In such a scenario, a static battle, it is also easy to picture a Gatling Gun. We would imagine it firing not just dependably, but also rapidly and repeatedly, barrel after barrel. With attackers arranged in circular surrounding lines, we can easily imagine the gun swiveling, rotating, and mowing the attackers down – without hitting the fellow soldiers who also surround the knob in a tight circle.

In 1876, reality was far different. Yes, both the Montana Column and Dakota Columns brought Gatling Guns on what is called the Yellowstone-Little Bighorn Expedition. Custer declined to take them on his final campaign, however. He had good reason.

The commands had obviously seen value the guns up to that point. Decision makers somewhere in the ranks saw their potential. Even one of Custer’s troopers later stated that he felt they might have changed the battle’s outcome.

However, at the same time others found them to be a tremendous hindrance. Their journal entries bear that out. Among them are Lt. James Bradley of the Montana Column and Lt. Edward Godfrey of the 7^th Cavalry. But first, the proponent’s viewpoint.

Sergeant Daniel Kanipe, in his 1924 account, mentioned both Gatling Guns and Rodman Guns available to Custer. (Gibbon’s Montana Column had also brought two Gatlings and a “Napoleon” cannon. They must have been left as his supply base near Fort Pease.) Kanipe later mused that Custer should have brought the artillery. Both the Rodman and Napoleon were Civil War-era cannon.

Kanipe was quoted, “There’s where he made a mistake, as we see it now, because if he had had one of those Rodman guns and had fired it one time those Indians wouldn’t have stopped running yet . . . And if we’d had one of the Gatling guns there would have been a lot more survivors than me.

Bear in mind that Kanipe survived only because he had been sent with a message to Benteen’s detachment miles to the south. Upon meeting Benteen he was heard to yell something like, “We’ve got them, boys!” Kanipe did not see how Custer’s actual battle played out. However, some merit does exist in Kanipe’s notion that case shot from cannon at a distance might have changed things before warriors engaged Custer.

James Bradley’s journal reflects a different reality regarding the Gatling guns. His first reference is to a Lt. Low, who brought the two guns from the Tongue River to Gibbon’s camp near the mouth of the Rosebud. He remarks that Low arrived the night of June 22^nd “during the night.” The distance was 28 miles, and seems to have taken a great deal of time beyond what even infantry might have required if unencumbered.

Both Bradley and 2^nd Cavalry Engineer Edward McClernand wrote of the travails of getting Gatling guns up Tollock Creek and the Bighorn River to the Little Bighorn. Guns overturnd on hills and had to be uprighted, apparently. They also had to be unhitched and lowered with ropes downhill at at least one point, requiring a great deal of manpower.

Bradley referenced the Gatling battery getting separated from the column and lost during a night march. They did indeed hamper the column’s progress. At least one reference mentions the gun detail finally reaching the column’s camp around 2:00 a.m. during the march.

Gatling guns were not light or readily mobile, necessarily. They were pulled by teams of four condemned horses – in other words by mounts no longer fit for cavalry use. The required manpower as well. The Dakota Column’s battery comprised 32 men plus officers.

Gatlings were also not unfailingly dependable either. Although capable of firing up to 350 rounds per minute, they were plagued by two common nemeses: overheating and fouling. Their rapid fire would obviously heat barrels quickly. Also, they pushed solid lead bullets, which helped to foul barrels. Smokeless powder would not find common use for another 20 years; the black powder of the day also fouled barrels quickly, which led to firing issues.

It is said Custer was offered extra cavalry from Gibbon’s command but declined it. Some speculate, understandably, that Custer did not want to share the anticipated laurels with another regiment. Others concede that Custer also might have found it less efficient to include troops that were not familiar to him or his command. Godfrey later wrote, sensibly, that Terry realized dividing Gibbon’s command would have left him unduly weakened, with only a few hundred infantry men.

Historian Thom Hatch wrote that Custer initially did accept the offer of Gatling guns but changed his mind an hour later. Godfrey and others described Custer’s directives to troop commanders that they be ready to travel light and fast. He planned to pursue the “hostiles” indefinitely, even if their 15 days’ rations ran out and they had to eat their pack mules. He wanted no encumbrance, which the Gatlings obviously would have been.

Hatch credits other historians with the observation that, had Custer taken Gatling guns, they would likely have delayed his movements. In turn, other events would have played out differently. Therefore, Custer might not have died June 25, 1876, if he had been delayed by taking Gatling guns. An interesting thought.

While a long-range shelling before direct attack would likely have change Custer’s outcome, he opted not to take a Rodman or Napoleon gun. If Gatling guns had been present, no one can say what difference one or more might have made. It is feasible the cumbersome, manpower-intensive guns would have helped – assuming their crews might have escaped arrows arching their way from hidden attackers.

It is just as likely Gatling guns would not have helped Custer, even they had not delayed him and he had attacked that afternoon of June 25, 1876. No one will really know exactly how that battle transpired, or what its outcome might have been, if Custer had brought Gatling guns to the Little Bighorn.

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A few particularly peculiar parallels exist between 7^th Cavalry captain Myles Keogh and Fetterman’s bugler Adolph Metzger. One such parallel might relate to Indian accounts of one soldier who stood out. If all accounts describe only one of the many soldiers, then he alone stands out as the bravest man the Sioux and Cheyenne fought that day. Several candidates exist, however.

Metzger and Myles Keogh Similarities

One thread that connects Metzger and Keogh is their horses that survived. Metzger had ridden a horse named “Dapple Dave.” When more troops arrived, they found all of Fetterman’s command, including two civilians, dead. Only Dapple Dave survived, too badly wounded to be valued by the victors. Due to severe wound(s), though, Dapple Dave had to be shot.

Myles Keogh’s mount Comanche is well known as the only cavalry survivor found by General Terry’s troops after the Little Bighorn battle. Comanche had been wounded seven times, but he was kept alive and became a mascot for the surviving soldiers. He managed to make the 12-mile journey to the Little Bighorn’s mouth, where the steamboat Far West waited.

Comanche was then shipped downriver with the wounded. After the 700–mile trip to Fort Abraham Lincoln, Comanche was never used by soldiers again. When he died in 1891 his remains were preserved through taxidermy. They remain on display in a University of Kansas museum.

A more striking parallel between the two soldiers is that their remains were not mutilated. All soldiers were stripped of their uniforms. Accounts vary, but most were mutilated by the victors in some form. Metzger’s story remains sketchy because no soldiers survived, but by many accounts Indians later attested that he had fought bravely to the end.

Metzger is said to have fired a Spencer carbine until he ran out of ammunition. He then used his bugle, his only remaining weapon, as a bludgeon. He fought so bravely and tenaciously that warriors showed him respect. Not only was his body not mutilated, it was found covered with either a blanket or buffalo hide.

Keogh, likewise, was found stripped but unmutilated. Equally interesting is that he wore a Catholic Pro Petri Sede medal, which was not taken by the victors (most items of interest of value were taken when bodies were stripped). Awarded after his service in the Irish papal guard and conflicts, the medal is believed by some to have been seen by Indians as “strong medicine.”

Others believe Keogh remained un-desecrated because of his bravery – a possible parallel to Metzger. Coincidences might hint at a pattern of thought or behavior.

The Little Bighorn’s Bravest Soldier

A number of Indians, including Sitting Bull and Gall, later credited Custer’s soldiers for fighting bravely. Granted, some accounts may have been tailored to suit what the tellers thought white recorders wanted to hear – or to what would spare them possible retribution. However, the Sioux warrior Red Horse and the Cheyenne Wooden Leg both specifically spoke of one who stood out as the bravest soldier they had ever fought against. Keogh might have been that man.

Wooden Leg’s account says that the last soldier to die with Custer’s command was finished off as non-combatants swarmed the battlefield. He said one officer, wounded, raised up on one elbow and “glared wildly” at the Indians as he wielded his revolver. The Indians withdrew, thinking he had “returned from the spirit world.”

A warrior finally approached and turned the man’s own pistol on him. Some accounts say the man wore “white metal bars.” That would indicate he was a captain, maybe Keogh.

Red Horse and others spoke of a man wearing a buckskin shirt and either leading troops bravely or turning his horse to protect troops as they retreated. Two Moon’s and Wooden Legs’ accounts describe a man dressed in buckskin, with long, black hair and a moustache. The man “fought hard with a big knife.” (Custer’s troops had left their sabers back at the Powder River supply depot.) They describe witnessing this bravery on the ridges where Custer’s troops were surrounded. 

Two Moon describes the man’s horse as a sorrel with a white face and white forelegs. The description could fit Custer’s horse Vic, but it also could fit a dust-covered Comanche (especially if the mount’s forelegs had gotten wet in the Little Bighorn and then caked with the dust that was plentiful on the battlefield.) However, that description could also have fit other horses, including some ridden by those with Reno’s command.

In two accounts Red Horse described an “officer” wearing a buckskin coat and a wide-brimmed hat. He said he, and numerous other Indians, believed this was the bravest man they ever fought. He stated the man rode a horse with four white feet.

However, in both accounts Red Horse places the man at the camp’s south end, early in the battle when Reno attacked and retreated. Red Horse said of the man, “He alone saved his command a number of times in the retreat.” This matches the account of Captain Thomas French.

Captain French’s Account

French later wrote in a personal letter, “I don’t wonder that Red Horse thought me a spirit from the bad place. . .” He went on to state that in Reno’s retreat alone he had shot eight pursuers and had seen them fall from their ponies.

In his letter French had questioned Reno’s retreat. He stated, “And when all had gone for safety was when I sought death – and tried to fight the battle alone . . . If one man could hold back seven or eight hundred, what might not a hundred and twenty have done . . .” French also hinted, not-so-subtly, that it had crossed his mind he should have shot Reno.

Who Wore Buckskin?

French might have worn buckskin that day, but at least eight men in Custer’s command had done so also. Multiple witnesses, including trumpeter John Martin, stated Custer had not worn his buckskin coat that day but wore a blue-gray flannel shirt. Others in Reno’s command might have worn buckskin, including Lonesome Charley Reynolds, another possible candidate for “bravest” honors.

Eye witnesses seem not to have recorded the actual death of Reynolds, but it is known he remained behind Reno’s wild retreat. It appears Reynolds was abandoned. The scout’s horse is not described either. Regardless, accounts indicate Reynolds was “unhorsed” at some point. Spent cartridges around his body showed he had fought fiercely to the end.

Reynolds may have used his horse, or another dead mount, as a barricade. Accounts do indicate he was seen deliberately fighting a “rear-guard” action singlehandedly. Red Horse may have referred to Reynolds.

Long Black Hair and a Big Moustache

A photo of French shows thick dark hair and a very large moustache. However, that description seems to belong to the brave man described by Two Moon on Custer’s battlefield. French was with Reno. Wooden Leg described his possible last man to die as having long black hair and a stubbly beard, with a moustache bigger than the beard.

Bear in mind the 7^th Cavalry had been campaigned more than five weeks before the Little Bighorn battle. Some may have shaved, but not frequently. Many who appear trimmed and clean-cut in prior photos may have had longer hair and stubbly beards by then. Even Reynolds, who was described by Libby Custer as unusually clean-cut for a scout, might well have fit that description.

Mysteries surround the Little Bighorn fight. They always will. One that remains is who that bravest soldier might have been. Others include the question why Myles Keogh, like Adolph Metzger 10 years prior, was not mutilated at the Little Bighorn.

The post The Metzger/Myles Keogh Connection and the Little Bighorn’s Bravest Soldier appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Background and Early Army Career

Benteen was born in August 1834 at Petersburg, Virginia, virtually the place where America’s Civil War ended. That war was the making of Benteen’s military career. By its end he had progressed through each rank to that of full colonel, and he was breveted a brigadier general.

Benteen’s career path was anything but conventional, however, which may have led to his apparent bitterness in much of life. He did not attend West Point, as most career officers had. As a boy he moved with his family to Missouri, where he was apparently a commoner.

Benteen’s father, a true Virginian, not only remained an ardent slave holder but viewed Southern slavery as a divine institution. At the Civil War’s outbreak Frederick aligned with the Union and enlisted. His father not only disowned him but stated he would pray daily that Frederick would be killed – ideally by a bullet fired by one of his own kin.

Distinguished Civil War Service

By September 1961 Benteen was a First Lieutenant in the 10^th Missouri Volunteer cavalry, and within a month he had become a captain. By 1962’s end he earned the rank of major, and early 1864 he was made Colonel in charge of a regiment. His brevet to brigadier general was made after the war’s end.

Benteen distinguished himself in numerous actions and conflicts during the Civil War. As Missouri was heavily divided between slavery and abolition, a good deal of military effort and resources went toward fending off secessionist forces and driving them from the state. Benteen was in the thick of much of it.

In Colonel Graham’s summary of Benteen’s career, he describes a family secret later “let out” by Benteen’s 10-year-old son Freddie. Benteen’s embittered father served the Confederacy as a blockade runner on “the great inland rivers.” Those apparently included the Mississippi and Missouri. Regardless, knowing his vessel and mission, Frederick used his 10^th Missouri to capture and confiscate the vessel and contraband cargo. His father remained in federal prison until paroled in 1865. He learned only years later that his capture had come at his son’s hands.

Benteen would distinguish himself beyond Missouri during the Civil War as well. He was conspicuous in his regiment’s actions in Alabama and Georgia too as the war progressed, thus earning his recommendation for the brigadier-general brevet.

Post Civil War Career

Unlike many career officers, Benteen retained his rank as Colonel of the 138^th “colored” regiment in 1865. As Custer historian William A. Graham wrote, “Benteen found this service personally distasteful,” and noted he “surrendered” the rank in July 1866 when the new 7^th Cavalry Regiment was organized. Benteen joined the Seventh as a captain and held that rank for most of his remaining career.

It is uncertain why Benteen disliked leading the “colored” regiment. Some writers allege he exhibited racial prejudice. It is also alleged he disliked or mistreated black interpreter Isaiah Dorman while later stationed at Fort Rice in Dakota Territory. He has generally been described as generally disliking most people.

A Sports Perspective

Benteen does appear to have appreciated various sports and their benefits, both to him and to his enlisted subordinates. Historian Thom Hatch quotes Private Thomas Ewert, who wrote to the Yankton Press and Dakotaian:

“On the first day of March, 1873, ‘H’ company seventh cavalry, stationed at Nashville, Tennessee, resolved to organize a club with the view of having games, sports and exercises to be known as the ‘Benteen base ball and gymnasium club’ (in honor of our company commander, captain F.W. Benteen, Brevet Colonel U.S.A.).”

Numerous accounts exist of baseball contests played between teams from Forts Rice and Lincoln as well as against civilian teams or clubs from nearby cities. In 1877 during the Nez Perce campaign, a trooper noted contests between the 2^nd and 7^th Cavalries along the Yellowstone River drainage.

Benteen seems to have enjoyed the merits of fishing as well. Frontier military troops often loved to supplement their mundane rations with either wild game or trout and other fish teeming in the streams along which they camped and campaigned. Reno himself made several mentions of the fishing rod he took along and enjoyed using during his western campaigns.

The Custer Controversy

When it came to Custer, however, Benteen had plenty of dislike and criticism. As with Reno, this may have stemmed from professional envy, given Custer’s youth and rapid success without seniority. It relates to other sources as well, however.

Benteen was close to Major Joel Elliot, who was wiped out along with 20 troopers during the Washita attack. Officers must have leeway to make decisions independently based on circumstances at hand. Acting independently, Elliot broke off his attack and pursued fleeing warriors away from the point of attack. Only much later was his squadron found, all dead and mutilated. No one had known he had left, or where he had gone.

Weather conditions were extreme, men and horses were already at risk due to the previous day and night’s march, and overwhelming numbers of warriors were appearing from nearby villages. Custer felt compelled to leave after scouts failed to find Elliot’s squadron. Benteen always felt Custer had abandoned him.

Custer fumed after he was criticized publicly in an “anonymous” letter published by a newspaper following Washita. The letter had been written to a friend by Benteen without intent to publish it. (At least one anonymous letter would appear in the New York Herald exposing tradership scandals under Grant’s administration. Ironically, Custer was a suspected source.) For any other faults, Benteen owned what he said. Custer, in effect, backed down when Benteen claimed authorship.

Little Bighorn Legacy

Animosity simmered beneath decorum through subsequent assignments and campaigns. It would lead to questions after the Little Bighorn. Among the first might be why Benteen’s battalion sent southward, away from the Sioux/Cheyenne village. It likely reflects trust rather than spite. Someone did need to ensure no “hostiles” were fleeing southward.

When Benteen decided (independently) his assignment was futile, he returned toward the other two battalions. Custer sent a message to Benteen directing him to hurry northward and bring the ammunition packs. The mule train was detached separately, but it reached Reno’s demoralized and routed troops about when Benteen’s did. Unanswered (and unanswerable) questions arise from there.

Disconcerted, Reno directed Benteen to help his troops; Benteen’s superior, he effectively countermanded Custer’s order.  Benteen was widely commended for taking command and control of the combined troops entrenching on those bluffs. He directed at least one surprise offensive movement, undoubtedly saving troopers’ lives. None other than George Herendeen described him as exceedingly brave.

Could He Have Saved Custer?

Benteen also led a troop movement toward Custer’s location, which was unknown to him. By that time, hordes of warriors were streaming en masse toward Reno’s position. It was later realized they had finished annihilating Custer’s troops. Further advance would have been suicidal. Only coordinated rear-guard action saved them.

Benteen’s Biggest Battles

Benteen continued his career as the 7^th Cavalry rebuilt. In 1877 he distinguished himself against the Nez Perce at Canyon Creek and was breveted colonel. He was promoted to major in 1882. However, after performing honorably in numerous battles from 1861 on, he effectively lost his battle with alcohol. As with Reno, drunkenness led to debauchery and discharge.

As with virtually all aspects of the Little Bighorn, many continue to question Benteen’s actions that day. In retirement he found mutual empathy with former trooper Theodore Goldin, whose Little Bighorn accounts are highly suspect. Letters between the two show Benteen’s bent for sarcasm and critique.

President Cleveland amended Benteen’s army dismissal to a one-year suspension. He then retired on disability. He was event breveted brigadier general for his actions against the Nez Perce and for what he is known best: the Little Bighorn.

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Captain Ball’s Bighorn River Scout

Ball was part of Colonel John Gibbon’s Montana Column. Gibbon’s assignment was to patrol the north bank of the Yellowstone River in order to keep “hostile” or non-treaty Indians from crossing the river northward. Gibbon would also try to locate “hostiles” south of the Yellowstone.

Ball took two companies of 2^nd Cavalry on a foray up the Bighorn River from its mouth at the Yellowstone. They would reach the old site of the abandoned Fort C.F. Smith before circling north and eastward. Their looping reconnaissance covered nearly 180 miles. One development would take an ironic turnabout.

After marching out from Fort Shaw, Montana Territory with his Seventh Infantry, Colonel John Gibbon had picked up two more companies of infantry and four cavalry companies at Fort Ellis near present-day Bozeman, Montana. The Fort Ellis troops had been under command of Major James Brisbin. In time he would make some questionable demands – at least of his scouts.

Up the Bighorn to Fort Smith

Captain Ball’ s mission would be a far less arduous and largely futile foray, however. It would be marked by frequent stops to rest horses and mules. The animals were already weakening and wearing down under the expedition’s demands.

The scouting detachment initially moved 75 miles up the Bighorn River drainage. On reaching the Fort Smith site, they noted its adobe walls were undisturbed and intact. Only the structures’ roofs had collapsed since the fort was abandoned in 1868.

Apparently a group of miners bound for the Black Hills had camped there just a few days prior. (It is uncertain how Ball or his command determined the group’s identity or destination.) Smith’s detachment also soon located the year-old site of a Cheyenne encampment. They found no Indians, though.

Leaving via the Little Bighorn

Finding no sign of the “hostiles” believed to be somewhere in that area, Ball took his troops north and eastward onto the Little Bighorn. Lieutenant Edward McClernand, an engineer, described a portion of it in his diary. It would later prove to be the area where a huge combined village of nontreaty tribes would encamp. Custer would descend on them there.

In his 1968 book Diaries of the Little Bighorn, Captain Michael Koury summarized journals of many soldiers, scouts and traders. He notes McClernand’s April 29^th entry as, “. . . we reached a point where the Little Big Horn washes a long, irregular line of hills on the right, while a short distance ahead, a picturesque valley opens on the left.” Less than two months later, the largest known gathering of Sioux and Cheyenne would encamp at that location. Then Custer would come.

Before leaving the area that ominously would soon be the site of Custer’s demise, a Crow scout left a message for the Sioux. Although done with apparent humor, it would prove ominous – but not for its intended recipients.

The Greasy Grass Pictographs: Trash Talk and Taunt Along the Little Bighorn

The scout, named Jackrabbit Bull, took an empty bread or hardtack box and scratched pictographs on it. Using charcoal to make his depictions, he stated they would should show the Sioux what Crows and soldiers would to do to them. Then he placed blades of green grass into the cracks in the box. He stated this would show the Sioux the events would take place before summer was over.

It is little wonder a Crow scout would take humorous satisfaction in such a taunt. The Crow had diminished in number over time, and the Sioux were more numerous and powerful. The two were long-time blood enemies. Crow numbers had diminished in part due to attacks by the Sioux and their allies. In fact, Sioux continued their attacks and raids after the Crow had settled on their established treaty agencies.

Tables would turn, however, on Jackrabbit Bull’s taunt – at least at the Little Bighorn.

The Tables Turned

On June 26^th Gibbon’s column approached that site again. They learned of Custer’s annihilation. McClernand made an interesting notation in his diary. He wrote,

“The fight taking place here reminds me of a taunt left by one of the Crow scouts not more than 3 or 4 miles up the valley during our scout over this same ground on April 29^th. . . It is somewhat strange that, considering the hundreds of miles we have marched, this taunt should have been left so near the spot where the one desperate fight of the campaign took place.”

Many, if not most, enjoy seeing trash talk quashed and taunts proved wrong. Many examples from today’s athletics come to mind. From the Sioux and Cheyenne perspective, maybe the same sense was felt, assuming they found and understood Jackrabbit Bull’s prediction.

We can only assume that someone in the huge, unprecedented gathering of Sioux and Cheyenne found the crate. Given subsequent rains and snows, it is unlikely the charcoal pictographs remained intact. If so, would the recipient(s) have understood them for what they were? If so, they had the last laugh over the taunt that had been left along the Little Bighorn.

The post Captain Ball’s Scout: A Portentous Taunt — Pictographic Trash Talk on the Greasy Grass appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Through 1866-67 Red Cloud’s War focused largely on the building of Fort Phil Kearney near what is now Banner, Wyoming. Some raids took place elsewhere along the Bozeman Trail, and warriors targeted other forts along the trail too.

The most persistent and notable confrontations surrounded Fort Phil Kearney, however. They culminated with what is known as the Fetterman Fight.

Surrounding Circumstances

The “Hayfield Fight,” near Fort C.F. Smith, was one of the more large-scale confrontations. “The Wagon Box Fight” in 1867 took place a few miles north of Fort Phil Kearney. Both would surprise the attackers with the relatively new speed of fire from the army’s breech-loading rifles now using metallic cartridges.

Fetterman’s Fight, however, is what demanded the U.S. Army’s full attention. It would force the U.S. to negotiate, resulting in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Forts on the Bozeman Trail were abandoned.

Throughout its own Civil War the United States had also dealt with Indian uprisings and conflicts. Besides attempted to rebellion and secessoin, President Lincoln had to deal with Indian hostilities.  In 1862 Santee Sioux under Little Crow had killed several hundred Minnesota residents; in the Southwest, Apache and Comanche conflicts raged. In between and to the west even more hostilities boiled.

After the Civil War ended, the U.S. Army diminished in size, but soldiers were still needed. They dealt not only with reconstruction issues and the Ku Klux Klan but also growing conflicts in the west. Various gold strikes, including those in Montana Territory, brought increased settlers and settlement. With that increase came growing conflicts, including those with Sioux and Cheyenne tribes.

Forts Fueled Conflict

Fort Laramie already sat along the Oregon Trail. Fort Ellis, in Montana Territory’s Gallatin Valley would protect the Bozeman Trail’s terminus. The army added three more forts along the Bozeman Trail: Fort Reno, Fort Phil Kearny and Fort C.F. Smith. Each was named for a Civil War general. Coincidentally, all three had died in 1862.

The Bozeman Trail cut through the heart of prime and cherished Sioux and Cheyenne hunting grounds. Worse, when Colonel Henry Carrington chose his site for Fort Phil Kearny, he ravaged  those treasured hunting grounds.

The fort needed huge amounts of timber. It needed water too, and good feed for beef to feed the troops and horses to draw wagons and carry cavalry. Colonel Carrington chose a site that met all of those needs. Knowing how Indians would respond, Jim Bridger recommended a different site. Carrington insisted on his.

For perspective, just the walls of the main stockade measured 800’ by 600’, totaling 2800 linear feet of perimeter. Ten-foot lengths were squared on the sides to fit tightly together, then set upright in the ground to form an eight-foot-high palisade. An added area of irregular shape had lower walls but made the total perimeter 3,900 feet or more.

The fort needed barracks, medical quarters, offices, tack rooms and numerous other roofed structures. The effect of the timber harvest on the area was heart-rending to the Sioux and Cheyenne. Their anger burned.

Red Cloud’s Persistent Raids

The closest timber stood a few miles away, though at the foot of the Bighorn Mountains. Wood cutting details went out each day, and wagon loads of timber were hauled to the fort’s location. Away from the protection of the fort, these details made easy, tempting targets for the irate tribes whose lands were being desecrated.

When wood-cutting detachments were attacked, larger forces would rush out to chase the attackers. As warriors harassed wood details, often killing some, the soldiers’ patterns grew predictable. Frustration grew, but soldiers failed to view the warriors as their equals. Captain William Fetterman, a Civil War veteran, was among them.

A Foreboding Boast?

Fetterman is often quoted as saying, “Give me 80 men and I’ll ride through the whole Sioux nation.” Maybe he did. The quote and its context were not recorded by an immediate witness. Whether he made that statement or maybe something similar, it has come to represent the attitude that soon led to Fetterman’s fall. It would foreshadow what befell Custer at the Little Bighorn.

As attacks persisted and soldiers tired of them, the Red Cloud’s Sioux strategized.  They decided to decoy the soldiers out of the fort and spring an ambush. It failed. Some of those who lay in ambush sprang the attack too soon. It seems the soldiers would have learned from it. They did not.

On December 21, 1866 the Sioux again attacked a wood-cutting detail. As soldiers emerged from the fort, ten warriors lagged acting again as decoys. A cavalry squadron of cavalry pursued them, followed by Fetterman and his infantry. Two civilian sutlers armed with Henry repeating rifles accompanied the force as well.
That brought Fetterman’s total force to 80 men.

How the Fight Unfolded

What happened next is somewhat subject to speculation. It resembles Custer’s Little Bighorn defeat in that regard. The soldiers disappeared beyond a long, open ridge more than a mile from the fort. Fetterman had been instructed not to cross it in pursuing the hostiles.

The Lieutenant in charge of Fetterman’s cavalry troop was of questionable character. (During the Civil War he courted and married a young Tennessee woman while still married to his first wife up north.) He was apparently impetuous as well. It is likely the lieutenant pursued the decoys past where he was authorized to proceed. Mounted, his troop easily outdistanced the infantry. He was soon surrounded and overwhelmed.

It is likely that Fetterman went over the ridge in order to reinforce the impetuous lieutenant who had defied orders. We will never know for sure. Such scenarios have been debated for 150 years regarding Custer at the Little Bighorn as well.

What is known is that Fetterman’s entire command – 78 enlisted men and two civilians – were annihilated. The ambush would become known as the Fetterman Massacre, or the Fetterman Fight, depending on one’s perspective. If he really did say, “Give me 80 men. . .” his end might seem poetic.

A Persistent Pattern

What we can be observed is a developing pattern. First Grattan barged into a Sioux camp in 1853 with only 29 men. He made demands, and his entire command died with him. Fetterman charged out with his 80 men in 1866, apparently expecting the Sioux warriors to flee. All his command died with him there as well.

Less than 10 years later Custer would charge toward a camp of “hostile” Sioux and Cheyenne. He apparently expected them to flee. All five of his troops – more than 200 men, plus more who fell in Reno’s separate charge – would soon lie dead. He likely failed to grasp the size of the village he attacked, but his scouts had warned him. Whether due to ignorance or arrogance, his command was wiped out too.

The Foreshadowing

Among the decoys who drew Fetterman and 80 men out of from Fort Phil Kearny was a young warrior named Crazy Horse. Like Sitting Bull he disdained white men’s ways and treaties. He would later face an impetuous cavalry officer along the banks of the Yellowstone River in 1873. He would try decoy tactics there, too. By then, Custer, the officer had learned.

The two warriors, Custer and Crazy Horse, would meet again in 1876. Crazy Horse’s forces would prevail. Ten years before that fateful meeting, though, Fetterman’s fight would foreshadow would occur at the Little Bighorn.

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By 1876 Red Cloud had become a diplomat for his people. He would leave a legacy of advocacy for his tribe and others. That legacy would last far beyond the echoes of the Little Bighorn battle.

Attacker to Ambassador

It was not always that way. Red Cloud was present at the Grattan “massacre” in 1853. He also led in Sioux and Cheyenne attacks over the next 15 years, particularly those along the Bozeman Trail in 1866-67.  In fact, that entire two-year “war” was named for Red Cloud.

Red Cloud led his subtribe of Oglala Sioux against the incursions of white settlers on tribal lands. He also succeeded in uniting other Sioux (Lakota) tribes and Cheyennes as well. Those hostilities, however, would continue after Red Cloud forsook them. They would reach their climax in 1876 at the Little Bighorn.

Red Cloud would be the only leader to fight the U.S. government within its boundaries and prevail. He all but forced the U.S. Army to negotiate, resulting in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. When he finally agreed to that treaty he vowed he would not fight against white men again. He kept his word.

Early Life

Red Cloud was born in or around 1822 near what is now North Platte, Nebraska. He was so named after a reddish effect was seen in the night sky right before he was born. It may have been a comet or a cloud-obscured lunar eclipse. Red Cloud’s father was a Brule Sioux, but he died by the time Red Cloud was three years old.

Red Cloud’s mother was Oglala. The Sioux followed a matrilineal family structure. Red Cloud and his mother were taken in by her brother, Chief Old Smoke. The boy was also mentored by his uncle White Hawk.

As a boy Red Cloud stood out in competitive games amongst his peers. Such games prepared boys for hunting and war. By the age of 16 he had joined his first raid against the Pawnees seeking revenge for their killing of his cousin. It is said he killed his first enemy and took his first scalp in that raid. More would follow.

Increasing Conflicts

Much of conflict in which Red Cloud was involved would simmer and sometimes boil as long as white settlers moved westward over the Oregon Trail. Gold strikes in California and then in Washington and Idaho Territories had played a part. Land in Oregon had also attracted settlers.

In the early 1860’s, however, gold was discovered in what would soon be Montana Territory. In 1862, Bannack burgeoned as a boom town on Grasshopper Creek. Then, Alder Gulch became the next big strike. Virginia City was its main settlement.

Those gold fields were difficult to reach, however. Some popular routes involved high, difficult passes up from the Oregon Trail or Salt Lake City. Others labored eastward from the Lewiston area to the west. Those coming from the east were eager for a better route.

An enterprising man named John Bozeman located a shorter route up from Fort Laramie. It was a tough but more efficient shortcut to Montana’s gold fields. However, Sioux, Cheyenne and even Crow Indians took warlike exception.

Bozeman’s trail cut right through the heart of not just homelands, but also prime and cherished hunting grounds of several tribes. It also ignored promises of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, which had led tribes to believe those lands were theirs.

As traffic increased along the Bozeman cutoff, or Bozeman Trail, so did attacks by the Sioux and Cheyenne. As conflicts increased, the U.S. government responded by establishing forts along the trail, including Forts Reno, Phil Kearney, and C.F. Smith. Those forts, though, only made matters worse.

Red Cloud’s War

Red Cloud’s War included raids and attacks against increasing trains of settlers along Bozeman’s trail. It also included attacks on parties working to build and supply the forts. The Hayfield Fight and the Wagon Box Fight would become prominent events in the history of those forts. Even more prominent would be the 1866 attacks on those building Fort Phil Kearny. They would climax with the Fetterman Fight.

Jim Bridger served as a U.S. Army scout during that time. Foreseeing the issues Fort Phil Kearny would cause, he advised against the location chosen for it. Bridger also offered an alternative route to the Bozeman trail. His recommended route would also save time and effort in reaching Montana Territory’s goldfields.

Bridger’s route would be called the Bridger Trail, or Bridger Cutoff. It was accepted by the Lakota and Cheyennes in negotiations. However, it was largely rejected by both settlers and the U.S. army in favor of Bozeman’s route. Much conflict and bloodshed would result.

The resulting two years of conflict would be labelled Red Cloud’s War. He inspired guerilla-like raids against settlers. His followers persisted in attacking parties of wood cutters who gathered timber for the construction of Fort Phil Kearny.

Fetterman’s Fight: A Foreboding

The fort used signal men to indicate when an attack was underway. Squads of soldiers would then rush from the fort to stop the attacks. Red Cloud’s warriors soon noted the pattern. They then used decoys to lure the soldiers out.

The warriors’ first attempt failed when over-eager warriors attacked too soon. A second attempt, however, worked as planned. Captain William Fetterman and all his men died in the attack. (More to come on that topic.)

Red Cloud’s Results

Red Cloud’s War humbled the U.S. army and brought it to negotiate a new treaty. The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 included an agreement to close the Bozeman Trail. The army agreed to abandon the three forts Red Cloud had persistently attacked: Forts Reno, Kearny and C.F. Smith. Red Cloud, however, would not sign it until troops had marched actually out and abandoned the forts.

Red Cloud gave his word at that time that he would live in peace with white men. He kept his word from that time on, even in the Great Sioux War of 1876. He moved to the agency at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. It would soon be called the Red Cloud agency.

Later Life and Leadership

Red Cloud became an ambassador for his people and other Plains tribes. He made repeated journeys to Washington, D.C. to lobby for improved conditions for his people. He was vilified by some Sioux and Cheyenne for no longer making war. He foresaw the need for living peacefully, however. He kept his vow to fight no more.

It is claimed that before Red Cloud’s death in 1909 he said of the white men, “They made us many promises, more than I can remember. But they kept but one – They promised to take our land … and they took it.”

Other Lasting Influence

Before Red Cloud made and kept his vow of peace, he had led tribes in united fights to save their homelands. Another young Oglala had fought under Red Cloud’s leadership. His name was Crazy Horse.

That young warrior led the decoys in what would be called the Fetterman Fight. Ominously, all 79 soldiers and two civilians who had entered that fight died. It would be known by many as a massacre. It would foreshadow a battle to come.

Nearly 10 years later Crazy Horse would lead warriors in another victory. There, all five troops with Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer would die too. It would occur on a river called the Little Bighorn.

The post Red Cloud: Revered Lakota Leader appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

In fact, that one fortunate assignment made the rest of Kanipe’s life possible.

On June 25, 1876 Kanipe rode with Company C, his assigned troop, under Captain Tom Custer. Custer’s brother George (Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer) had divided his command four ways. He had sent three troops with Major Reno and  three with Captain Benteen. He assigned one company, under Captain Thomas McDougal, to escort the regiment’s pack mules and act as a rear guard.

Kanipe’s troop was one of five that were annihilated with Custer. However, Kanipe had received an assignment that spared his life. Tom Custer relayed an order to Kanipe to ride back, find Captain McDougal, and tell him to hurry forward with the packs. Those packs included large amounts of much-needed ammunition.

Pack mules were an interesting link in the chain of events that led to the Little Bighorn. (A later post will examine the topic further.) On the night of June 24, 1876, a hardtack crate had fallen from a pack mule during a forced march. Custer had planned to rest his regiment and their mounts on June 25^th.

However, Custer sent a sergeant back to retrieve the lost rations. He found the crate, along with two Indians who were eating the contents. The Indians fled, and the soldier reported the matter back at the main command. Tom Custer reported the incident to the commander. (Later accounts from the Crow and Ree scouts state other “hostiles” had seen the regiment too.)

Custer realized his command had been spotted. He felt he must press the attack before the large gathering of “hostiles” escaped. Forging ahead, he divided his command as he approached their large village.

Custer sent Captain Benteen far to the south to search for hostiles and cut off any escape in that direction. He assigned Major Reno to attack the village’s south end. He took his own five troops northward, apparently intending to strike the hostiles from the flank or rear.

However, Custer had never yet actually seen the size of the village or the force he would encounter. He had ignored his scouts’ warnings as well. (Yet another topic for another time.)

After finally ascending a high knoll on the east side of the Little Bighorn, Custer finally got a look at the encampment, or at least a large portion of it. It extended for miles along the river’s west bank. He also apparently saw what he thought to be Indians fleeing.

Custer had separated from his battalion, taking only an orderly and a few scouts.

His plans appear to have changed at that point, but he knew he would need more ammunition. Thus, he sent the first of two messengers to hurry the ammunition packs toward him and bring Benteen’s battalion into the fray.

The first assignment went to Sergeant Daniel Kanipe as described above. The chain of communication is a bit curious. No written message appears to have been sent, unless it remained with Captain Tom Custer. Kanipe’s later account simply says his captain told him to go back and deliver the orders that had just been issued by “General’ Custer.

Now that Custer had surveyed the village his troops joined him. They advanced at a gallop. Some had trouble reining their mounts back and galloped past Custer. Kanipe recounted that as he rode away, Custer shouted, “Boys, hold your horses. There are plenty of them down there for us all.”

Feeling he had drawn the short straw, Kanipe summed up his account, “They rode on. I rode back.”  He backtracked and dutifully relayed Custer’s message to Captain McDougal. He then located Captain Benteen and relayed the same order.

Major Reno’s attack quickly turned to retreat. It has long been the topic of much heated debate. Most of his battalion fled or straggled up to a high point on the bluffs east of the Little Bighorn. McDougal’s pack train soon found him there after fending off scattered attacks along the way.

Benteen’s command also reached Reno’s demoralized and disorganized troops on the bluffs. Kanipe’s later account states that he remained with Benteen after delivering Custer’s orders. He was unable to return to his assigned “C” troops due to hostiles massed between Custer’s battalion and the troops Kanipe had joined. Because Kanipe had been dispatched with amended orders, however, he lived a full life — unlike the rest of his troop and the others with Custer.

Kanipe was discharged from the army either in 1877, at the end of his five-year enlistment, or in 1887 (sources vary, likely due to a “typo.”) He farmed past the age of 50 and then worked 20 years for the Internal Revenue Service. Only a few other factors in his life bear mention.

Kanipe’s later account mentions a First Sergeant Bobo, who died with Custer. Bobo and his wife were also from North Carolina. Bobo’s wife, Missouri Anne, had married at the age of 15 and was now widowed. On April 12,1877, less than a year after the battle, Kanipe married Bobo’s widow and helped in raising Bobo’s two young sons. The couple appears to have added eight children of their own.

Kanipe’s account of the Little Bighorn campaign seems not to have reached print until April 27, 1924, nearly 50 years after the battle. It offers interesting insights including commentary related to Custer’s Trader Post Testimony. It also includes an opinion on Custer’s lack of artillery. However, Kanipe had ended up with Reno’s command. He could not have known how Custer’s battle really played out.

One amateur student of the Little Bighorn battle has written attempting to discredit Kanipe’s story. The lack of a written dispatch does lead to questions. At least two other accounts surfaced from survivors who claimed to have left Custer’s battalion en route to Reno’s. One has been the source of at least one totally bizarre myth involving Custer, a lone Crow scout and a captured Sioux woman.

However, the other accounts have been widely discredited. On the other hand, Kanipe is mentioned as a messenger by several other credible survivors. His story seems to add up. It meshes with other credible accounts.

Kanipe received an honorable discharge upon leaving the army. Captain Thomas McDougall received Kanipe’s dispatch at the Little Bighorn. He later wrote in a letter of recommendation:

“Sergeant Kanipe is an honest, sober, trustworthy man that always did his duty well, gaining the entire respect of the officers of his regiment, as also the enlisted men. I cannot too highly recommend him for any position of trust that may be given him, knowing that he will perform all duties well that are entrusted to him, with honesty, faithfulness, courage and loyalty to those who employ him… This soldier’s record is good all through, and I gladly recommend him for any position he may seek…. His hard service entitles him to great consideration.”

It appears he was dutifully dependable both at, and after, the Little Bighorn.

The post Sergeant Daniel Kanipe: Custer’s First Fortunate Courier appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

By that time the various Indian bands and tribes had scattered. The treaty is a study in itself, but several factors led to a flawed negotiation. Misunderstandings – and violations – resulted.

The logistics of sustaining a huge encampment in one place for months would have been impossible. Challenges included sanitation and sustenance, both for people and horses.

Of necessity, tribes scattered out in order to find newer, cleaner camp areas as well as grazing for their horse herds. The tribes needed hunting opportunities in order to feed their members in the short run, and winter was approaching.

The treaty was negotiated in September. Harsh winter months loomed. Much hunting and preparation were needed in order for tribes to lay in stores of dried meat and pemmican. Therefore, they dispersed after the original version of the treaty was signed.

Regardless, both sides believed the main tenets of the treaty had been agreed upon. Failure to follow this treaty resulted in large amounts of needless conflict and death. Those consequences would follow for more than two decades, even beyond the Little Bighorn.

One of the more notable events that started the coming conflicts is sometimes called the Grattan Affair (some have called it the Grattan Massacre.)

Most readers will be generally familiar with the Oregon Trail, or at least its existence. Gold discoveries in California, along with the opening of the trail to Oregon’s Willamette Valley, led to increasing wagon traffic over the trail. Also, widespread drought in 1853 and 54 left many plains tribes with few buffalo to hunt. Conditions became ripe for conflict.

In August of 1854 a group of Mormon emigrants was approaching Fort Laramie. A large band of Brule Sioux was also camped near the fort. A lame ox belonging to one of the emigrants wandered away from the train and close to the Sioux encampment.

A brave named High Forehead was visiting from another band of Sioux. Whether on a lark or due to hunger, he shot the ox. Its owner proceeded to Fort Laramie and complained about the incident, demanding that he be paid $25 for the ox.

Uncertainties surround the incident. The ox may have been abandoned, and its owner simply saw an opportunity for reimbursement. It is also unknown as to whether the owner actually expected cash from the Indians. Given that the tribes normally traded and bartered, it seems unlikely they would even have owned or understood white man’s money at that point.

Perhaps the ox’s owner thought the U.S. Government would pay him cash at the fort for his loss. One can also speculate on the lame ox’s value. A quick AI search indicates that $25 would not have been too unreasonable, at least for a healthy ox at that time. That price sounds high for a lame ox, however.

(NOTE: Trapper, explorer and trader Jim Bridger established Fort Bridger as a trading post farther west on the Oregon Trail. He supplemented his income by purchasing lame or worn-down oxen, cattle, horses and mules from trail-weary emigrants. He would then sell healthy, rehabilitated livestock at a profit to parties of settlers coming later along the trail.)

Regardless, after the killing of the lame ox, Brule Chief Conquering Bear went to Fort Laramie and offered a number of his own horses as payment for the beast. The owner of the lame ox would not be placated. As a result, the fort’s commander demanded the Sioux bring the offender to him for punishment.

However, Sioux “law” prohibited the Brule from turning a visitor or guest over to the white men. Such a practice would also violate the 1851 treaty. The treaty stated that the tribe and its government agent should handle to incident. Instead, the fort’s commander sent a detachment of soldiers to the Brule camp to arrest High Forehead. It did not go well for them.

The detachment of 29 soldiers was led by young 2^nd Lieutenant John Grattan, fresh out of West Point. At only 22 years old, he had no experience in either armed conflict or in dealing with Indians. He led his infantrymen into the Sioux encampment and confronted the tribe’s chief who had tried to defuse the situation. Knowing the soldiers were coming, the tribe’s warriors had prepared accordingly.

It is unknown who fired the first shot, or why, but someone in the camp fired. Mayhem ensued. Brave Bear was killed. Surrounded by armed warriors, all the soldiers were quickly wiped out. Grattan himself was found with 24 arrows protruding from his body.

Sadly the Grattan incident was just the opening act in the decades of conflict to follow. It had both a prequel and a sequel.

Issues began in that area the previous year. A few bands of Oglala and Brule Sioux had camped peacefully in the area for some time. However, an aggressive band of Miniconjou had come to the area also and had camped at the Platte Ferry crossing. They harassed emigrants and exacted tolls from them, likely in the form of flour, sugar, coffee and other goods. (More on this when Fanny Kelly is profiled in May.)

On June 15, 1853 a Minneconjou brave fired a shot toward an army sergeant who was out on the ferry. Whether he missed intentionally or by accident is unknown. What is known is that the matter was reported at Fort Laramie and then dealt with.

Within two days a contingent of soldiers went to the Miniconjou camp to arrest the warrior. They planned to take hostages with which to bargain for his surrender. They were led by Hugh Fleming, also a recent West Pointer. A classmate of Grattan, he had graduated in 1852. The next year he would command the fort.

Conflict arose. Those warriors in camp withdrew away from the meeting, and the soldiers fired on them, killing three. A few squaws were also taken as captives. It appeared the matter was settled during negotiations that followed.

The problem was that most of the camp’s warriors had been away on their spring hunts. Easy success seemed to give the soldiers a false impression. Now they believed all they must do is make a show of strength in such disputes.

George Custer would gain much the same impression in his battles against Sioux war parties in 1873. Much like Grattan, he would find his impression was wrong.

The sad sequel to the event is that Brigadier General William Harney would then come to Fort Laramie and issue an ultimatum. Any Indians who came to the fort would be treated as peaceful. They would be issued food and supplies to sustain them near the fort. Any Indians who did not move to the fort would be seen as considered warlike. They would be attacked.

Brave Bear’s band, now under Chief Little Thunder, believed it was already known as a peaceful tribe. Therefore, they did not report to Fort Laramie. Harney located their village, attacked it and destroyed it. At least 86 Sioux died. More than 70 women and children were captured.

The perceived success of Harney’s use of force further set the stage.  Plains tribes waged guerilla-like warfare, while whites waged large-scale military actions. Their conflicts would span more than two more decades to come. They would reach their apex at the Little Bighorn.

One of the greatest leaders in that conflict would be the Oglala chief Red Cloud. (Stay tuned.)

The post What Led to the Little Bighorn: Early Beginnings: The Grattan Affair appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

Immigrants from numerous nations were prevalent in both armies during our nation’s Civil War. In fact, many officer positions were filled for political purposes with the intent of winning the loyalty of immigrants from give nationalities.

President Lincoln, for example, a perceptive politician, was known to have filled a general’s position with a man of German descent in order to retain the loyalties of German immigrants. In another case, at least one deserving officer was passed over for promotion because a given command already had “too many Irish officers.” Sadly, I have not been able to locate his name in time for posting on this topic.

It is noted that Ireland suffered its Great Famine, or Potato Famine, in the late 1840’s and early 1850’s. It resulted in many Irish immigrating to the United States. Most were poor. By the time they paid passage across the ocean most had little or no money left for starting businesses or buying farms. As a result, many of them, like other immigrants, found at least sparse employment by enlisting in the U.S. military.  

After the oppression most Irish had endured, it seems odd that many of them fought for the South during America’s Civil War. More Irish did fight for the Union and its desire to break the oppression of slavery. However, some feared that the freeing of southern slaves would lead to even greater competition for employment, particularly in the North. Some had simply settled in the South and therefore were loyal to their states.

Regardless of their motivation, many Irish fought capably on both sides of the war. An AI pop-up notes that at least 12 Union generals were Irish, while at least 6 Confederate generals were Irish immigrants or descendants. Many Irish, naturally, had served honorably in America’s Revolution as well, it might be noted.

Thomas Francis Meagher bears mention here, although he had little direct connection to the Little Bighorn. An Irish revolutionary, he was exiled to Tazmania, then managed to escape and make his way to the U.S. After becoming a Union general he led the famed Irish Brigade, also known as the original “Fighting 69^th.”

After the war, Meagher became Acting Governor of Montana Territory and raised a territorial volunteer militia to combat Blackfeet Indian depredations. However, he died a mysterious death on the Missouri River while en route to receive a shipment of arms for that purpose. A statue of Meagher has long stood in front of Montana’s capitol building. He is portrayed atop a horse with his saber raised as if leading his troops.

After 1865, many poor immigrants continued to enlist in America’s army. They were not all selfless in their motivations. Some might well have been “rabble.” Out at the lonely, isolated posts on what was then America’s frontier, drunkenness and disciplinary problems were not uncommon. Desertion was relatively frequent as well. Rumors of gold often beckoned.With no ties elsewhere, a man might easily change his name or otherwise disappear in the frontier’s vast reaches.

Regardless, many Irish ended up in the army’s Seventh Cavalry Regiment. At its head was General Phil Sheridan. Although he was American-born, Sheridan was the son of Irish parents. John and Mary ( Meenagh) Sheridan had immigrated from Killinkere parish in County Cavan, Ireland.

Sheridan is sometimes regarded negatively for his practice of “total warfare,” both in America’s Civil War and later against Plains Indian tribes. (A particularly unfair and inaccurate quote has been attributed to Sheridan as well. That has contributed to the overall negative perceptions and portrayals of him, but that will be discussed in another post.)

Regardless of one’s view, Sheridan was a lieutenant general overseeing the army’s Department of the Missouri through the 1870’s. The Seventh Cavalry fell under his overall command.

The only other commissioned officer in the Seventh Cavalry was Myles Keogh. Aside from George Armstrong Custer himself, Captain (brevet Colonel) Keough is likely the most widely known member of the Seventh Cavalry. Keough had been recruited directly from Ireland during the Civil War. More will be posted about him, as well, in the near future. However, he brought an Irish influence to the regiment, and his Irish Catholic practices may have kept his body from being mutilated after his death at the Little Bighorn.

It is less well known that the 7^th Cavalry had a strong Irish presence throughout its ranks, far beyond just the well known Myles Keough.

Accounts vary, but anywhere from 103 to 128 Irish were enlisted in the Seventh Cavalry in 1876. Of those, 34 (or possibly 35) died at the Little Bighorn, a high attrition rate. I have read on a discussion board that Irish made up 16% of the regiment (out of roughly 600 total enlistees.) Although Keogh was its only commissioned officer, roughly 18 held the rank of sergeant.

Although Keough may or may not have actually brought the song Garryowen to the Seventh Cavalry, he certainly helped to popularize it there. That spirited Irish jig tune is well know for its adoption as the 7^th Cavalry’s “anthem.” (See ‘Songs of the Seventh,’ posted 3/10/26.)

A brief mention here of the Civil War term “galvanizing” might be fitting. It refers to members of either side who changed their outer uniform, or coating just as iron pipes were galvanized (a practice patented in1836.) This was often done by prisoners of war who wanted to escape the horrors of prison camps, but it was started at Camp Douglas, in Illinois, by Colonel James Mulligan. (Irish, perhaps?) Many who galvanized were Irish immigrants who had been drafted or conscripted, and many were sent to remote frontier posts, away from their original places of loyalty.

After noting the Seventh Cavalry’s strong Irish presence, I looked into the topic further. I realized the notion was hardly original with me. An internet search will show many other sources have dealt with this topic. The site below, though might be one of the best. Although it has some inaccuracies regarding the lead-up to the Little Bighorn, it is overall a good source on this topic:

The post The Seventh Cavalry’s Irish Contingent appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.

The Seventh Cavalry Regiment and the song “Garryowen” are virtually synonymous – at least to anyone who has a passing familiarity with either. The two have appeared together in countless books and movies. Even those who have never dived into that part of history might have some awareness of the Seventh and its “anthem.”

The Seventh’s regimental band played that lively tune as the troops rode out on campaign. At times it was even played as they rode into battle. Understandably, the troopers loved it. As Saint Patrick’s Day approaches, the song warrants a bit more background. It bears an interesting history and even some irony.

As for its origin, the song is an Irish jig. Its name is actually “Garry Owen.” Adapted from the Irish “Garrai Eoin,” or St. John’s Court, it celebrates a particular section of Limerick, Ireland. Other sources state the name means “Owen’s Garden” or “John’s Garden,” but all refer to an area near an old castle frequented by “roisterers.”

Interestingly, the jig is a drinking song, first popular among rowdy Irish revelers in the late 1700’s. A look at the lyrics well bears that out. Its irony is that Custer was known to love the tune, but he is widely believed to have been a teetotaler – at least after a drunken spree that nearly cost him a chance to court Elizabeth Bacon.

While living with his sister and finishing schooling in Monroe, Michigan, Custer became acquainted with the Bacons. Elizabeth was the daughter of Judge Daniel Bacon, a member of Monroe’s finer society. Later, as a young Civil War lieutenant Custer became ill and went back to Monroe on leave. One evening he and a fellow soldier got inebriated and wandered past the Bacons’ house, apparently singing raucously. (Garryowen, perhaps?)

At the time, the judge forbade his daughter to have contact with Custer; however, when young soldier arrived home that night his sister took him aside, lectured him sternly and elicited a pledge from him to avoid all alcohol from that time forward. It is believed that he kept that pledge.

Custer was also reputed to have banned, or at least limited sales of alcohol to his troopers at Fort Abraham Lincoln. He may have done so earlier at Fort Hays as well.  Alcoholism was not uncommon at remote posts. Some contraband liquor undoubtedly reached the ranks, and it would later be the undoing of Major Marcus Reno. In fact, lives may have been lost due to his drinking (more on that to come.)

Regardless, it’s easy to see why troopers loved and adopted Garry Owen as their favorite. It’s lively tune was a favorite of the 5^th Royal Irish Lancers, and it was quickly picked up by other Irish and British units. It may have made its way to America before or during our Revolution.

Interestingly, the tune was also used by composer Ludwig Beethoven in the early 1800’s. However, his composition “From Garyone My Happy Home” is far more formal and far less spirited than the Irish version.

The song may have been introduced to the 7^th Cavalry by Captain Miles Keough when the regiment was formed in 1867 (more later on Keough as well.) As I will note in my next post, the U.S. military included a number of Irish immigrants in the 1850’s and later, with many of them belonging to the 7^th Cavalry. Little wonder the song became their anthem.

Like “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” Garryowen lends itself to the spirit of a unit of soldiers starting out on a campaign. The lyrics, however, not so much. Rather than write them out here I’ll include a link to a rendition or two:

The first rendition, of course, is distinctly Irish. Again, it is fitting as we approach St. Patrick’s Day.

In researching Garryowen’s background I came across a well written post by a Northern Cheyenne member on the site Buffalo’s Fire. She stated the song can be offensive to today’s descendants of tribes who were attacked by Custer, the 7^th Cavalry and other U.S. military units.

It is stated in multiple sources that Garryowen was indeed played by the 7^th Cavalry’s regimental band, for example, as Custer attacked Black Kettle’s village of Southern Cheyenne on the Washita River in 1868. Not all members of that village were exactly faultless, either at the time of the attack or in the months prior. However, the attack has long been viewed in a negative light by most Americans, both at that time and for more than a century-and-a-half that have followed. It is easy to see why the tune would be offensive to the descendants of those tribes.

The writer notes that in 1968, on the 100^th anniversary of Custer’s Washita attack, 7^th Cavalry commander Eric Gault promised the song would never again be played against the Cheyenne. While the song continues in popularity, as best I can determine that promise has been kept.

Regardless of any negative attachments it might have, Garry Owen continues to be popular in other contexts.  Most can easily see the spirited tune’s appeal.

See also, Buffalo’s Fire and Irish Central websites for related articles.

https://www.buffalosfire.com/garryowen-retired

https://www.irishcentral.com/roots/history/ireland-song-garryowen-banned-custer

The post Songs of the Seventh: Garryowen appeared first on Bighorn, Big Hole and Beyond.