General Alfred Terry, leading the Dakota Column, had sent Reno out on June 10. Reno had directions to scout up the Powder River drainage. He was to move westward down Mizpah Creek, then ascend Pumpkin Creek to the Tongue River and descend the Tongue to the Yellowstone. He followed only a part of those orders.

Reno was to ensure no hostiles lurked in the Powder and Tongue River drainages. Taking six cavalry companies and the mixed-blood scout Mitch Bouyer, he was provisioned with 10 days’ rations and forage. Perhaps due to Bouyer’s influence, he became sidetracked. Bouyer, with Lt. James Bradley, had observed a large Sioux village on Rosebud Creek several weeks earlier.

Reno barely touched the Tongue drainage, potentially leaving hostiles to attack the column from behind. Worse, he disobeyed Terry’s orders to stay out of the Rosebud drainage. The entire campaign’s effort could have been jeopardized if Reno’s detachment had been detected. The large gathering of hostiles would have dispersed.

It is noted that Custer strongly believed, like others, that no hostiles remained in the drainages east of the Rosebud. However, true to his nature, he wished to lead the mission. Historian Edgar Stuart noted Custer had already led a fruitless scouting foray on the Little Missouri. Some writers speculate that General Terry wanted to spread assignments out in order to avoid showing favoritism.

Regardless, it undoubtedly chafed Custer to see the assignment go to his rival and subordinate. He and Reno had never liked each other. Custer would soon get his chance, though, with all 12 companies of his 7^th Cavalry Regiment.

In the open, un-timbered terrain, Reno apparently felt he could see down into enough of Mizpah Creek to warrant bypassing it. He then scouted little of the Tongue, instead taking up a heavy lodgepole trail made by a large number of Indians and their ponies pulling travois, or pony-drags. He followed it well into the Rosebud Creek drainage, then backtracked and followed the Rosebud down to the Yellowstone.

Terry had specifically directed Reno to avoid Rosebud Creek. Upon learning Reno’s flaunting of his orders he fumed. He was concerned that Reno’s relatively small force would merely tip off the large, multi-tribe gathering that his column sought to locate. It is hinted that he would have arrested and Court-martialed Reno had he not been the regiment’s only major.

At least one writer states that Terry suspected Reno had hoped to best Custer, his superior officer, whom he despised. Custer was also indignant at Reno’s half-way attempt to follow the moving hostiles. He too was concerned Reno had spoiled the regiment’s chances for a surprise attack.

In a letter to his wife, however, Custer lamented that Reno had come so close but had failed to attack. He decried the waste of time. Custer also rued what, to him, was a missed opportunity. That mindset toward Reno’s best course of action might explain Custer’s own upcoming decisions (More on that topic to come.)

It should be noted that even General Sheridan, in Chicago, had no real expectation that a mobile bunch of nomads could be trapped and crushed between even two converging columns, much less three. Edgar Stewart, among others, noted that each column was believed capable of attacking and defeating any hostiles alone.

Reno’s junket bore little direct result. He had seen no Indians. However, the fact that he had seen a wide and heavy travois trail brought impending results – or consequences. The fact that he had disobeyed orders and potentially compromised the column’s mission made things even more urgent.

A lot legend and folklore exist regarding Custer’s personality and motives. Perpetuated by Hollywood and the “dime novel” mentality, these conceptions have muddied the waters. However, objective historians can agree that Custer was impetuous, audacious and exuberant if nothing else. Reno’s report could have served only to stoke those fires.

With Custer, General Terry moved the command to their designated meeting place near the  mouth of the Tongue River during Reno’s absence. Messengers brought him news of Reno’s prodigal return down the Rosebud. After a hard march on June 20^th the regiment reunited. New plans were made based on Reno’s report.

It was noted by General Terry that Reno’s horses and pack mules were “tired and badly spent.” The existing plan had been for Custer to take nine companies back up the Tongue River on Reno’s return and then scout down the Rosebud drainage. All that changed, however, based on Reno’s report. All twelve companies would ascend the Rosebud.

The condition of mounts and mules in Custer’s last contingent has been the topic of much speculation. It may be that the animals’ fatigued condition played a role in the mission’s outcome.

On June 22 Custer set forth with all 12 companies of the 7^th Cavalry. Presumably, he was already worried that Reno’s abandoned travois trail was growing colder. He would have set out with an underlying urgency that must have colored his upcoming decisions. That urgency would be compounded two days later when it Custer realized his command’s presence had been discovered.

Had Reno obeyed his orders, Custer’s actions would likely have not been much different. He would have found the lodgepole trail when he reached the Rosebud, and he would have locked onto it like a bloodhound. Even his letters bear out that he planned to pursue the hostiles, once on their trail, even if his rations ran out and the regiment had to eat their mules.

Regardless, the result of Reno’s scout and report can be said to have reaped one result. They threw fuel on the fires that would lead to destiny on the Little Bighorn.

The post Results of Reno’s Powder River “Recon” And His Recalcitrant Rosebud Foray appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

The Colonel’s Curiosity

Colonel Gibbon’s Montana column had patrolled the Yellowstone River for nearly two months. They were to block any “hostiles” from moving north across the river; they also tried to locate the nontreaty Indians’ burgeoning village. As part of their efforts they established a supply base on the Yellowstone across from Rosebud Creek.

In his journal Lt. Bradley describes taking one of the Fort Pease traders’ boats downriver. Across the river, he and Gibbon had seen “red-looking objects that . . . appeared like quarters of freshly butchered meat hung upon a frame of poles . . .” He found them to be two Indians corpses wrapped in red blankets. Their scaffolds, or “platform burials,” were falling down.

Despoiling the Dead

Both Indians and white men were known to disturb the others’ graves for various reasons. Some did so in order to scalp the dead, some out of curiosity. More on that later. A passionate historian, as his journal bears out, Bradley fell among the latter.

Bradley wrote, “To get a better insight into the methods of Sioux burial, I perpetrated the vandalism . . . to tear down one of the scaffolds and pry into the arrangement and accompaniments of the corpse.” He got an education.

Curious Contents

Wrapped in with the body, Bradley found a small packet of letters and a soldier’s hymn book. The had belonged to “a soldier of some regiment of Iowa volunteers . . . and among the letters were some from a wife to her absent soldier-husband . . . touching in their devotion and simplicity.”

Colonel Gibbon mentioned the account a year later in his summary of the campaign. He noted the soldier had been named Betts, of the 6^th Iowa Cavalry. He would have served in General Alfred Sully’s 1864 expeditions following the Santee Sioux uprising of 1862.

A Rescued Captive

Sully is connected to what Bradley found next. It was a paper signed, “Fanny Kelly, captive white woman.” Bradley did not quote all its contents, but he describes his indignation, stirred by the missive. He quotes its conclusion: “The Indians are kind to me, but I am compelled to do their bidding.” Bradley is especially indignant at the last statement, implying the “worse fate than death” suffered by many white women taken captive by various tribes.

Bradley recalled that Kelly had been captured by Sioux and eventually rescued by Sully. She had then written and published her Narrative of my Captivity Among The Sioux Indians. The book details not only her experience but also that of several other white women across the plains who were captured, enslaved and otherwise subjected to abuse and atrocities.

Kelly’s Account

In short, Kelly had married a Kansas farmer who felt a change of climates might help is chronic ailments. He may have suffered “gold fever.” They travelled with a small wagon train.

At Box Elder Creek in the vicinity of Fort Laramie, the party was attacked. The attack came while Kelly was out gathering wood. He survived. Other men of the party were killed, but Fanny was captured, along with her 8-year-old adopted niece.

Also taken captive were Sarah Larimer and her eight-year-old son. They managed to escape after two days. They were reunited with husband and father William Larimer at Deer Creek Station west of Laramie.

Fanny was not so fortunate. Desperate, she had her niece slip off a horse in the dark and hurry back toward the wagon trail. Only later would Fanny learn the girl had been riddled with arrows and scalped.

Fanny also tried to escape by slipping quietly off her horse and hiding in the darkness. She was soon discovered, recaptured and beaten. She remained enslaved for five months and was passed from one camp, or chief, to another. What is not written of her existence might be telling. We know only that she was treated as property and often physically abused.

At one point, Kelly was with a Sioux band that attacked Captain James Fisk in one of his wagon expeditions. The Sioux had her exchange written messages with Fisk, apparently hoping he would lower his guard. As her captors could not read her missives, though, Kelly was able to warn Fisk of their murderous intent. Negotiations for her release failed.

Kelly did find at least one protector and sympathizer amongst the Sioux. When the relative of a chief aimed his bow at her, Jumping Bear “jumped in” and disarmed him, defusing the conflict. In a dispute the chief had killed a horse belonging to the brave. Because the chief possessed Kelly at the time, his relative threatened to kill her in return. Thanks to Jumping Bear, the dispute was resolved without harm to her.

Jumping Bear later told Kelly he wanted to be “more than a friend” to her. Apparently he wanted to take her as his wife. However, thanks to Sully’s persistent efforts, the Sioux were persuaded to return her at his fort. In a written message carried by Jumping Bear, Kelly warned troops the Sioux planned to perpetrate an attack once inside the fort.

In the end, a dozen Sioux escorting Kelly were admitted to the fort, but then its gates were quickly closed and secured. Kelly regained her freedom, and the situation was defused without further bloodshed after a three-day stand-off.

Kelly would suffer more hardship and deprivation, most of which is detailed in her book. Thankfully, she was able to raise a son and prosper financially as a widow. She also engaged in charitable work through her remaining life.

A Cautionary Conclusion      

Sadly, Kelly described a Sioux warrior riding into the camp where she was being held. He held a sweater matching that her adopted niece, Mary had worn. His horse was adorned with a fresh scalp of blond hair much like Mary’s. This happened not long after she had tried to help Mary escape.

After the battle at the Little Bighorn in 1876, many of the Sioux and Cheyenne dead were found on platforms in abandoned lodges. Years later private Daniel Kanipe described opening the wrappings of one corpse out of curiosity. Within the buffalo robes, along with the corpse he found a collections of scalps on long cord.

Kanipe described one scalp as being obviously that of a white woman, with reddish hair “as long as my arm.” It is unlikely, but possible, that scalp had belonged to Mary.

Other instances of graves being disturbed are recounted across history of the West. Some were by various Indian tribes. After the Big Hole battle in 1877, it was noted that General Howard’s Bannock scouts dug into Nez Perce graves to take scalps. Bradley described measures taken to prevent graves of slain soldiers from being disturbed by animals as well as Indians seeking scalps.

Today, members of all races and cultures would disdain the pilfering or even disturbing of graves. In some cases it might seem softened by the historical and educational value to be gained. Sadly, as with so many wrongs and atrocities, plenty of blame for past wrongs is shared by all.

Recommended Reading:

Kelly’s book has been reprinted roughly a dozen times and can still be purchased. More graphic accounts of killings and horrors known by women taken captive by various tribes can also be found. The 2010 book Empire of the Summer Moon details conflicts and kidnappings by Commanches, Kiowas and other tribes on the southern plains. Those accounts parallel and connect with similar northern plains conflicts.  

Sadly, such wrongs would lead to – but would not end at – the Little Bighorn.

The post Fanny Kelly: Held Captive by Sioux, Rescued by Sully appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Custer’s Absence

After congressional testimony, political detainments and delays, Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer did not manage to return to his post until May 10, 1876. Along with his immediate superior, General Alfred H. Terry, Custer arrived at Bismarck, Dakota Territory. With Terry and his staff, Custer arrived by train from St. Paul, Minnesota.

Final Preparations, More Weather Delays

It was May 14^th when Custer hired the black interpreter Isaiah Dorman. Some sources indicate Custer did Dorman a favor. He commandeered Dorman from the condescending Captain Frederick Benteen at nearby Fort Rice. It ended poorly.

Historian Edgar Stewart notes that Dorman had lived amongst the Sioux and was close with Sitting Bull. Stewart says Dorman asked to accompany the expedition because he wanted to visit the favored Sioux lands around the Powder, Tongue, Rosebud and Bighorn Rivers. Other scouts and interpreters were also hired at this time.

Regardless, a week of preparation occurred after Custer’s return to Fort Abraham Lincoln. After winter delays due to snow depths, heavy rains had turned the prairie’s clay-like soil to “gumbo.” This sticky mud made Prairies all but impassable for the expedition’s huge train of supply wagons, artillery and cattle.

Coordinating Columns

The column finally set forth on May 17, 1876. The two columns with which they were to coordinate and “cooperate” strategically had been in action now for more than two months. General George H. Crook’s Wyoming column had suffered setbacks and regressed. In another month it would again do so.

Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column actually carried out its orders since setting out on March 17^th, two months earlier. It had dutifully patrolled the north bank of the Yellowstone River. It was hoped the column would keep non-treaty tribes from fleeing northward until the other two columns could converge and entrap the tribes.

The Delays: Cause and Effect

Custer’s delays had been largely political. Previous posts here have detailed Custer’s testimony before Congress. First, he was called to witness before the House committee investigating the “Trader Post Scandal” under Secretary of War William Belknap. Wishing to head back and prepare his regiment for its planned campaign, Custer was then asked to appear before the Senate’s committee too.

Custer had wired the army’s headquarters when a contractor provided Fort Abraham Lincoln with grain in sacks marked for the Indian agencies. Believing the grain had been stolen from the Indian Department, Custer refused to accept it. After notifying headquarters he was ordered to accept the grain. He was also summoned by Congress; he stated he believed the order had come from Belknap.

Custer likely did not mention President Grant’s brother Orvil, who was also involved in the graft. It was enough that Belknap was a personal friend of Grant and had served on his staff during the recent Civil War. He had already resigned in hopes of avoiding impeachment, but the damage was done – for Belknap and Custer.

When Custer called at the White House before leaving for his post, Grant refused to see him. So Custer left but was detained at Chicago upon Grant’s order. General Terry interceded for Custer, writing to Grant that “Custer’s services would be very valuable with his regiment.” Terry had no Indian war experience. General Sheridan also interceded, reluctantly, as did Major General William T. Sherman.

Custer was allowed to accompany his 7th Cavalry Regiment. General Sherman’s dispatch of May 8^th makes it appear Custer was no longer prohibited from leading it. General Terry did, however, disobey Sherman’s directive to prohibit Custer from taking any newspaper men along. (See Mark Kellogg, March 31,2026.)

All these delays did more than set the campaign back. They allowed time for increasing numbers of tribal members to leave their reservations and join Sitting Bull’s huge gathering of Sioux and Cheyenne tribes. As that gathering grew in numbers, so did its fighting strength. The confident Custer would underestimate it.

Reinforcing the Regiment

As the 7^th Cavalry set forth on May 17^th, 1876, it had bolstered its numbers too. Private William O. Taylor would later write that troops G, H and K had been recalled from duty in the south. The regiment’s entire twelve troops marched out. They had been joined as well by two companies of 7^th Infantry and one company of 6^th Infantry, making a total of more than 800 enlisted men and nearly 40 officers.

The entourage was huge.

Parade-like Departure

Custer loved pageantry, and his column’s start from Fort Lincoln was typical. It is doubtful the officers or men were in parade uniforms, as they were in fact starting out on a remote campaign. It is known, though, that the regimental band was playing. General Terry ordered a full mounted march into the fort from the regiment’s nearby encampment (where incoming troops had “tented.”)

Various sources record that the Ree (Arikara) scouts led off, organized according to their warrior societies. Their families were said to have beat drums and sung “melancholy war songs.” Steward describes this as a “wailing, mournful dirge that was customary when Indians went to war.”

Many sources quote Elizabeth Custer, who described the parade in her well known Boots and Saddles. She described the fort’s children as beating on pots or pans and hoisting flags made of handkerchiefs tied to sticks to emulate soldiers. She then describes passing “laundress row,” where many enlisted men’s wives shed tears as if knowing many would not return.

General Terry, possibly at Custer’s behest, had ordered the march across the parade ground in order to reassure the wives. At one point he also ordered a brief halt so the married men could dismount and bid those wives ‘good-by.’ Naturally, the band had played the regimental favorite, “Garryowen,” probably many times over. However, Mrs. Custer wrote that when it broke into “The Girl I Left Behind Me” many of those wives broke down in tears.

An Ominous Phenomenon

The day was described as raw and cold, with a heavy fog over the river. Such is not uncommon on the plains in May, but a very rare phenomenon seemed ominous. Mrs. Custer wrote, “As the sun broke through the mist a mirage appeared, which took up about half of the line of cavalry, and thenceforth for a little distance it marched, equally plain to the sight on the earth and in the sky.” Or, as Stewart quotes, “. . . the moving column was mirrored in the radiant mist.”

Many of us put no stock in coincidences. This phenomenon, however coincides interestingly to Sitting Bull’s coming sun dance vision. Less than a month later, after self-deprivation in that dance, Sitting Bull would see soldiers falling upside down into the tribes’ huge, combined village. If the cavalry was truly mirrored as it left Fort Abraham Lincoln, its reflected image would have been upside down.

Regardless, the Seventh Cavalry’s fate is somewhat well known. Roughly half the regiment would survive in June of 1876. Custer and the five companies with him, as we know, would not. On May 17, 1876, 150 years ago today, they began their march toward destiny on the Little Bighorn.

The post This Date in History: 150 Years Ago Today May 17, 1876 The Dakota Column and Destiny: The Seventh Cavalry Sets Forth appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

No mention seems to exist regarding dogs at the Little Bighorn. However when Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column reached Fort Pease, the men were greeted by a greyhound that was “overjoyed” to see them.

Fort Pease

Fort Pease (see Fort Pease February 18^, 2026) was located on the north bank of the Yellowstone River. A group of enterprising trappers and traders had built it across from the mouth of the Bighorn River. However, persistent raids and attacks by Miniconjou Sioux persuaded the occupants to seek military help. They abandoned the fort.

Apparently one occupant had been away when the fort’s occupants and military escort left. Perhaps the dog was out hunting at the time. It had managed to subsist on its own, at any rate, from the first week of March until April 20^th when more white men arrived at the fort.

The Campaign Plan

Gibbon’s column had marched out of Fort Shaw, nearly 400 miles to the north and west, on March 17^th. They had gathered two more troops of 7th Infantry and four of 2^nd Cavalry at Fort Ellis, near present-day Bozeman, Montana.

Gibbon’s orders were to patrol the Yellowstone River’s north bank and prevent hostile Sioux and Cheyenne from escaping northward. Meantime, General Crook’s Wyoming Column would push up from the south. General Terry’s Dakota Column would converge from the east.

The plan, overseen by General Phil Sheridan, was to entrap a large gathering of non-treaty Indians and force them onto reservations. However, many treaty Indians were leaving agencies and joining the non-treaty tribes. To the generals and politician in the East, all Indians not on reservations were now regarded as “hostiles.”

As noted in previous posts, Crook met with setback on the Powder River (see The March Toward Destiny Begins, March 17, 20266.) Custer, who was to lead the Dakota Column had been called back to Washington, D.C. to testify in the Trader Post inquiry (See March 29 and April 4^th Trader Post Testimony postings). Custer had then lost favor with President Grant. Severe weather conditions set in, further delaying the Dakota Column’s start.

Subsistence and Survival

Still, the Montana Column had dutifully performed its assignment. It was patrolling the Yellowstone’s north bank. The troops arrived at the abandoned site of Fort Pease to be greeted by an elated greyhound.

Lieutenant James Bradley noted in his journal for that day, “A greyhound was found inhabiting it, who has been its solitary occupant for weeks. He was overjoyed to see human beings again. How he subsisted is a mystery, but probably by hunting rabbits and other small game.”

Canine Connections

When Captain William Fetterman marched out of Fort Phil Kearny for the last time on December 21, 1866, a dog from the fort followed his command. The dog did not survive the attack that took the lives of Fetterman and the 80 men with him.

Dogs had served many roles amongst Indian tribes. Before Plains tribes obtained horses, dogs often carried packs or pulled small travois. Dogs also sometimes sounded alarms, especially at night, when intruders might wander into a camp. They also served as meal fodder at times, and in some cases were valued as such.

Lewis and Clark mentioned this factor in their journals. Lewis found a meal of dog quite palatable. If Clark ever sampled it, however, he made it known he did not like it. He seemed to favor the dog as a companion. At times on the brink of starvation, the expedition sometimes subsisted on the meat of dogs. Despite that need, Lewis’s large Newfoundland accompanied them for the duration of their voyage.

A seemingly self-indulgent Custer regularly brought dogs with him on campaigns. He kept staghounds, sometimes in large numbers, using them to chase game in such a way that he could shoot it. Custer’s final expedition was no exception. However, he left his dogs back at the Powder River supply depot when he embarked on his final ride up Rosebud Creek and to the Little Bighorn.

Outcome Unknown

It is not recorded what became of the Fort Pease greyhound that was so overjoyed to see people again. It seems the dog must have followed Gibbon’s troops. We will likely never know if that dog accompanied them to the Little Bighorn – or beyond.

The post A Grateful Greyhound: April 20, 1876 appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

For one thing, Grant was Custer’s Commander-in-Chief, and Grant’s brother Orvil was implicated in the inquiry. Grant took that personally.

The issue had come to light years earlier. As mentioned in my last post, part-time reporter Mark Kellogg had published a letter in 1874 decrying Orvil Grant’s involvement in graft. Then in 1875, as commander at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Custer had looked into monopolistic price gouging by the post’s sutler, or trader.

Sutler Selection

Until the early 1870’s the commander of a regiment or military post had chosen the merchant through which his enlistees would buy personal supplies. Oftentimes the sutler would accompany the regiment out on campaigns.

However, under Grant’s Secretary of War William Belknap, the War Department (Belknap, specifically) appointed all post traders. He awarded each trader exclusive rights to a given post. Prices were inflated and Belknap received kickbacks.

Custer was not the only officer to question the tradership monopolies. In fact his rival Frederick Benteen also questioned how a post trader could save $13,000 to $15,000 on a salary of only $1,500. When a new trader arrived at Fort A. Lincoln in 1875, Custer questioned him as to his profits. The sutler informed Custer that he received only $3,000 out of the year’s $15,000 profits. The rest went to his “investors.”

Scandals and “Scoops”

Custer then went on an extended leave, much of it in New York, in late 1875 and early 1876. On February 10, 1876 the New York Herald printed a story further exposing the Tradership Scandal. It ran another on March 31 under the title “Belknap’s Anaconda.” Custer was suspected of supplying the manuscript, or at least supporting information, helping the Herald in its investigation.

During this same time-frame the “Whiskey Ring,” was being investigated publicly as well. With Civil War notoriety and recent success in Indian campaigns, Custer was soon coveted as a witness by Congress. However, that would soon put him in hot water with his military superiors.

Tradership Twists

An odd twist played into this turmoil. Under Grant’s Peace Policy, various Indian tribes were given food, blankets and supplies for cooking and other subsistence. They were even being supplied, directly or through trade, with firearms and ammunition. These were to be used in hunting off the reservations. They were often used in hunting white settlers.

Devious bands would go to reservations to receive these “presents” as promised. They would then leave to carry out depredations. They burned homesteads and stage stations, and they murdered some whites. They kidnapped numerous women and children. While the Indian Department gave provisions and arms to the tribes, the U.S. Military had to pursue them and fight them in an attempt to keep citizens safe.

Another twist was that tribes were often compelled to leave reservations due to hunger. Unscrupulous agents often cheated tribes out of supplies promised to them in treaty agreements. Their monopolies also let them inflate prices and sell the goods elsewhere. They filled their own pockets while giving tribes badly inferior goods.

The agents, obviously, were a twofold problem. They supplied tribes that would leave reservations at will, and they caused tribes to leave by cheating them.

Sheridan’s Chagrin

General Sheridan had complained of this as far back as 1868. On one hand his troops (including Custer) were expected to quell uprisings and push tribes onto, or back onto, reservations. At the same time the Indian Bureau gave those tribes food, blankets, firearms and ammunition and then let them leave their reservations to hunt. Agents also benefitted by inflating the census counts on their agencies, regardless of how many of those Indians were actually present.

Custer dealt with these issues in 1867 and 1868 in Kansas, Indian Territory (today’s Oklahoma) and Texas. He would again face untallied tribesmen off reservations in 1876.

Ripples, Results and Ramifications

Despite Belknap’s resignation on March 2, a Congressional committee still investigated. It soon chose to impeach him anyway. These events had a huge ripple effect, however.

During Custer’s absence, Sitting Bull enticed more tribal members to leave reservations. He sent runners to ask that tribes gather in some of their traditional lands. They would congregate in the vicinity of the Powder, Tongue, Rosebud and Bighorn Rivers. Their numbers increased (not entirely without notice, as will be discussed another time) while Custer’s regiment sat idle.

While the Montana Column and the Wyoming Column started General Sheridan’s campaign, the Seventh Cavalry remained sedentary. New recruits were coming in, or soon would be. Major Marcus Reno, though, is said to have neglected both drill and marksmanship practice.

Meanwhile Custer languished in a political mess not entirely of his choosing. (It is debated whether he was compelled to testify or if he could have opted out. Letters indicate he was advised by General Terry to go east.)

Commander-in-Chief’s Recourse

Historian Thom Hatch writes that transcripts show Custer did not mention Grant’s brother. Regardless, Grant took his testimony personally and forbid him from leading the 7^th Cavalry on its spring campaign. Custer tried to appeal in person but Grant refused to see him.

After Custer left for Forth Abraham Lincoln, Grant had him stopped in St. Paul. Custer had breached military decorum by not visiting Grant and the army’s top general (Sherman was away at the time.) This further delayed Seventh Cavalry’s campaign preparations.

Custer made an emotional appeal through Generals Sheridan and Sherman. Both supported him, given his Civil War exploits. General Terry also went to bat for him. Ultimately, it appears political pressure persuaded Grant to relent. He allowed Custer to accompany, but not to command, the Seventh Cavalry in its campaign.

Aspirations and Aftershocks

No written records or witness statements really tell Custer’s motivations past that time. Some speculate he had presidential aspirations. Some feel he was motivated to redeem himself with a dramatic victory in the campaign. Some believe he merely wanted to get free of his immediate superior, General Terry, once given the chance. Custer had “cut loose” from General Stanley, acting independently during the 1873 Yellowstone Expedition. He may have had similar designs in 1876.

What is known is that growing numbers of both treaty and nontreaty Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho were away from reservations in early 1876. General Sheridan wanted to strike them hard and force them all onto reservations. It is also known that the scandals under William Belknap had hurt soldiers in the short run. They also emboldened and even compelled Indians to leave reservations.

It is known that Custer was delayed in preparing his regiment for the campaign. It is alleged that Major Reno failed to drill and train during that time. It is also believed the Indians Custer would face were better armed and well supplied with ammunition. Some writers blame Belknap for this too, directly and indirectly.

We know that western problems grew while Custer muddled in political turmoil back east. That fallout would reverberate through history. It would crescendo, then climax at the Little Bighorn.

The post Custer’s Second Call Before Congress: Results, Ramifications and Reverberations appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

The third column remained, perhaps snugly, in quarters at Fort Abraham Lincoln. Their late departure would be attributed in part to deeply drifted snow. Conditions on the plains were anything but conducive to the conduct of Sheridan’s wished-for winter campaign. But another factor delayed the Dakota Column’s departure.

The more significant reason for the column’s inactivity was that Custer, the Seventh Cavalry’s Lieutenant Colonel, had been called back to Washington, D.C. to testify before Congress. His first testimony took place there on March 29, 1876.

A huge political and financial scandal had been brought to light. It was learned the trader at each army post held a virtual monopoly. The same applied to the agent at each of the government’s Indian agencies. Prices were then inflated, and a huge percentage was kicked back to the head of the scheme and his group of “investors.” Both soldiers and Indians suffered for it.

At the head of the scandalous scheme was Secretary of War William Belknap. The scandal was not brought to light initially by Custer, but Custer had complained about his soldiers being price-gouged by the unscrupulous post traders. His national renown, or celebrity, would certainly have lent credibility or political clout to its investigators. A  committee headed by one of Belknap’s political foes pounced on this advantage.

Trying to avoid impeachment, Belknap had already resigned his position in tears back on March 2nd.. He would still be impeached, however, and Custer’s first-hand knowledge would lend credibility. The affair would be called the “Trader Post Scandal.”

In effect, Belknap was giving exclusive rights to traders, or sutlers, at military posts throughout the frontier. As stated, they would in turn inflate their prices and Belknap would receive kickbacks. Percentages also went to a group of Belknap’s “investors,” including Orville Grant, a brother of President Ulysses S. Grant. That’s where Custer got into trouble. President Grant, the army’s Commander in Chief, took Custer’s testimony personally.

That political fallout would soon plague Custer. It delayed his return to his regiment, and it may have contributed to his untimely death. That, however, will be covered in an upcoming post.

What is significant on this date is that the scandal had been brought to light and Custer was drawn into it. Then, as in today’s sad world, politics were often personal, and Custer played them poorly in this case. He played them to his disadvantage, and it nearly cost him his career.

A few other interesting coincidences and connections also came into play. Reporter Mark Kellogg, with the Bismarck Tribune, had published a letter under his pen name “Frontier” chastising President Grant’s brother Orville for his role in Post Trader graft. Kellogg had also seen previous pieces published by the anti-Grant New York Herald. An anonymous piece published by the Herald, was suspected to have been written by Custer. Could it have actually been written by Kellogg?

Did a connection exist between Custer and Kellogg in regard to those essays? Or could that second published piece have originated solely with Kellogg? (He wrote several articles under the pen name “Frontier” during that time period.)

Kellogg will be featured on March 31. What is interesting here, though, is that Kellogg had once shown Republican leanings in the mid-1800’s, but during America’s Civil War he worked for the La Crosse Democrat. He appeared to espouse his publisher’s Copperhead (anti-war Democrat) leanings both then and when he edited the Democrat in Council Bluffs, Iowa. He aligned with those opposed to Reconstruction, and he may have wished to undermine Grant’s presidency.

It appears Custer and Kellogg may have been acquainted at that time. They were on the same train to Bismarck as Custer his wife returned from an extended leave back East. Fatefully, Custer and Kellogg would also travel together (possibly against President Grant’s orders) when the Dakota Column rode out toward the Little Bighorn. More on that will soon follow.

Of significance here is that Custer’s first fateful testimony before Congress in the Trader Post Scandal took place on March 29, 1876, 150 years ago today.

The post Custer’s Call Before Congress: The Trader Post Scandal and Testimony appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

March 17, 1876 is little remembered, but three notable developments coincided that day. It would mark, in ways, another beginning of events that would lead to the Little Bighorn.

A recent spring snowstorm here in central Montana nearly mimics the conditions of 150 years ago. Nearly 200 miles of Interstate 15 were shut down March 14^th due to high winds and blizzarding, white-out conditions.  Of interest is that at least 40 to 50 miles of that route follow the Missouri River. They approximates the route of the old Mullan Trail, which was used by troops ultimately en route to the Little Bighorn.

On March 17, 1876, Colonel John Gibbon and five infantry companies from Fort Shaw, Montana Territory, set out along the Mullan Road toward Fort Ellis. There, at the northwest end of the Bozeman Trail, they would gather another infantry company. They would soon be joined by four companies of 2^nd Cavalry, also from Fort Ellis. They were following orders to begin General Phil Sheridan’s desired “winter campaign” against non-treaty Indian tribes, forcing them to reservations.

Known as the “Montana Column,” this force would then continue down the Yellowstone River to coordinate and “cooperate” with military columns from Wyoming and Dakota Territories. They would end up at the Little Bighorn a day after Custer’s ill-advised and ill-fated attack there.

Gibbon’s assignment was to patrol the north bank of the Yellowstone River in order to keep non-treaty Sioux and Cheyenne tribes from moving northward. Columns from Wyoming Territory and Dakota Territory were intended to close in, catching the tribes deemed “hostile” more or less in the jaws of a trap.

Not only did the column set out in blizzard conditions, many of its members suffered frostbite. Just as this year, 150 years later, the skies soon cleared and the sun shone brightly, turning deep snows to a slushy mess. With sunlight glaring off the snow, other members of Gibbon’s force then suffered snow blindness.

According to the journal of Lieutenant James Bradley, one way soldiers tried to combat snow blindness was to rub stove-black under their eyes. Modern athletes continue to use that practice, theoretically to fight glare from sunlight or stadium lights. Oddly, the eye black of today’s athletes seems to be worn more for the sake of drama or a Halloween-like makeup effect. (Why the makeup under only one eye, or over one side of the face?) Regardless, in the absence of sun glasses, the practice seems to have some basis in merit.

On March 17, 1876, Major James Brisbin and his two cavalry companies returned from their rescue mission. As noted in an earlier posts, Brisbin had been asked by occupants of the Fort Pease, a trading post, to bring them relief from marauding Miniconjou Sioux. Many occupants had left the post by the time Brisbin arrived, but he provided protective escort back to Fort Ellis for those who remained at Fort Pease. Although the event has little real bearing on history, they arrived back at Fort Ellis 150 years ago today.

One item of later interest is that while returning from Fort Pease, Brisbin’s troops happened onto George Herendeen. Herrendeen had left Fort Pease and was out trapping on his own. He accompanied Brisbin’s troops only grudgingly, under military orders. Herendeen would soon figure significantly in future events. He would save lives at the Little Bighorn.

The only real battle of the planned winter campaign also occurred on March 17^th, 1876. Sadly, while Gibbon’s troops were making final preparations for their march out of Fort Shaw, General George Crook was unleashing an attack on a winter encampment of Cheyenne Indians. Some visiting Oglala Sioux also shared their camp on the Powder River in Montana Territory.

Part of the U.S. Army’s strategy was to attack tribes in their winter encampments while their food supplies were limited, while snow hampered their movements, and while their horses were weak due to limited winter grazing. While Crook didn’t actually lead his attack, he directed his Colonel John Reynolds to lead the attack. It appears the tribe had no scouts or sentinel out due to the weather. The village was taken by surprise.

After a night march through frigid, snowy conditions, Reynolds’ command neared the village around 4:00 a.m. on March 17^th. He broke his six cavalry companies into four battalions. One was assigned to approach along the river and drive the horse herd away. A second was to position atop bluffs overlooking the village and provide covering fire. A third was to make a mounted attack into the village , while the fourth would follow in support.

Due to prohibitive blizzard conditions, difficult terrain and overtaxed cavalry mounts, the battalions failed to position and attack in a coordinated fashion. The Cheyenne horse herd was driven off and captured, but the battalion assigned to the bluffs failed to reach them in time. The first wave of attackers found that contrary to their expectations, the Cheyenne stood their ground and fought rather than fleeing. The support battalion failed to advance in a timely fashion, and the troops soon found themselves needing to retreat.

Much of the village had been plundered and burned, which did leave much of the tribe destitute in the throes of winter. Most of them were able, however, to walk to Crazy Horse’s Oglala Sioux village 30 miles away where they found sustenance. After his hasty retreat, Reynolds left the captured horse herd unguarded (based on faulty advice from scout Frank Gruard, who will be featured again in future posts.) That night Cheyenne warriors recaptured all but 100 of the horses.

General Crook would later report that he had ordered Reynolds to capture the village and hold it until he arrived. He would bring charges, resulting in courts-martial, against Reynolds and two of his captains. His force returned southward to Fort Reno and then Fort Fetterman in Wyoming Territory, and Sheridan’s proposed winter campaign largerly ground to a halt. (As is so often the case in today’s military, para-military and other large organizations, higher-ups had failed to seek out and heed the perspectives of those doing the work.)

Crook’s charges against his subordinates, and their resulting countercharges, are reported to have led to divisions in those ranks. As with Custer and other officers, ranks became divided for or against General Crook. As for the those he had attacked, they allied with other villages and tribes, now more angered and steeled against the invading armies.

General Crook had dealt successfully with Indians in the Northwest, and he would do so later in the Southwest. He attained the rank of General in America’s Civil War. However, he did not fare so well in Montana Territory. Exactly two months after his Power River attack, he would again face Sioux and Cheyenne at the headwaters of Rosebud Creek.

The post March 17, 1876: 150 Years Ago Today appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

(Part Two)

After the 1868 treaty, conflicts in that region stayed below a “boil” over the next five years or so. Although it led to ill feelings amongst the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes, the 1868 treaty did set the Black Hills aside from white settlement, ceding it to the Sioux nation. It was “unceded lands,” another provision of that treaty, that set much of the stage for later conflicts, however. Other issues contributed as well.

First, as with the previous treaty, not all leaders and not all bands had agreed to the 1868 treaty. The treaty did set aside what was called the Great Sioux Reservation, located entirely in the Dakota Territory. However, Fort Rice was located on that reservation land designated for the Sioux. The fort were seen by Sioux as an intrusion. It violated promises made in the unratified treaty of 1851. It also sat entirely too close to the “Paha Sapa,” or Black Hills, which remained sacred to the  Sioux and other tribes. Non-treaty Sioux, particularly under Sitting Bull, sometimes harassed Fort Rice.

Secondly, the treaty designated “Unceded” lands. These were to be set aside as hunting grounds for use by treaty Indians when they needed to supplement the annuities of beef, flour and other supplies the U.S. Government had promised to provide. However, non-treaty tribes roamed freely on and off those unceded lands, and whites did too. As many as half the reservation Indians freely left their reservations to hunt during warmer months. They would return to their reservations for the winter. This too would become a factor in 1876 events.

A third factor and sad reality was that widespread corruption existed amongst various tribal agents.  Even William Belknap, President Grant’s Secretary of War, received lavish kickbacks. (More on this later.) Sutlers and agents were all under military supervision or contracts. Many would require trade or payment for the supplies that had been promised to the Indians living on their “agencies.”

In other cases, Indian agents would sell those supplies to whites rather than issue them to the Indians for whom they were intended. Again, Belknap got kickbacks. (Soldiers in remote forts would be gouged too. I’ll write more about this scandal later.) The government then tried using civilian agents, but the same type of problem occurred. The “agency,” or “treaty” Indians, often had to leave their reservations and hunt simply to avoid starvation.

Not that this issue was entirely one-sided. The written account by Fanny Kelly, a white settler who had been kidnapped by Sioux Indians not far from Fort Laramie, tells another reality. The Indians who held her captive would go to the appointed reservations in order to receive “presents,” or supplies, then they would leave again and wreak havoc with white settlers throughout the region. The issue certainly had two sides.

The issue of treaty Indians leaving their reservations to hunt was compounded as agents and traders often supplied firearms and ammunition to them. Those armaments were valued for hunting, and traders valued the buffalo robes and furs received in return. Those firearms, however, would also be used against white settlers and soldiers.

A fourth factor in this brewing conflict was the expansion of railroad travel and transportation. The first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, and a more northerly route was being surveyed. By 1873 the Northern Pacific Railway had extended as far as Bismarck, in Dakota Territory, which sat on the Missouri River. Across the Missouri, Fort Abraham Lincoln had been established. The goal and intention was for the Northern Pacific to extend across Montana Territory and on to the Pacific coast by that desired northerly route.

One problem was that the intended route went directly through the Unceded Lands in southern Montana Territory. Survey expeditions with military escorts were sent, in the “national interest,” to survey the best route, roughly following the Yellowstone River drainage. Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer led parts of one of those military escorts. His contingent twice fought against Crazy Horse in 1873, three years before they met at the Little Bighorn. The actions of the Oglala Sioux when Custer charged them might have shaped his expectations three years later when he charged their encampment on the “Greasy Grass.”

The 1873 railroad surveys ground to a halt due to the economic Panic of 1873. Due to the resulting depression, the Northern Pacific Railway went bankrupt and spent years restructuring. That panic, in turn, seems to have led political and military leaders in the U.S. government to turn a blind eye when new gold strikes became a possibility. In fact, those leaders might have encouraged a new gold rush. The problem was that gold was rumored in the Black Hills, which had been promised and ceded to the Sioux.

In 1874 a military expedition was sent into the Black Hills. It was sent, supposedly, to police incoming prospectors and keep white intruders off those ceded lands. The expedition’s mission was also to look for a suitable site for a new fort. The stated purpose included protection of treaty Indians from non-treaty tribes.

That expedition was led by none other than George Custer. Soon another rumor leaked out – perhaps intentionally – that gold was found “at the grass roots” in those Black Hills. Then the rush was on full-bore. Treaty and non-treaty tribes alike took exception to this broken promise and its violation of their sacred lands. Inevitably, more conflicts arose.

By 1875 the U.S. government tried more than once to purchase the Black Hills. Those attempts were refused by treaty and non-treaty tribes alike. As 1875 wore on, military leaders were ready to abandon the Peace Policy. Finally the military gave up and decided just to try forcing even non-treaty tribes onto the respective reservations.

With approval of his Commander in Chief, the General Phillip Sheridan, who oversaw the Department of the Missouri, issued his deadline. Agents were to pass along the edict that all non-treaty Indians, Cheyenne and Sioux alike, must “come in” to their tribes’ assigned reservations. They must do so no later than this date in history: January 31, 1876.

Sheridan’s “order” did not even reach the various Indian agents until December 22, 1875. Worse, it demanded that tribes leave their winter camps, in which they huddled to wait out the snow and cold (throughout the warmer months they hunted, dried meat and roots and berries and stored them as “pemmican” to sustain them through the harsh winter months.) Sheridan’s deadline demanded that they travel through conditions that even the Seventh Cavalry would not brave until May of 1876.

The stage was set: an unreasonable demand that could not possibly be honored in the time-frame that was allowed. (That type of demand would be repeated less than 18 months later, leading to tragic conflict for the Nez Perce to the west.) War was the only possible result.

The U.S. Army favored winter campaigns against Plains Indians. Reference Custer’s 1867 attack on Black Kettle’s Southern Cheyenne village on the Washita River in what is now Oklahoma. The strategy was also used in the 1870 Marias Massacre by Major Eugene Baker in what was even then viewed as a despicable act. It would continue into 1877 against remnant bands after Custer’s last battle on the Little Bighorn. It is a topic unto itself, to be discussed in future posts. For many, the stage set by that January 31, 1876 deadline was the beginning of the end. It was 150 years ago today.

The post This Date in History: 150 Years Ago Today (Part Two) appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

This Date in History: A Dead-of-Winter Deadline 150 Years Ago Today

(Part One)

What really happened on this date 150 years ago? The question is really not what happened but rather, “What did not?” The date proved fateful in many ways, and it is one of many that could be marked as “the beginning of the end.” For one, it set in motion more events that led to the ignominious demise of Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer.

Perhaps more sadly, it marked the start of a military campaign – often one of winter warfare against non-treaty Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho bands. Its purpose was to force those non-treaty tribes onto reservations set aside by treaties to which they had not agreed. Those bands, and any Indians who had left their reservations, would now be called “hostiles.”

Oftentimes the name “hostiles” fit. As with any two-sided issue, justification for that hostility would be a matter of perspective.

What makes this date fateful is that January 31, 1876 was the arbitrary date set by General Philip Sheridan for all bands and tribes mentioned above to move onto reservations set by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Not only was this deadline totally unrealistic, it was more than unreasonable.

As always, a discussion of this demands background as to why the U.S. military under Generals Sherman and Sheridan –with the apparent blessing of President U.S. Grant — established this date.

For years (perhaps to its credit when viewed through what they knew only at the time) the United States had pursued a Peace Policy toward nomadic Indian tribes. No marked or surveyed boundaries delineated various tribal lands. In fact, concepts of boundaries were blurred at best. The Black Hills, in what was then Dakota Territory, were considered sacred homelands by Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho as well as by the Sioux who had moved westward. That would become a matter of concern relating to the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, which I’ll discuss shortly.

The Peace Policy, though, could be summed up as good intention by those in the eastern United States. With lack of defined boundaries for tribal lands, and with waves of western movement by European-American settlers, many viewed the more native tribes as uncivilized nomads. The lands those tribes roamed were seen as unsettled and therefore free for the taking by settlers, prospectors, etc.

The Peace Policy sought to offer reservations ceded specifically for each tribe, with food and clothing supplied annually as needed. The belief was that Indians could be educated in the white man’s knowledge and ways. They would be taught to farm so they could live in one place and produce their own food, raising beef, vegetable gardens and other farm crops. They would be influenced toward various “Christian” religious beliefs and practices.

A treaty with many of the Plains tribes was attempted near Fort Laramie in 1851. It tried to do away with inter-tribal warfare (yes, they warred among themselves over homelands and hunting grounds long before white men arrived). It sought to protect tribes and individuals from wrongs by white settlers, and to persuade tribes to live permanently on lands set aside for them. It sought tribal approval for safe travel by white settlers though tribal homelands and hunting grounds. It also allowed for the building of military forts, supposedly to protect both Indians and whites.

The treaty was actually never ratified by Congress, however. The original called for “annuities” to be provided to the tribes for the next 50 years. Some tribal leaders had approved it based on that promise. However, before ratifying it, Congress scaled the annuities back to five years, with an option to add five more when the first five years expired.

Tribes had long scattered by the time Congress ratified the amended version. Many tribal leaders had refused to accept even the first treaty. Those who did approve were under the belief that they had agreed to the first version. It could be said that the treaty was broken. In the eyes of those who had agreed to the first version, that was the case. In the eyes of Congress, they could not break a treaty to which all parties had not signed.

Readers will see this pattern over the next few years. Differences in language, culture and types of government led to many misunderstandings and broken promises – real or imagined – between the U.S. government, its military, and various Indian tribes. Sadly, some treaties truly were later flat-out violated and promises directly broken. Plenty of space will be dedicated to those issues over time.

In the prelude to the Little Bighorn, matters escalated all the more when gold fever was unleashed. The rush in what would become Montana Territory shift later to the Black Hills. When John Bozeman established his namesake trail as a shortcut to Montana gold fields, it cut directly through the heart of hunting grounds cherished by Arapaho, Cheyenne and even Sioux tribes. Settlers took some game. Worse, their livestock grazed heavily on the lands along the trail, pushing buffalo away.

That and other factors led to raids and predations against settlers by those tribes who saw their lands and hunting grounds violated. Five military forts were built along that trail, and others were built over in the Dakota Territory. Much of the resulting conflict could be summed up in what is known as Red Cloud’s War. That conflict is a topic in and of itself.

Red Cloud’s War led to U.S. government acquiescence in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. In part two I’ll discuss issues that stemmed from it and contributed to continuing conflicts. Suffice it here to say that many causes of those conflicts were factors that led to the deadly deadline of January 31, 1876. ;That ultimatum would bring conflicts to a climax at the Little Bighorn.

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