors engaged Custer.

James Bradley’s journal reflects a different reality regarding the Gatling guns. His first reference is to a Lt. Low, who brought the two guns from the Tongue River to Gibbon’s camp near the mouth of the Rosebud. He remarks that Low arrived the night of June 22^nd “during the night.” The distance was 28 miles, and seems to have taken a great deal of time beyond what even infantry might have required if unencumbered.

Both Bradley and 2^nd Cavalry Engineer Edward McClernand wrote of the travails of getting Gatling guns up Tollock Creek and the Bighorn River to the Little Bighorn. Guns overturnd on hills and had to be uprighted, apparently. They also had to be unhitched and lowered with ropes downhill at at least one point, requiring a great deal of manpower.

Bradley referenced the Gatling battery getting separated from the column and lost during a night march. They did indeed hamper the column’s progress. At least one reference mentions the gun detail finally reaching the column’s camp around 2:00 a.m. during the march.

Gatling guns were not light or readily mobile, necessarily. They were pulled by teams of four condemned horses – in other words by mounts no longer fit for cavalry use. The required manpower as well. The Dakota Column’s battery comprised 32 men plus officers.

Gatlings were also not unfailingly dependable either. Although capable of firing up to 350 rounds per minute, they were plagued by two common nemeses: overheating and fouling. Their rapid fire would obviously heat barrels quickly. Also, they pushed solid lead bullets, which helped to foul barrels. Smokeless powder would not find common use for another 20 years; the black powder of the day also fouled barrels quickly, which led to firing issues.

It is said Custer was offered extra cavalry from Gibbon’s command but declined it. Some speculate, understandably, that Custer did not want to share the anticipated laurels with another regiment. Others concede that Custer also might have found it less efficient to include troops that were not familiar to him or his command. Godfrey later wrote, sensibly, that Terry realized dividing Gibbon’s command would have left him unduly weakened, with only a few hundred infantry men.

Historian Thom Hatch wrote that Custer initially did accept the offer of Gatling guns but changed his mind an hour later. Godfrey and others described Custer’s directives to troop commanders that they be ready to travel light and fast. He planned to pursue the “hostiles” indefinitely, even if their 15 days’ rations ran out and they had to eat their pack mules. He wanted no encumbrance, which the Gatlings obviously would have been.

Hatch credits other historians with the observation that, had Custer taken Gatling guns, they would likely have delayed his movements. In turn, other events would have played out differently. Therefore, Custer might not have died June 25, 1876, if he had been delayed by taking Gatling guns. An interesting thought.

While a long-range shelling before direct attack would likely have change Custer’s outcome, he opted not to take a Rodman or Napoleon gun. If Gatling guns had been present, no one can say what difference one or more might have made. It is feasible the cumbersome, manpower-intensive guns would have helped – assuming their crews might have escaped arrows arching their way from hidden attackers.

It is just as likely Gatling guns would not have helped Custer, even they had not delayed him and he had attacked that afternoon of June 25, 1876. No one will really know exactly how that battle transpired, or what its outcome might have been, if Custer had brought Gatling guns to the Little Bighorn.

The post Should Custer Have Taken Gatling Guns? (And/Or More Cavalry?) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Pro-Custer and Anti-Custer factions existed long before his Little Bighorn demise. They had taken root during America’s Civil War. In part, Custer rose in rank quickly and others felt personal or professional jealousy. Some dislike was based on personality as well, and some was attributed to his actions.

The factions seemed to rise up in earnest, as Colonel William Graham wrote, before Custer’s body had even cooled. With that in mind, the debate over whether Custer disregarded orders or not is often based on one’s personal bias. This will be an attempt at an objective analysis.

The Question

So . . . Did Custer really disobey orders? In a word, NO. How could he? The orders General Terry gave to Custer are so ambiguous, ambivalent and open-ended that they could not possibly be disobeyed. If anything, they were written in such a way as to save Terry’s neck if anything went wrong. And it did.

The Orders

On June 22, 1876 Custer marched out with written orders as follows:

Headquarters Department of Dakota, (In the Field,)

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana, June 22, 1876

Lt. Colonel Custer, 7ty Cavalry.

Colonel: The Brigadier-General commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno as few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement; and were it not impossible to do so, the department commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders, which might hamper you action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.  He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads.  Should it be found (as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found) to turn toward the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank.

The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Little and Big Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as the arise; but it is hoped that the Indians if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed (sic) by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek; and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. . . [bold/italics mine]

The Conclusion

It is evident from those written orders that Terry gave Custer complete leeway, and even encouragement, to use his judgment. Even when expressing his desire for Custer to move to the headwaters of the Rosebud and Tongue drainages, he framed it as just that – a desire, not a directive. The only area in which Custer might have disobeyed is in regard to scouting upper Tullock’s Creek and sending George Herendeen to convey the findings. But Custer checked even that box.

A June 26^th Directive?

There are those who try to vilify Custer by saying some sort of “unwritten” orders or agreement existed. Some say that in the final officers’ an agreement was made setting June 26^th as a hard and fast date at which Custer and Gibbon’s commands would meet. Custer was to attack from the south, and Gibbon’s column would arrive on foot (they were mainly infantry) following the Little Bighorn.

It is documented that the topic was discussed in general terms in that meeting aboard the steamboat Far West. Major Brisbin, of Gibbon’s Montana Column, reportedly marked out and pinned a map showing roughly how far each column thought it could move in a given day. Thus June 26^th appeared to be a vague and general target date. However, no one attests that a written or verbal order to meet June 26^th ever existed.

The Views of Those Involved

In fact, multiple officers (and historians) stated how unrealistic such an order would have been. The Indians were extremely mobile and well mounted, with most households owning several horses. To think an infantry column could somehow catch them, or block and engage them in battle is ludicrous.

Lt. Edward Godfrey wrote a lengthy account years later, and he commented on other accounts. In his 1892 Century Magazine article, Godfrey notes that General Terry’s battle report contradicts his actual orders. (Terry claimed he had stated the travois trail should not be followed if it led toward the Little bighorn. His actual orders state otherwise.) Godfrey later added, “A careful perusal of orders issued to Custer will show that the General was given practically a free hand. If any supplemental instructions were given they were never revealed . . .”

Godfrey went on to state it was absurd to think two commands of 700 and 400 soldiers, respectively, could coordinate “in that open country” could . . . “hold the Hostiles for a co-operative attack.” Anyone who had seen the battlefield and its surrounding terrain knows that moving columns of soldiers and their dust clouds would have been easily visible to hunting parties, even if tribal scout were not out.

Godfrey, who served in Benteen’s troop, later attained the rank of General. His insights are invaluable. In regard to the open country, he also wrote the “country toward Tullock’s Fork was under surveillance.” It appears Custer had not failed to obey there either. His timing regarding sending Herendeen back as a courier appears his only failing. It would have changed nothing in what followed.

Bradley and Brisbin

Also, multiple officers indicated they knew Custer had leeway to attack when he deemed it appropriate. Lt. James Bradley wrote in his journal, “. . . it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent . . .”

If, as historian Edgar Stewart believed, a New York Herald piece had come from Major Brisbin, it also reflects the other column’s understanding that Custer was free to attack at will. Its writer stated, “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow.” [bold and italics mine, both quotes]

Private William O. Taylor

Private William O. Taylor, who rode with Reno, wrote an invaluable account that was not published until 1996. He included, “General Custer, with the Seventh Cavalry and scouts, was to take up the trail Major Reno had found and follow it, to some conclusion. . . The question as to whether General Custer fully obeyed these instructions has been extensively debated . . . In his official orders General Custer was given a certain latitude of action.” [again, bold and italics mine]

A Sliver of Doubt

In fairness, Taylor also mentions specific instructions. He questioned whether Custer was justified in all his actions, but he deferred to the views of those in higher rank. He offered no opinion of his own.

In his account published in 1877, Colonel Gibbon did allude to a discussion of the troops meeting “the third day.” However, even if Custer had waited until the 26^th to attack, Gibbon’s column would not have been there. Gibbon’s command finally approached the battlefield and abandoned village at evening on the 26^th. Their presence was well known (hence the abandoned village.) No “hostiles” would have fled their way or remained stationary to be attacked.

What We Do Know

This much is known: Custer did not follow the trail into the Little Bighorn drainage until he realized his troops’ presence was known. Troopers including trumpeter/orderly John Martin stated Custer had planned to rest his troops and not attack until June 26^th. (A surprise dawn attack was far preferable than the afternoon action Custer settled for.)

When Custer realized “hostiles” had seen his troops, he felt compelled to attack early for fear the hostiles would flee and disperse. Had the large gathering dispersed, the months-long campaign would have failed. Had “the hostiles escaped,” as Godfrey wrote, “who would have shouldered the blame?”

While Custer’s judgment is subject to question, it strongly appears he did not disobey orders. It was other factors, still discussed and debated, that led to his demise at the Little Bighorn.

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A Reporter Riding Along

General Alfred Terry had been sent in charge of the Dakota Column. Lieutenant Colonel Custer had angered President Grant. Initially he was denied permission to go. However, with support from his Civil War superiors and mounting political pressure, the popular Custer was finally allowed along.

While admonishing Custer, Commanding General of the Army William T. Sherman ordered Terry not to take reporters, “who always make mischief.” Kellogg came anyway. The Bismarck Daily Tribune benefitted, along with the New York Herald. Kellogg, a stringer for both newspapers, did not.

A Prophetic Preamble

Kellogg is best known for his classic lines to the Tribune, “We leave the Rosebud tomorrow and by the time this reaches you we will have met and fought the red devils, with what result remains to be seen. I go with Custer and will be in at the death.” [italics added]  In hindsight those words ring poetic, prophetic and ominous.

The Bismarck Tribune’s editor agreed. It led off its astounding July 6, 1876 extra with Kellogg’s prophetic words. Word of Custer’s unthinkable defeat and annihilation had just reached Bismarck the night of July 5^th when the steamboat Far West arrived bearing the battle’s wounded.

A Phantom Telegraph?

Oddly, several writers overlook the obvious; they ignorantly state that Kellogg telegraphed his last dispatch to the Tribune. Nothing could be farther from the truth. One of the distinct challenges of Custer’s last campaign was the lack of telegraph wires or other efficient forms of communication.

In fact, the entire campaign was hampered by that distinct challenge. Three military columns had all been sent to seek out and attack non-reservation Indians, viewed as “hostiles,” in the Powder, Tongue, and Bighorn River region. No command really knew the others’ whereabouts most of the time.

The three “converging” columns were effectively unable to communicate. In fact, Reno was within roughly 40 miles of General Crook’s Wyoming Column at the time of the Rosebud Battle. Reno went north up Rosebud Creek while Crook was attacked and turned back south.

The communication challenge was two-fold. First, couriers had to ride miles and days through lands teeming with hostile Sioux and Cheyenne. The closest telegraphs were at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Fort Ellis, or Fort Fetterman respectively. These posts lay 200 to 300 miles or more from the Powder River, Rosebud, and Bighorn drainages.

Any telegram would had to be sent by courier back to one of the forts. Then, the messages were telegraphed to the Department Headquarters in Chicago or St. Paul – or at best to whichever fort might served as the recipient’s home base. Then that message must be relayed by courier out to the officer for whom it was intended.

Any reply would require that the process be reversed. Return messages then had to be taken back by courier to the nearest fort, then telegraphed to the recipient’s home fort. Another courier then had to relay it to its recipient at an unknown location.

All of that to say that Kellogg’s final dispatch was hardly telegraphed. He had to send his missives downriver by whatever boat might be travelling that way. His previous dispatch, dated June 12, had been dropped into the Yellowstone River with an entire mail bag of mail while being loaded onto the steamboat Josephine. Some diligent souls spent an entire night opening letters and messages, then spreading them out and drying them by a fire.

Slow News Days

Kellogg had chronicled parts of the column’s travels and experiences thus far. However, he had relatively little to report. In more than 300 miles of marching, patrolling and scouting, the Dakota Column had not seen a single Indian – except their own Ree scouts.

That was about to change. It might be understandable that most in the command were eager for some action. In fact, Gibbon’s column held the same anticipation, which would soon turn to disappointment.

Kellogg’s final dispatch, hand-written, described the changing terrain and natural history. He even commented on how ripe the Rosebud drainage looked for “economic” development. He castigated Reno and praised Custer. It might well have appealed to Bismarck Tribune readers.

Aside from that, Kellogg had no action to report – except that he planned to march out with Custer’s 12 cavalry troops, and that he expected they would find “hostiles” and fight them. He expected to be “in at the death.” He neglected to specify whose death.

At The Death?

Kellogg’s words “at the death” ring poetic. Several writers have noted that they are an expression used previously in fox hunts. Apparently those who rode fancy horses and chased foxes with hounds strove to finish the fox and be “at the death.”

The expression, interestingly, was used by two other members of that campaign. In his journal, also on June 21, Lt. James H. Bradley expressed frustration and disappointment when he wrote, “. . . it is understood that if Custer arrives first, he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent. We have little hope of being in at the death [my italics], as Custer will undoubtedly exert himself to the utmost to get there first and win all the laurels for himself and his regiment. . .”

In his excellent book Custer’s Luck historian Edgar Stewart noted a New York Herald article printed July 8,1876 amidst the battle’s aftershocks. The piece mentions General Terry’s meeting with his higher-ranking officers. It then states, “It was announced by General Terry that General Custer’s column would strike the blow and General Gibbon and his men received the decision without a murmur. There was great rivalry between the two columns and each wanted to be in at the death. . .” [italics mine]

Stewart stated the article was written by a member of Gibbon’s command. He believed Major James Brisbin was likely the source. Brisbin led the 2^nd Cavalry troops that were combined with infantry under Gibbon. Brisbin was noted for some published writings. Given the duplicated wording and Bradley’s literary bent, however, it seems he also could have been the source.

Regardless, the repeated use of “at the death” makes Kellogg’s final dispatch and others stand out stark and ominous. Four days later, on June 25, 1876 Kellogg would be in at his own death at the Little Bighorn.

Remains and Relics

Gibbon’s troops would arrive, somewhat as predicted, to deal with the aftermath. When combing the battlefield for survivors or corpses, Gibbon’s men found Kellogg’s body well below most of Custer’s dead. It lay and closer to the Little Bighorn near a ravine where others had apparently attempted to escape.

It is unknown if Kellogg was killed there early in Custer’s advance, or in a later attempt to flee. His body, curiously, had been stripped. He had been scalped, and an ear was missing (given his ‘mutton-chop’ whiskers, perhaps one of those had been scalped away, as Lt. W.W. Cooke’s had been.)

Kellogg could be identified only by his civilian clothes and the unique boots he wore. They had an unusual strap that buckled over the arch, and they had not been taken.

Some of Kellogg’s belongings had been left back at a supply base at the Powder River. They now belong to the North Dakota State Historical Society and may be displayed in its museum. A notebook of Kellogg’s is also there, but it holds no entries past June 9, 1876. It is unknown if the notebook was found near his body or had been left behind.

Kellogg’s Legacy

The Bismarck Tribune was in close cahoots with the New York Herald. Even in death Kellogg helped the Herald sell countless copies. In an earlier Kellogg bio it was noted that the New York Herald’s publisher helped Kellogg’s two daughters financially, along with the aunt who had taken them in. In the end, maybe being “at the death” did benefit Kellogg in some way, as his lifeless body rested near the Little Bighorn.

EXTRA: THE BIG SKY SCOOP

News of Custer’s defeat had reached Bozeman, MT via courier on July 3rd. Due to telegraph wires being down, a stringer instead sent the dispatch to Helena, but not before the Bozeman Times ran an ‘extra’ at 7 p.m. on July 3^rd. The Helena Herald received the report on July 4^th and ran its astounding ‘extra’ that evening. It also sent the new by wire to the Associated Press in Salt Lake City.

The steamboat Far West, bearing Reno and Benteens’ wounded survivors reached Bismarck the night of July 5,1876 on the heels of America’s first centennial celebration. The New York Herald then got the news by telegraph and published it on July7. It followed up with several reports, including the letter above.) Other papers had gotten the AP report, but the New York Herald ran ongoing reports for more than a week, due to its Bismarck Tribune connection.

The post “At The Death:” Reporter Mark Kellogg’s Final Dispatch: (“I Go With Custer . . .”) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

A few particularly peculiar parallels exist between 7^th Cavalry captain Myles Keogh and Fetterman’s bugler Adolph Metzger. One such parallel might relate to Indian accounts of one soldier who stood out. If all accounts describe only one of the many soldiers, then he alone stands out as the bravest man the Sioux and Cheyenne fought that day. Several candidates exist, however.

Metzger and Myles Keogh Similarities

One thread that connects Metzger and Keogh is their horses that survived. Metzger had ridden a horse named “Dapple Dave.” When more troops arrived, they found all of Fetterman’s command, including two civilians, dead. Only Dapple Dave survived, too badly wounded to be valued by the victors. Due to severe wound(s), though, Dapple Dave had to be shot.

Myles Keogh’s mount Comanche is well known as the only cavalry survivor found by General Terry’s troops after the Little Bighorn battle. Comanche had been wounded seven times, but he was kept alive and became a mascot for the surviving soldiers. He managed to make the 12-mile journey to the Little Bighorn’s mouth, where the steamboat Far West waited.

Comanche was then shipped downriver with the wounded. After the 700–mile trip to Fort Abraham Lincoln, Comanche was never used by soldiers again. When he died in 1891 his remains were preserved through taxidermy. They remain on display in a University of Kansas museum.

A more striking parallel between the two soldiers is that their remains were not mutilated. All soldiers were stripped of their uniforms. Accounts vary, but most were mutilated by the victors in some form. Metzger’s story remains sketchy because no soldiers survived, but by many accounts Indians later attested that he had fought bravely to the end.

Metzger is said to have fired a Spencer carbine until he ran out of ammunition. He then used his bugle, his only remaining weapon, as a bludgeon. He fought so bravely and tenaciously that warriors showed him respect. Not only was his body not mutilated, it was found covered with either a blanket or buffalo hide.

Keogh, likewise, was found stripped but unmutilated. Equally interesting is that he wore a Catholic Pro Petri Sede medal, which was not taken by the victors (most items of interest of value were taken when bodies were stripped). Awarded after his service in the Irish papal guard and conflicts, the medal is believed by some to have been seen by Indians as “strong medicine.”

Others believe Keogh remained un-desecrated because of his bravery – a possible parallel to Metzger. Coincidences might hint at a pattern of thought or behavior.

The Little Bighorn’s Bravest Soldier

A number of Indians, including Sitting Bull and Gall, later credited Custer’s soldiers for fighting bravely. Granted, some accounts may have been tailored to suit what the tellers thought white recorders wanted to hear – or to what would spare them possible retribution. However, the Sioux warrior Red Horse and the Cheyenne Wooden Leg both specifically spoke of one who stood out as the bravest soldier they had ever fought against. Keogh might have been that man.

Wooden Leg’s account says that the last soldier to die with Custer’s command was finished off as non-combatants swarmed the battlefield. He said one officer, wounded, raised up on one elbow and “glared wildly” at the Indians as he wielded his revolver. The Indians withdrew, thinking he had “returned from the spirit world.”

A warrior finally approached and turned the man’s own pistol on him. Some accounts say the man wore “white metal bars.” That would indicate he was a captain, maybe Keogh.

Red Horse and others spoke of a man wearing a buckskin shirt and either leading troops bravely or turning his horse to protect troops as they retreated. Two Moon’s and Wooden Legs’ accounts describe a man dressed in buckskin, with long, black hair and a moustache. The man “fought hard with a big knife.” (Custer’s troops had left their sabers back at the Powder River supply depot.) They describe witnessing this bravery on the ridges where Custer’s troops were surrounded. 

Two Moon describes the man’s horse as a sorrel with a white face and white forelegs. The description could fit Custer’s horse Vic, but it also could fit a dust-covered Comanche (especially if the mount’s forelegs had gotten wet in the Little Bighorn and then caked with the dust that was plentiful on the battlefield.) However, that description could also have fit other horses, including some ridden by those with Reno’s command.

In two accounts Red Horse described an “officer” wearing a buckskin coat and a wide-brimmed hat. He said he, and numerous other Indians, believed this was the bravest man they ever fought. He stated the man rode a horse with four white feet.

However, in both accounts Red Horse places the man at the camp’s south end, early in the battle when Reno attacked and retreated. Red Horse said of the man, “He alone saved his command a number of times in the retreat.” This matches the account of Captain Thomas French.

Captain French’s Account

French later wrote in a personal letter, “I don’t wonder that Red Horse thought me a spirit from the bad place. . .” He went on to state that in Reno’s retreat alone he had shot eight pursuers and had seen them fall from their ponies.

In his letter French had questioned Reno’s retreat. He stated, “And when all had gone for safety was when I sought death – and tried to fight the battle alone . . . If one man could hold back seven or eight hundred, what might not a hundred and twenty have done . . .” French also hinted, not-so-subtly, that it had crossed his mind he should have shot Reno.

Who Wore Buckskin?

French might have worn buckskin that day, but at least eight men in Custer’s command had done so also. Multiple witnesses, including trumpeter John Martin, stated Custer had not worn his buckskin coat that day but wore a blue-gray flannel shirt. Others in Reno’s command might have worn buckskin, including Lonesome Charley Reynolds, another possible candidate for “bravest” honors.

Eye witnesses seem not to have recorded the actual death of Reynolds, but it is known he remained behind Reno’s wild retreat. It appears Reynolds was abandoned. The scout’s horse is not described either. Regardless, accounts indicate Reynolds was “unhorsed” at some point. Spent cartridges around his body showed he had fought fiercely to the end.

Reynolds may have used his horse, or another dead mount, as a barricade. Accounts do indicate he was seen deliberately fighting a “rear-guard” action singlehandedly. Red Horse may have referred to Reynolds.

Long Black Hair and a Big Moustache

A photo of French shows thick dark hair and a very large moustache. However, that description seems to belong to the brave man described by Two Moon on Custer’s battlefield. French was with Reno. Wooden Leg described his possible last man to die as having long black hair and a stubbly beard, with a moustache bigger than the beard.

Bear in mind the 7^th Cavalry had been campaigned more than five weeks before the Little Bighorn battle. Some may have shaved, but not frequently. Many who appear trimmed and clean-cut in prior photos may have had longer hair and stubbly beards by then. Even Reynolds, who was described by Libby Custer as unusually clean-cut for a scout, might well have fit that description.

Mysteries surround the Little Bighorn fight. They always will. One that remains is who that bravest soldier might have been. Others include the question why Myles Keogh, like Adolph Metzger 10 years prior, was not mutilated at the Little Bighorn.

The post The Metzger/Myles Keogh Connection and the Little Bighorn’s Bravest Soldier appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Life-saving Assignments

Dutifully, Godfrey checked in only after ensuring his troop was duly prepared. As a result he was assigned to the rear, along with the regiment’s mule train. It saved his life. Those who went ahead with Custer – and many who went with Major Reno – died at the Little Bighorn.

It appears the designation of orderlies followed a similar process. On June 25^th trumpeter John Martin was designated as the colonel’s Orderly of the Day, or one of several. As with Godfrey, it saved his life.

Developing Battle Plans

Custer divided his command as he approached the sought-after village of “hostiles” on the afternoon of June 25^th. First he sent Benteen, the regiment’s senior captain, with three troops sweeping southward. He was to ensure the command would not miss hostiles encamped or fleeing in that direction. The regiment’s pack mules lagged behind under the protection of a single cavalry company.

Custer then detached Major Reno with a second battalion of three troops. Reno was ordered to proceed as fast as he could and charge into the encampment’s south end. Tall hills and bluffs obscured the village from Custer’s view, so he did not yet realize its exact location or extent. He told Reno he would support him with the whole regiment.

After separating northward from Major Reno’s attack, Custer topped a hill and saw more of the village and its layout along the Little Bighorn. However, he saw only a portion of the village. He did not fully realize what he was up against (despite repeated warnings from his scouts that they would face an overwhelming force.) Custer saw enough to make him realize he needed Benteen’s battalion to complete his developing battle plan. He wanted more ammunition too.

Misconstrued Call For Cartridges

Some writers construe Custer’s call for ammunition as a sign of desperation. History, including Martin’s later account, show it was more an afterthought. Troopers carried 50 rifle rounds in their ammunition belts and 100 more in saddle bags. They also carried 24 revolver rounds apiece. Custer’s message was not sent under duress.

Martin’s Account

Trumpeter Martin’s written account nearly 50 years later provides some of the best insight into Custer’s plans and intentions. As Custer’s orderly, Martin rode within a few yards of Custer until detached with a message for Benteen. Martin heard and witnessed most of the orders as they were given out. They reveal a great deal.

Martin states Custer told Reno he would have Benteen hurry northward and attack the village’s center. Custer would “drive them” (the hostiles) from the north.

Martin’s account is included, along with numerous others, in Colonel William A. Graham’s tremendous resource book “The Custer Myth, A Source Book of Custeriana.” The only caveat is that Martin was an Italian immigrant who had just arrived in America two years prior. His difficulty with English may have caused misunderstanding of some statements, or miscommunication of others. (He referenced that in regard to his 1879 testimony in the Reno Court of Inquiry.)

Custer’s First Impressions

Martin relates that upon seeing the village Custer first noticed no warriors. He was unable to see Reno’s advance or the warriors that were rushing to meet him. Custer is said to have commented the men appeared to be asleep still in their tepees. (Some, in fact, were rising late after their large social dances the previous night.) Martin related that Custer then commented only that his command had “got them this time.” He was likely still under the impression the hostiles were fleeing.

Custer turned and yelled, according to Martin, “Hurrah, boys, we’ve got them! We’ll finish them up and then go home to our station.” Then he and Martin returned to the troops, conferred with adjutant Cooke, and proceeded another mile northward at a trot and gallop. Martin estimated they had gone three miles from where Reno was detached.

Only after reaching a ravine leading downward toward the Little Bighorn (Medicine Tail Coulee) did Custer detach Martin with his classic message to Benteen. First Custer ordered Martin to ride as fast as he could to Benteen and tell him to hurry. Martin recounts Custer’s mention of a big village and Benteen’s need to be quick – and to bring the ammunition packs.

The Historic Dispatch

Custer’s adjutant, Lt. W.W. Cooke, told Martin to wait while he hurriedly wrote the command out in a small memo book. He then tore the page out and handed it to Martin. That message is the classic, “Benteen, come on – big village – be quick – bring packs. P.S. – bring packs.” Even most casual students of the battle know of it.

Martin related that his horse was fatigued, but he rode as fast as he was able over the troops’ back trail. He was fired on by a small group of warriors and was thankful he was not hit. He realized only later that a round had hit his horse. He related that when he topped the hill where he and Custer first surveyed the village, he could now see Reno’s skirmish line as it fell back under attack.

Boston Custer had left his brothers’ battalion earlier when his horse “played out.” He had gone back to the pack train in order to obtain a replacement. Martin met him near the high hill. Boston asked where the “general” was, and Martin directed him northward. Boston’s body was later found near those of his brothers. Under orders to hurry, Martin continued south.

Martin’s Message

Finally locating Benteen, Martin conveyed his message. Benteen asked, “Where’s the General now?” Martin relates he replied they had seen Indians running and he believed by that time Custer had charged through the village. That information undoubtedly played into Benteen’s subsequent course of action. Reno would soon appear far more in need of help than Custer did at that time.

Martin belonged to Benteen’s company and was directed to stay with it. That order also helped preserve his life. He remained with Reno and Benteen’s combined forces under siege for two days but survived. He related an attempt to move the forces in Custer’s direction once they had reorganized (despite the challenge of caring for wounded troopers). Overwhelming numbers of Indians prevented the move, and the besieged forces fell back. They believed Custer had withdrawn northward to join Terry and Gibbon’s column.

Background and Military Career

Born Giovanni Martini in Rome in 1851, Martin had been a drummer boy in the Army of Liberation by age 14. By 1866 he apparently served as a soldier against Austrians in Italy’s armed conflict. He came to America in 1873 and soon enlisted in the U.S. Army. He was assigned to Benteen’s H Company, 7^th Cavalry in time to experience its Black Hills Expedition. His name was “Americanized” to John Martin.

A Grateful Immigrant

A grateful immigrant, Martin served out a 30-year army career. He is said to have taken pride in his service and in the fact that his two sons both served honorably too. He admired Custer and even named a son for him. Army lawyer Col. William Graham noted Martin donned his old uniform for years and never missed a chance to “honor the Stars and Stripes.”

Martin retired to New York City in 19004 and worked as a subway ticket agent for years, dying in 1922. His long and productive life were made possible because he had been designated for orderly duty. They were ensured when Custer detached him with a classic dispatch at the Little Bighorn.

The post Trumpeter John Martin and His Life-Saving Dispatch At The Little Bighorn appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

General Alfred Terry, leading the Dakota Column, had sent Reno out on June 10. Reno had directions to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to move westward down Mizpah Creek, then ascend Pumpkin Creek to the Tongue River and descend the Tongue to the Yellowstone. He followed only a part of those orders.

Reno was to ensure no hostiles lurked in the Powder and Tongue River drainages. Taking six cavalry companies and the mixed-blood scout Mitch Bouyer, he was provisioned with 10 days’ rations and forage. Perhaps due to Bouyer’s influence, he became sidetracked. Bouyer, with Lt. James Bradley, had observed a large Sioux village on Rosebud Creek several weeks earlier.

Reno barely touched the Tongue drainage, potentially leaving hostiles to attack the column from behind. Worse, he disobeyed Terry’s orders to stay out of the Rosebud drainage. The entire campaign’s effort could have been jeopardized if Reno’s detachment had been detected. The large gathering of hostiles would have dispersed.

It is noted that Custer strongly believed, like others, that no hostiles remained in the drainages east of the Rosebud. However, true to his nature, he wished to lead the mission. Historian Edgar Stuart noted Custer had already led a fruitless scouting foray on the Little Missouri. Some writers speculate that General Terry wanted to spread assignments out in order to avoid showing favoritism.

Regardless, it undoubtedly chafed Custer to see the assignment go to his rival and subordinate. He and Reno had never liked each other. Custer would soon get his chance, though, with all 12 companies of his 7^th Cavalry Regiment.

In the open, un-timbered terrain, Reno apparently felt he could see down into enough of Mizpah Creek to warrant bypassing it. He then scouted little of the Tongue, instead taking up a heavy lodgepole trail made by a large number of Indians and their ponies pulling travois, or pony-drags. He followed it well into the Rosebud Creek drainage, then backtracked and followed the Rosebud down to the Yellowstone.

Terry had specifically directed Reno to avoid Rosebud Creek. Upon learning Reno’s flaunting of his orders he fumed. He was concerned that Reno’s relatively small force would merely tip off the large, multi-tribe gathering that his column sought to locate. It is hinted that he would have arrested and Court-martialed Reno had he not been the regiment’s only major.

At least one writer states that Terry suspected Reno had hoped to best Custer, his superior officer, whom he despised. Custer was also indignant at Reno’s half-way attempt to follow the moving hostiles. He too was concerned Reno had spoiled the regiment’s chances for a surprise attack.

In a letter to his wife, however, Custer lamented that Reno had come so close but had failed to attack. He decried the waste of time. Custer also rued what, to him, was a missed opportunity. That mindset toward Reno’s best course of action might explain Custer’s own upcoming decisions (More on that topic to come.)

It should be noted that even General Sheridan, in Chicago, had no real expectation that a mobile bunch of nomads could be trapped and crushed between even two converging columns, much less three. Edgar Stewart, among others, noted that each column was believed capable of attacking and defeating any hostiles alone.

Reno’s junket bore little direct result. He had seen no Indians. However, the fact that he had seen a wide and heavy travois trail brought impending results – or consequences. The fact that he had disobeyed orders and potentially compromised the column’s mission made things even more urgent.

A lot legend and folklore exist regarding Custer’s personality and motives. Perpetuated by Hollywood and the “dime novel” mentality, these conceptions have muddied the waters. However, objective historians can agree that Custer was impetuous, audacious and exuberant if nothing else. Reno’s report could have served only to stoke those fires.

With Custer, General Terry moved the command to their designated meeting place near the  mouth of the Tongue River during Reno’s absence. Messengers brought him news of Reno’s prodigal return down the Rosebud. After a hard march on June 20^th the regiment reunited. New plans were made based on Reno’s report.

It was noted by General Terry that Reno’s horses and pack mules were “tired and badly spent.” The existing plan had been for Custer to take nine companies back up the Tongue River on Reno’s return and then scout down the Rosebud drainage. All that changed, however, based on Reno’s report. All twelve companies would ascend the Rosebud.

The condition of mounts and mules in Custer’s last contingent has been the topic of much speculation. It may be that the animals’ fatigued condition played a role in the mission’s outcome.

On June 22 Custer set forth with all 12 companies of the 7^th Cavalry. Presumably, he was already worried that Reno’s abandoned travois trail was growing colder. He would have set out with an underlying urgency that must have colored his upcoming decisions. That urgency would be compounded two days later when it Custer realized his command’s presence had been discovered.

Had Reno obeyed his orders, Custer’s actions would likely have not been much different. He would have found the lodgepole trail when he reached the Rosebud, and he would have locked onto it like a bloodhound. Even his letters bear out that he planned to pursue the hostiles, once on their trail, even if his rations ran out and the regiment had to eat their mules.

Regardless, the result of Reno’s scout and report can be said to have reaped one result. They threw fuel on the fires that would lead to destiny on the Little Bighorn.

The post Results of Reno’s Powder River “Recon” And His Recalcitrant Rosebud Foray appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Exactly two months later, on June 17, 1876 the Cheyenne and Sioux surprised Crook. They stopped his advance and sent him back southward He retreated once again, in effect, to rehabilitate, re-supply and await reinforcements.

Many Cheyenne were present at both engagements; they would also be present at the Little Bighorn battle. Two stood out, not only through their actions at that time but also for their valued accounts later recorded by researcher Thomas Marquis. They are Two Moon and Wooden Leg.

The Cheyennes, sadly, had direct and indirect connection to conflicts farther south as well. They began in part with Colonel John Chivington’s despicable 1864 attack on Black Kettle’s village. The treachery took place along Sand Creek in present-day Colorado and at best can be called a massacre. 

Tragically, Custer’s Washita attack in November 1868 also came against Black Kettle’s village of generally peaceable Southern Cheyennes. It was part of a campaign targeting Cheyenne raiders. They had carried out a pattern of depredations ranging north into Kansas. Their raids included murders and kidnapping of women and children.

Custer had followed a band of raiders who left a trail to Black Kettle’s camp. Unbeknownst to Custer and his scouts, the culprits had already moved on to other villages strung out over miles along the creek. Black Kettle and his wife were both killed, along with other innocents.

At Washita, soldiers witnessed a Cheyenne woman killing a white child to keep him from being freed. They also found a captive white woman and her child who had been killed for the same purpose. The entire affair was tragic.

Following Chivington’s debauched massacre, a number of Cheyennes engaged in hostilities against increasing numbers of white intruders into their traditional homelands. These included the elder Two Moon. He and other Cheyennes also joined Sioux allies in what would be called Red Cloud’s War.

Across expansive distances, word of conflicts, intrusions and wrongs traveled with impressive effectiveness. When Sitting Bull summoned tribes to gather in 1876, most who came belonged to Sioux sub-tribes. A large contingent of their Northern Cheyenne allies came too.

The Cheyennes would play a large and significant role in the defeats of Crook on the Rosebud and Custer at the Little Bighorn. It is asserted that some there remembered Custer’s attack at Washita.

Two Moon

Accounts involving Two Moon become confused because two Cheyennes actually bore that name. The elder was a chief and leader. His nephew, the younger Two Moon apparently was born around 1857 and participated in actions against Crook and Custer in 1876. The elder Two Moon is said to have led an attack against Fort Phil Kearny in 1866 in Red Cloud’s War; he also refused to sign the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty.

Both Two Moons were likely present when General Crook attacked their Powder River camp in March 1876. Before the Rosebud Battle in June, a hunting party including Two Moon noticed Crook’s Wyoming Column well before it knew of their tribe’s location. Soon a raiding party made an attempt to steal the column’s horses and mules. In May 1876, Two Moon had helped steal horses from Crow scouts with Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column.

One or both Two Moons would have been present on June 17^th, 1876 when Cheyenne and Sioux warriors surprised Crook’s column on Rosebud Creek. While the battle is considered a tactical draw, the attack had the strategic affect of turning Crook back southward. Had he continued northward, one can only speculate as to  what might have unfolded involving the Little Bighorn a week later.

While neither Two Moon is noted for specific actions at the Little Bighorn, each continued leading the tribe in the trying times after the battle. After Nelson Miles’ attack on Cheyenne chief Dull Knife’s band in early 1877, Two Moon surrendered and went to a reservation. Before the year’s end, at least one of the two served as a scout in Mile’s campaign against the Nez Perce in their flight toward Canada.

Like Red Cloud and other Indian leaders, Two Moon traveled to Washington, D.C. as a diplomat for his people’s cause. Accounts vary as to the model for the Indian profile on the 1913 Indian Head/Buffalo nickel Historian Thom Hatch specifies a James Fraser designed the 1913 nickel using Two Moon’s likeness. Fraser actually said he used a composite of three different models. Two Moon was one of them.

Wooden Leg

Also born in the late 1850’s, Wooden Leg is thought to have been 16 years old at the Little Bighorn battle. He had actually played a significant earlier role. Wooden Leg was part of the hunting party that discovered Crook’s Wyoming Column as it wandered off-course near the Tongue River. He was also likely a part of Little Hawk’s raiding party that skirmished with Crook a few days later.

The skirmishes yielded no real casualties on either side, other than a few horses killed. They may, however, have misled Crook’s men into overconfidence (just as past successes against Indians may have influenced Custer.) Crook had made camp below a bluff, from which Cheyennes rained potshots down at long distance. Each time soldiers advanced toward them, they wisely moved accordingly, keeping out of range of the infantry’s long-barreled rifles.

Wooden Leg was likely present when Cheyennes joined Sioux allies in their surprise attack on Crook’s column on Rosebud Creek. The attack occurred June 17, 1876. Again, while it resulted in little more than a stalemate, it affected what would occur over the following eight days.

Wooden Leg claimed no outstanding exploits at the Little Bighorn. However, he was present in the routing of Reno at the village’s south end. He then moved north to join the defense and attack against Custer’s battalion. He did state he took a carbine from a retreating trooper during Reno’s disorganized dash back across the Little Bighorn. However, his notable contribution would come later.

Decades later physician and Custer researcher Thomas Marquis interviewed Wooden Leg, who by then was in his 70’s. Wooden Leg described in detail the phases of Indian movement as they overwhelmed Custer’s command. He also added notable insight into what might have been a large factor in the battle.

Again, accounts are many and varied. However, Marquis firmly believed multiple Cheyenne accounts. Wooden Leg stated that many of Custer’s troops either shot each other or shot themselves in the face of overwhelming warriors surrounding them. He also stated many troopers’ canteens contained whiskey (bought from a trader at the mouth of the Rosebud before they embarked).

Wooden Leg and other Cheyennes believed the soldiers showed signs of intoxication, which might have contributed to individual or mutual suicides. Even dehydration due to alcohol consumption would have diminished fighting abilities on that notably hot afternoon. Regardless, Marquis believed multiple Cheyenne accounts regarding whiskey and soldiers killing themselves.

Wooden Leg was sent to Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) after joining Dull Knife’s 1877 surrender. He was allowed to return and served as a scout for the U.S. Army in the 1880’s. He then served as a tribal judge as his people assimilated, living until 1940.

Neither Two Moon or Wooden Leg became notorious for battle exploits. However, each was present and played noteworthy roles before and after the Little Bighorn.

The post Two Moon and Wooden Leg: Cheyennes Who Shared In Honors appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Frederic Girard

Boyhood and Background

Frederic Girard (sometimes spelled Gerard) was an interpreter for the Dakota Column. His parentage was mixed only in the sense that his father was Canadian (perhaps a French Canadian trader) and his mother American. Gruard, on the other hand, was of both mixed race and a checkered past. He became a scout and interpreter for General Crook’s Wyoming Column.

Girard was born in St. Louis in 1829. He attended St. Xavier Academy for four years and was quite literate compared to many on the frontier. (Actually, a number of officers and enlisted men wrote very well, but many did not.) In fact, Girard was employed by the St. Louis Republic newspaper for a time, but by 1848 he had ventured up the Missouri to Fort Pierre in Dakota Territory. He worked as a clerk for the American Fur Co.

On the Upper Missouri

The company moved Girard up to Fort Clark, where he learned the Arikara and Sioux tongues. By 1855 he was moved to Fort Berthold, another trade fort. There in 1863 he and 17 other occupants stood off an attack by 600 Yankton Sioux. They claimed they killed at least 40 and wounded 100. When Assiniboines drove the Sioux off, the white traders all left.

By 1869 Girard became an independent trader at Forts Buford and Stevenson, also on the upper Missouri. By 1873, though, he was hired as a post interpreter for the Sioux and Ree scouts at Fort Abraham Lincoln. He also farmed nearby, selling vegetables and milk at the fort.

Interpreter and Impromptu Scout

Girard’s first foray into scouting duties came with the Dakota Column in 1876. He was employed as an interpreter at $75 per month (as compared to $150 a month for Mitch Bouyer, who served the Montana Column as both interpreter and scout.) When Custer climbed to the Crow’s Nest on June 25^th after Crow scouts spotted the hostiles’ encampment, he took Girard along.

With others, Girard saw a distant body of Indians moving away, toward the larger village. It appeared the Indians were already fleeing, which made a quick attack imperative. Girard joined the scouts, though, in warning Custer just how large that village was. Custer denied being able to see it. Confident, he forged ahead.

Later, as Custer split his command and sent Reno to attack, Girard peeled off and rode up a small knoll. Again he spotted a group of Indians moving away. He galloped back and told the command, “There go your Indians, and they are running like devils.” Custer continued to press the attack. The scouts were sent with Reno.

Surviving Reno’s Retreat

Girard was negatively impressed with Reno’s attack, retreat and subsequent conduct. Like many, including trained officers, he believed Reno abandoned a defensible position after moving his troops backward into a stand of timber. When Reno led a disorganized “charge,” or retreat, out of the timber up to the bluffs, many in his command were left behind. Girard was among them.

Girard later remarked how the Indians (accustomed to running buffalo) rode near and shot many soldiers in the back. Left behind, he met up with Billy Jackson, another mixed-blood (half-blackfeet) scout as well as Lt. Charles DeRudio and Private O’Neil. Girard and Jackson still had mounts; the other two were on foot.

The group hid until dark. Then, encountering hostiles, the two mounted scouts charged away and hid another day in brush along a tributary. They remained hidden the next day until dark, as did DeRudio and O’Neil. Both pairs managed to sneak up to the siege lines, joining their comrades on the bluffs at dusk on June 26^th.

Court Witness and Civilian Life

Girard, like George Herendeen, was called to testify at Reno’s Court of Inquiry in 1879. He seemed to echo the belief that those present had “closed ranks” and colluded to protect the hapless major. Regarding those officers, Girard later commented he was “amused to see how bad their memories became.” By 1883 he embraced civilian life, mainly working for Pillsbury Mills. He died in 1913.

Frank Gruard

Birth and Background

Frank Gruard mainly ranged further south. Regarding his past, it seems difficult to discern fact from embellishment. His Buffalo, Wyoming biographer in 1891 is said to have embellished freely.

Some accounts state Gruard was born on a Polynesian island to a Mormon missionary and a native girl. Others assert he was actually born to a French Creole father and a Sioux mother. Still others say his father was a black steamboat cook and his mother an Indian of unspecified tribe. Regardless, his dark skin seems to have helped him gain acceptance among the Sioux tribe.

Early Career and Captivity

Some accounts have Gruard doing honest work as a mail carrier when he ran afoul of either a Crow or Sioux party. One version, not necessarily contradictory, says he stole mail horses and fled, ending up amongst the Sioux. Some say he was captured.

Gruard may have lived with Assiniboine or Yankton Sioux, but it is generally accepted he was adopted into the family of Hunkpapa Sioux leader Sitting Bull. He may have remained as a de facto captive until gaining freedom at the Fort Robinson Sioux agency in Nebraska.

Gruard has been described as “hulking;” it is believed he was named Standing Bear because his buffalo coat made him look like one. The account says he was grappling with one of his captors who tried to steal the coat. Sitting Bull mistook him for a large bear.

Gruard lived among the Sioux for several years. He is said to have joined the 1873 attacks against Custer’s troop along the Yellowstone. He may have raised Sitting Bull’s ire by reporting an inside deal with traders to the soldiers at Fort Peck. Whatever his motivation, he soon parted ways with the Sioux.

Scouting for General Crook

When General George Crook tried to recruit scouts at a Sioux reservation, “using Indians to find Indians,” he found no Sioux willing to assist. He did recruit Gruard, however. Given Gruard’s knowledge of Sioux habits and patterns, he became invaluable – at least in terms of finding their winter camps. Crook was later quoted as saying he would rather lose a third of his command than lose Gruard’s services.

Gruard led Crook’s forces to a Cheyenne and Sioux camp on the Powder River in March, 1876. Crook delegated the attack to a Colonel, and it was poorly coordinated, then botched. In June 1876 Gruard again accompanied Crook’s Wyoming Column into Montana Territory. Before they located the hostiles, the tribes attacked unexpectedly, again turning Crook back.

The Little Bighorn

When Custer was defeated just eight days later, Crook’s scouts apparently knew of it before Crook was informed. Gruard was said to have seen smoke signals that indicated the annihilation. Officers did not believe him.

Gruard was then said to have dressed as an Indian and ridden to confirm the message. He may have passed undetected near Reno’s besieged troops.

The Killing of Crazy Horse

Accounts also vary regarding Gruard’s involvement with the death of Crazy Horse. In 1877, after the war chief’s surrender, the U.S. army asked Sioux to act as scouts to against the Nez Perce in Montana Territory. Crazy Horse was among them, and Gruard acted as interpreter. Some say he was drunk. Others speculate he intentionally misinterpreted to spite Crazy Horse.

Either way, when asked, Crazy Horse is said to have replied he would help until all Nez Perce were dead. Gruard’s interpretation led officers to believe Crazy Horse said he would fight until all whites were dead. He was arrested, and when he saw he would be placed in a guard house he resisted. He was bayoneted by a soldier and soon died.

Although highly regarded as a scout, Gruard is viewed with suspiscion due to the chief’s scandalous death. Girard and Gruard traveled different paths, but those paths may have nearly crossed at the Little Bighorn.

The post Fred Girard and Frank Gruard: Scouts And Interpreters With Confusing Consonants appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Background and Early Army Career

Benteen was born in August 1834 at Petersburg, Virginia, virtually the place where America’s Civil War ended. That war was the making of Benteen’s military career. By its end he had progressed through each rank to that of full colonel, and he was breveted a brigadier general.

Benteen’s career path was anything but conventional, however, which may have led to his apparent bitterness in much of life. He did not attend West Point, as most career officers had. As a boy he moved with his family to Missouri, where he was apparently a commoner.

Benteen’s father, a true Virginian, not only remained an ardent slave holder but viewed Southern slavery as a divine institution. At the Civil War’s outbreak Frederick aligned with the Union and enlisted. His father not only disowned him but stated he would pray daily that Frederick would be killed – ideally by a bullet fired by one of his own kin.

Distinguished Civil War Service

By September 1961 Benteen was a First Lieutenant in the 10^th Missouri Volunteer cavalry, and within a month he had become a captain. By 1962’s end he earned the rank of major, and early 1864 he was made Colonel in charge of a regiment. His brevet to brigadier general was made after the war’s end.

Benteen distinguished himself in numerous actions and conflicts during the Civil War. As Missouri was heavily divided between slavery and abolition, a good deal of military effort and resources went toward fending off secessionist forces and driving them from the state. Benteen was in the thick of much of it.

In Colonel Graham’s summary of Benteen’s career, he describes a family secret later “let out” by Benteen’s 10-year-old son Freddie. Benteen’s embittered father served the Confederacy as a blockade runner on “the great inland rivers.” Those apparently included the Mississippi and Missouri. Regardless, knowing his vessel and mission, Frederick used his 10^th Missouri to capture and confiscate the vessel and contraband cargo. His father remained in federal prison until paroled in 1865. He learned only years later that his capture had come at his son’s hands.

Benteen would distinguish himself beyond Missouri during the Civil War as well. He was conspicuous in his regiment’s actions in Alabama and Georgia too as the war progressed, thus earning his recommendation for the brigadier-general brevet.

Post Civil War Career

Unlike many career officers, Benteen retained his rank as Colonel of the 138^th “colored” regiment in 1865. As Custer historian William A. Graham wrote, “Benteen found this service personally distasteful,” and noted he “surrendered” the rank in July 1866 when the new 7^th Cavalry Regiment was organized. Benteen joined the Seventh as a captain and held that rank for most of his remaining career.

It is uncertain why Benteen disliked leading the “colored” regiment. Some writers allege he exhibited racial prejudice. It is also alleged he disliked or mistreated black interpreter Isaiah Dorman while later stationed at Fort Rice in Dakota Territory. He has generally been described as generally disliking most people.

A Sports Perspective

Benteen does appear to have appreciated various sports and their benefits, both to him and to his enlisted subordinates. Historian Thom Hatch quotes Private Thomas Ewert, who wrote to the Yankton Press and Dakotaian:

“On the first day of March, 1873, ‘H’ company seventh cavalry, stationed at Nashville, Tennessee, resolved to organize a club with the view of having games, sports and exercises to be known as the ‘Benteen base ball and gymnasium club’ (in honor of our company commander, captain F.W. Benteen, Brevet Colonel U.S.A.).”

Numerous accounts exist of baseball contests played between teams from Forts Rice and Lincoln as well as against civilian teams or clubs from nearby cities. In 1877 during the Nez Perce campaign, a trooper noted contests between the 2^nd and 7^th Cavalries along the Yellowstone River drainage.

Benteen seems to have enjoyed the merits of fishing as well. Frontier military troops often loved to supplement their mundane rations with either wild game or trout and other fish teeming in the streams along which they camped and campaigned. Reno himself made several mentions of the fishing rod he took along and enjoyed using during his western campaigns.

The Custer Controversy

When it came to Custer, however, Benteen had plenty of dislike and criticism. As with Reno, this may have stemmed from professional envy, given Custer’s youth and rapid success without seniority. It relates to other sources as well, however.

Benteen was close to Major Joel Elliot, who was wiped out along with 20 troopers during the Washita attack. Officers must have leeway to make decisions independently based on circumstances at hand. Acting independently, Elliot broke off his attack and pursued fleeing warriors away from the point of attack. Only much later was his squadron found, all dead and mutilated. No one had known he had left, or where he had gone.

Weather conditions were extreme, men and horses were already at risk due to the previous day and night’s march, and overwhelming numbers of warriors were appearing from nearby villages. Custer felt compelled to leave after scouts failed to find Elliot’s squadron. Benteen always felt Custer had abandoned him.

Custer fumed after he was criticized publicly in an “anonymous” letter published by a newspaper following Washita. The letter had been written to a friend by Benteen without intent to publish it. (At least one anonymous letter would appear in the New York Herald exposing tradership scandals under Grant’s administration. Ironically, Custer was a suspected source.) For any other faults, Benteen owned what he said. Custer, in effect, backed down when Benteen claimed authorship.

Little Bighorn Legacy

Animosity simmered beneath decorum through subsequent assignments and campaigns. It would lead to questions after the Little Bighorn. Among the first might be why Benteen’s battalion sent southward, away from the Sioux/Cheyenne village. It likely reflects trust rather than spite. Someone did need to ensure no “hostiles” were fleeing southward.

When Benteen decided (independently) his assignment was futile, he returned toward the other two battalions. Custer sent a message to Benteen directing him to hurry northward and bring the ammunition packs. The mule train was detached separately, but it reached Reno’s demoralized and routed troops about when Benteen’s did. Unanswered (and unanswerable) questions arise from there.

Disconcerted, Reno directed Benteen to help his troops; Benteen’s superior, he effectively countermanded Custer’s order.  Benteen was widely commended for taking command and control of the combined troops entrenching on those bluffs. He directed at least one surprise offensive movement, undoubtedly saving troopers’ lives. None other than George Herendeen described him as exceedingly brave.

Could He Have Saved Custer?

Benteen also led a troop movement toward Custer’s location, which was unknown to him. By that time, hordes of warriors were streaming en masse toward Reno’s position. It was later realized they had finished annihilating Custer’s troops. Further advance would have been suicidal. Only coordinated rear-guard action saved them.

Benteen’s Biggest Battles

Benteen continued his career as the 7^th Cavalry rebuilt. In 1877 he distinguished himself against the Nez Perce at Canyon Creek and was breveted colonel. He was promoted to major in 1882. However, after performing honorably in numerous battles from 1861 on, he effectively lost his battle with alcohol. As with Reno, drunkenness led to debauchery and discharge.

As with virtually all aspects of the Little Bighorn, many continue to question Benteen’s actions that day. In retirement he found mutual empathy with former trooper Theodore Goldin, whose Little Bighorn accounts are highly suspect. Letters between the two show Benteen’s bent for sarcasm and critique.

President Cleveland amended Benteen’s army dismissal to a one-year suspension. He then retired on disability. He was event breveted brigadier general for his actions against the Nez Perce and for what he is known best: the Little Bighorn.

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West Point Records and Early Career

At West Point, apparently, Reno did outdo Custer in one area: demerits. A notorious as Custer is for pushing the limits on demerits, Reno outdid him. Scheduled to graduate in 1855, Reno failed to finish until 1857 and may have set a record for demerits in a term with 1,031.

Entering “the Point” in 1858, Custer should have finished in 1862. He actually graduated sooner, in 1861 due to the Civil War’s outbreak. Trained officers were suddenly in demand. Unlike Custer, though, who finished last in his class, Reno managed to finish 20^th out of a class of 38.

Until 1861 Reno served as a junior officer at Fort Dalles and Fort Walla Walla. Assigned to cavalry in the Civil War, he became a captain and was breveted major after the Kelly’s Ford battle in 1863. In 1864 he was breveted lieutenant colonel, then gained the rank of full colonel in early 1865. He received the brevet rank Brigadier General of Volunteers in March 1863, shortly before the war ended.

Post-Civil War Career and the Springfield Specter

Like most officers continuing their careers, Reno dropped in rank and moved to assignments around the country, including the Reconstruction South. By 1869 he had become a major in the 7^th Cavalry at Fort Hays, Kansas but then served two years on the army’s Small Arms Board starting in 1871.

During Reno’s time there the army adopted the Model 1873 Springfield Trapdoor rifle and carbine. The carbines became well known for failing to eject spent cartridges. This may have contributed to Custer’s astonishing defeat that the Little Bighorn. Other aspersions fell toward Reno after that battle too.

Seventh Cavalry Career

Assigned to the 7^th Cavalry in late 1873, Reno missed his regiment’s 1873 and 1874 expeditions. In 1874 he was assigned, with two companies, as escort for America’s part of the joint Northern Boundary Survey. His wife died unexpectedly during that time. Requesting funeral leave, he received a sympathetic but firm denial. Worse, his wife’s family saw fit to deny him any of the family’s fortune.

After leave spent in Europe in 1875, Reno rejoined his regiment and assumed its command while Custer dealt with scandals and politics in Washington, D.C. When Custer returned in time to resume command, Reno allegedly was resentful. He also allegedly neglected drill and marksmanship practice in Custer’s absence.

The Powder River “Recon”

Questions regarding Reno’s performance began in earnest with the Little Bighorn battle. They first began, though, with his Powder River scouting assignment. On June 10, 1876, General Terry sent him with six companies to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to reconnoiter its tributary Mizpah Creek as well, then range west to the Tongue River and down to its mouth back at the Yellowstone.

Colonel Gibbon would have already reported his scouts’ findings of a large hostile village up the Rosebud. Perhaps Mitch Bouyer, assigned to Reno, led his detachment there in hopes of an early attack. It appears, though, that General Terry wanted to rule out the possibility of any remnant hostiles still in the Powder or Tongue River drainages and their tributaries.

Custer had led a scouting foray up the Little Missouri. This time General Terry sent Reno with three cavalry troops. They took rations for 10 days. Watch for “Results of Reno’s Powder River Recon” coming on June 18. One result was Reno’s finding of a wide and heavy travois trail heading up Rosebud Creek. It would lead to the Little Bighorn.

Little Bighorn Legacy

Reno would come into question after Custer detached him and ordered him to attack the hostile camp on the Little Bighorn, June 25, 1876. Reno ended up leading a headlong “charge,” as he described it, that has been characterized as a chaotic retreat. His behavior drew question after his men were besieged on the bluffs above the Little Bighorn for the next two days as well.

In fairness, at least some of his tactics and choices were later defended by knowledgeable military analysts. Much, however, remains subject to question or outright disgrace.

One charge against him was drunkenness during the fight. As with most or all of the battle, accounts are many and varied. Some eye witnesses stated they saw him drinking an “amber-colored” liquid from a flask, both during his attack/retreat and during his subsequent siege. Others state they never saw it. He was later quoted by Rev. Arthur Edwards in the Northwest Christian Review (Sept. 7, 1904) as stating he performed poorly there because he had been drunk. (Maybe just an excuse for poor performance, but a damning confession nonetheless.)

One virtually unforgiveable act by Reno was his willingness to abandon some of his wounded. Reno was said to have proposed to Captain Benteen that the combined battalions mount up and flee during the night. When questioned about moving the wounded, Reno was said to respond that they could mount those capable of riding; those unable would be left. Benteen, and apparently others, evaded questioning on this and other topics during Reno’s 1879 Court of Inquiry. Benteen later confirmed the conversation in a letter published long after his death.

Court of Inquiry

With relentless finger-pointing, questioning and criticism after the battle, Reno requested his own Court of Inquiry in hopes of exoneration. It is noted that he conveniently waited until the army’s two-year statute of limitations had expired. He was indeed exonerated, but much speculation and evidence point toward the witnesses “closing ranks” to protect the 7^th Cavalry’s reputation; the process is seen by as a sham.

Reno’s Final Battles

Reno was not particularly liked by most of his subordinates or fellow officers. Historian Thom Hatch notes two 7^th Cavalry officers, Benteen and Godfrey, who specifically disliked him. Plenty of subordinates did too. Young Lt. Hugh Scott, another contemporary who would go on to become a general also fell among them.

Many supported him though, in ways including their Court of Inquiry Testimony. Whether by coercion or fear of retribution, most of the regiment signed a petition asking that all officers move up in rank, filling voids including that left by Lt. Colonel Custer. Many later denied signing, but it requested that Reno fill Custer’s vacated position.

In following years Reno was Court-Martialed and convicted twice. His first sentence, including charges of drunkenness on duty, was commuted. Other charges were raised and dropped. He was accused of “peeping” into the parlor of a young woman with whom he had become enamored. She was the daughter of Colonel Samuel Sturgis. This conviction was not commuted and ended his military career.

Though Reno’s discharge was eventually changed to “honorable,” his struggles with alcohol would plague him. They would overshadow what he did well in America’s Civil War and at the Little Bighorn.

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